Abstract
This paper aims to solve the time-constrained problems of knowledge sharing caused by geographical distance and cultural differences in cross-border business models by proposing a novel knowledge sharing model based on principal–agent theory. Given that digital technologies (DTs) can solve the information asymmetry issue, this paper analyses and compares the contract parameters given by the principal, the efforts of the agent, and the changes in the expected profits of both parties before and after the application of DTs and therefore discusses the influence of various relevant factors in incentive contracts; the relationship between the expected profit of both parties and the various relevant factors is analyzed through numerical simulations. The results show that, in cross-border business models considering the time value of knowledge, the principal is affected not only by “information rent” and “channel loss” but also by the “time cost”. The application of DTs can effectively reduce all three of these costs. More importantly, the principal’s incentive coefficient and the agent’s effort are related to this time constraint and the application of DTs.
Highlights
This paper explores the impact of considering the time attribute of knowledge and the application of digital technologies (DTs) on the principal–agent relationship
The superscript f b indicates a scenario without time constraints under information symmetry, the superscript sb indicates a scenario without time constraints under information asymmetry, the superscript tb indicates a scenario with time constraints considering the agent, the superscript lb indicates a scenario with time constraints considering the principal, and the superscript bc indicates the scenario after applying DTs
By modeling the principal–agent model when the agent and principal have time constraints, we analyze the effects on the contract parameters, effort, and expected profit obtained by the principal and agent
Summary
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. According to a literature search, many scholars have studied the incentive mechanism of KS in the supply chain by establishing a principal–agent relationship, they are merely studies considering a CBBM scenario, which includes the current trends and the knowledge time attribute. For the latter, it means the value of knowledge will change sharply with the passage of time [36,37,38].
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