The Impoundment Control Act of 1974: Restraining or Reviving Presidential Power?

Abstract

The power to impound allows the president to cancel or postpone the spending of appropriated funds. Over the years Congress has struggled with the challenge of maintaining some control over impoundment actions while still allowing sufficient discretion for the president during budget implementation. This article examines the events leading up to the passage of the Impoundment Control Act as Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, and the framework established by the law. It provides some analysis of data on rescissions and deferrals in the period from 1975–1995 and reviews efforts to grant the president expanded impoundment authority, culminating in the passage of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. On April 10, 1997, the new law was found unconstitutional by a district court, but on June 26 the Supreme Court set aside that earlier decision on jurisdictional grounds, ruling that the plaintiffs (six members of Congress) lacked proper legal standing to bring the case (Raines v. Byrd, 96–1671). However, the Supreme Court decision was confined to this technical issue and did not address the underlying constitutional questions. Whatever the further legal developments relating to the Line Item Veto Act, the article suggests that the issue of restraining or reviving presidential impoundment power will remain unsettled.