The importance of the legislative system in respecting the law and rights

The paper is devoted to the analysis of the development of the system and structure of the Russian legislation in the space-time continuum. The author demonstrates the defining role of economic, and more widely—social—factors, ultimately determining the vector for the development of law. The paper questions the idea of the supposed self-sufficiency of law that develops in compliance with its own rules. In recent years this approach has dominated the domestic legal science. In the Western doctrine, this approach has existed for quite a long time. Such a methodological platform fits into the general context of postmodern, where objective reality is replaced by preconceptions about it. In this regard, the need to prove any approach disappears because all opinions are declared to be equal. The author substantiates the statement concerning the necessity of studying law in the context of causal relations between legal and social factors. The analysis made by the author attempts to justify the fact that the economic reform carried out in Russia by means of privatization and shares-forloans auctions was not aimed at economic growth. The objective of the reform was to redistribute property, which became the basis of first oligarchic and, later, bureaucratic Russian capitalism, equally unpromising in the present and foreseeable future. To meet this objective, i.e. to redistribute property, a system of legislation was formed under immediate control of Western, mainly American, analytic centers. That policy resulted in creating the economy based on raw materials and off-shores. It is noted that the pandemic has seriously affected the system of values and benchmarks of social development. Therefore, the issue of a shift in the paradigm of social development will inevitably arise. The economic, political, social and legal doctrines of the past that were perceived largely uncritically, will lose their strength and will never be the intellectual basis of evolution. The author anticipates the orientation of nations at maximizing the demand of the domestic markets. Russia’s integration into the world economic system, the idea of which used to dominate in Russia, proved completely untenable, as did the myths of globalization in general. In this regard, the transformation of the system and structure of the Russian legislation is inevitable. The development of Russia’s legal system should be aimed at solving internal problems, which, of course, does not mean isolation of the country.

У статті розглядається проблема визначення та співвідношення таких понять, як «система законодавства» («законодавство») та «система нормативно-правових актів». Зазначається, що з огляду на таку ознаку зазначених понять, як збірність, перспективним напрямом подальших наукових пошуків для уточнення змісту цих понять є вивчення їх складників, а саме понять закону та нормативно-правового акта.

The purpose of the research. The article discusses the problems of forming horizontal and vertical ties in Russian legislation system. The process of transformation of the Russian legal system in the context of the development of digital technologies, the ongoing changes in the modern mechanism of legal regulation are analyzed. The purpose of the research is to establish and identify the features of existing horizontal and vertical relationships that exist and arise between normative acts included in the system of legislation. This is necessary to determine the main directions for the development of the Russian legal system in the context of digital technologies. Results. As a result of the research, the author comes to the conclusion that vertical and horizontal connections can be distinguished in the system of Russian legislation. The subject of legal regulation and the system of public administration are singled out as grounds. In the context of the development of digital technologies, it is advisable to supplement these criteria with a more subjective approach and the legal regime used in the field of legislation. The author comes to the conclusion that vertical and horizontal links between normative acts are formed at the level of the legal system, while the legal system is characterized by the presence of only horizontal links. The legal system is much larger than the legislative system. The legislative system includes not only normative legal acts, but also various technical rules and regulations. In the system of legislation, it is possible to distinguish separate complex entities that regulate a certain sphere of public relations. Having a man-made nature, the legislative system can respond more quickly to changes in public life. The author concludes that it is necessary to use a more differentiated approach in determining the branches of the legislative system. Here, too, the subject approach can be used as a solution.

Social and economic development is a difficult process in which positive and negative factors interact that causes rises and recessions in development of territories and public communities. Indicators of rating act as indicators of efficiency of management decisions at the central and local levels. However, the level of economic development doesn’t coincide with social development in most of regions of Ukraine.
 The purpose of article is adaptation of a matrix method to rating estimates of social and economic development of regions for identification of regional distinctions, definition of priorities and strategic management of development of regions.
 The economic development of the regions was estimated by GRP per capita, the average salary of employees and the unemployment rate (according to the ILO methodology). Social development is characterized by the number of people enrolled in higher education institutions per 10,000 population; coefficient of incidence of the population; volumes of emissions of pollutants in atmospheric air, thousand tons; crime rates.
 The multidimensional average method with the standardization of indicators based on the variation range was used to calculate the integral indicators of economic and social development. On the basis of integral coefficients, the ranking of regions according to economic and social development was executed. It is established that for the regions of Ukraine there is a characteristic imbalance between economic and social development, which is connected, first of all, with different structure of the economy and territorial differences of regions.
 The combination of results of economic and social development of regions was proposed with the help of building a matrix as a tool for strategic management. In the graphs (vertically), the level of economic development is singled out, in lines (horizontally) the level of social development of the regions is singled out, with the identification of three groups: low, medium and high levels.
 Regions with low economic and low social level get to 1 square; in 2 – with low economic and average social; in 3 – with low economic and high social; in 4 – with average economic and low social; in 5 – with average economic and average social; in 6 – with average economic and high social; in 7 – with high economic and low social; in 8 – with high economic and average social; in 9 – with high economic and high social level.
 Calculations show that in Ukraine no region was detected with simultaneous high levels of economic and social development (the 9th square). The vast majority are regions with average economic and average social development and also regions “below or above an average” level of development, that is one of the directions (economic or social) is “low”, and the second, accordingly, “average”. The position of the region in a matrix specifies what development strategy should be chosen. The economic and social development is higher; the capacity of the region for increase in the standard of living of the population is higher. High economic and social development is followed by the high potential of the region to increase the standard of living of the population.

Development: Social

Relegated to the back bench, the Seventies are often considered as no more than a bridge between the more momentous decades of the Sixties and Eighties. However, delving into this historical period, this book asks; how significant were the Seventies in terms of political, economic and cultural developments? And, to what extent did this decade change the course of the second half of the twentieth century? Seeking to uncover the extraordinary transformative capacity of this era, this book reveals how important events from this decade marked history for many years to come. Grounded in a ‘history of developments,’ this book investigates connections of causality or concomitant causality with events that were yet to come. The first part of this volume traces the economic, political and cultural trends that prevailed during this decade, before turning its attention to the legacies of the Seventies and the events that changed the course of history and that are still having repercussions to this day. From the oil crisis to microwaves, this book offers an in-depth and complete look at the Seventies that will not only be of interest to historians and economists, but also sociologists and those intrigued by the evolution of political, economic and cultural developments.

The field of law and development examines the role of law, legal institutions, and legal systems in economic, social, and political development. As a comparatively recent field emerging in the 1960s, law has become an increasingly important aspect of the issues and debates surrounding international development, particularly since the 1990s. Debate continues over the meaning of “development” and what constitutes international development law, as well as over theoretical approaches: the character, role, and impact of legal institutions and development actors; the structures and processes of development; and the principles and norms that are already or arguably ought to be in the system. International development law generates a range of practical challenges, including implementation and enforcement of a right to development; the role of state, and the role of an increasingly globalized civil society; the rule of law; environmental sustainability; land reform; poverty and aid; issues of gender in law and development; law-building in post-conflict situations; transparency and accountability for donors and recipients; and the relationship between human rights, social justice, and rule of law. The centrality of sustainable development, the complexities of globalization, the private sector, civil society, new technologies, and the rise of emerging powers—some as new “nontraditional” donors—further add to the necessity and importance of understanding law and the sustainability of development. Together, these factors of change and transformation provoke new thinking and debate within this field on the role of the state in development and how the international legal rules of the game should operate. From the perspectives of developing countries, primary issues of concern relate to development cooperation and pro-poor, inclusive growth; improved access to trade for small enterprises; development effectiveness; South-South dialogue; climate change; and low-carbon development. Environmental protection and sustainable development represent significant challenges for international law-making, while also offering innovative solutions to some of the systemic problems of the international legal order. One central thrust of contemporary analysis and practice in law and development is the search for better understanding of the relationships between social and cultural factors and international development law in promoting more multidisciplinary approaches. Another central theme is the role of the state in development. The state is not simply a formal legal institution, but has both internal structures of legal competence and external, international legal commitments. There is a pattern of litigation history between the compatibility of the two, with implications for development law. Extensive debate continues over what constitutes development, why and how developing countries should pursue it, and what the eventual goal ought to be. This debate is necessary in retaining the vitality and practical relevancy of law. Development constitutes a form of social and societal change, and the relevancy of law depends on its responsiveness to such change; as such, the role of law in development should be of significant, if not dominant, importance.

Azerbaijan, which gained its independence after 1990, competed with each other for the exploitation of natural gas and oil and many projects were signed.Turkey has been involved in this project as a strategic partner. In this sense, the two countries have common history and values that Azerbaijan-Turkey political, economic, socio-cultural relations began to develop rapidly. In this study between Azerbaijan and Turkey in economic, political, cultural and artistic relations were examined. In the study, it is aimed to deal with the economic, political, social and cultural developments between the years 1990-2020. During the Soviet Union period from 1970 to 1990, a brief discussion of political, cultural and artistic data was given and the economic, political, cultural and artistic knowledge that developed after Azerbaijan gained its independence after 1990 was examined. In the research, political, historical, economic and cultural events were researched and the findings were analyzed. In the study the development of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey were evaluated. In the study between Azerbaijan and Turkey in line with the development of cultural relations basic economic and political factors are examined. In the research between Azerbaijan and Turkey in economic, political and diplomatic relations have been placed under the same title. in the other part of the study established between Turkey and Azerbaijan socio-cultural, artistic relationships are the subject of research. At the same time, by referring to the agreements signed after the independence, the relations between the two countries with the effect of economic, political, cultural and social developments on the new level were discussed and inferences were made in this direction. Keywords: Azerbaijan, Turkey, culture, art, politics, economics

Winning medals at the Olympic Games has become an objective that countries worldwide want to achieve. In line with research devoted to the predictors of success, the present article examines the connection between certain welfare characteristics (political, social, and economic development) and the probability of success in the 1984 and 2004 Olympics. We expected to find that structural macro conditions still predict Olympic success. Using welfare indicators as formative instead of reflective indicators (Bollen, Qual Quant 183: 77–85, 1984, p. 65), the results of our Structural Equation Model reveal that both economic and social development had an effect in 1984, as well as in 2004. Political development was only significant in 1984. As for the control variables, population size was significant in both 1984 and 2004. Sporting tradition and geographical conditions had no effect at all. The model fit is very good with a chi-square of 6.62 with 5 degrees of freedom (p = 0.25).

Problem setting. Recently in our country the tendency to introduction of innovative activity in domestic economy has become widespread. This focus is provided by many means. Among them, not the least role belongs to the reliability and effectiveness of legislation. Therefore, both the state strategy and the relevant branch of legislation have already begun to be drafted in order to standardize and speed up the whole process. Analysis of resent researches and publications. This article is a partial continuation of the series of works on the place of business law in the strategy of ensuring innovation in Ukraine and areas for improving innovation legislation. In general, the question of the effectiveness of innovation legislation in Ukraine has been raised by various scientists, for example, Yu. E. Atamanova, O. M. Vinnyk, S. V. Glibko, D. V. Zadykhailo, V. S. Shcherbyna and others. However, methodological principles were given more importance in broad areas, such as N. S. Kuznetsova in civil law, and in the context chosen in the article, little attention was paid. Target of research. The aim of the article is to study the methodological principles of the effectiveness of innovation legislation. Article’s main body. Legislative efficiency methods need to be given the same weight as existing methods for determining the economic efficiency of capital investments, new equipment and automated management systems. In this case, it is necessary to constantly keep in mind both past experience and care for the acquisition of new knowledge. The analysis of the actual effectiveness of the legislation can be carried out in three directions. First, the object of study may be the effectiveness of the internal structure of the system of economic legislation. Obviously, this efficiency can reflect the degree of compliance of the existing structure with the goals of the whole system. Secondly, there is a need to study the effectiveness of the legal system. It is solved by establishing the degree of achievement of the goals of the legal system during its implementation in real conditions. Third, it is necessary to determine the effectiveness of sets of rules of a particular system of legislation (its subsystems or individual rules (elements of the system). This implies that in general the system may have inefficient subsystems and elements, and vice versa – efficient subsystems and elements may be part of an inefficient system. Conclusions and prospects for the development. In the context of studying the problems of the effectiveness of legislation, various new opportunities can be used, which appear in foreign countries and already bring some benefits there. A good example is the Better Regulation Delivery Office (BRDO), an independent non-governmental think tank established at the initiative of the Department of Economic Development and Trade and Western partners: the World Bank and the Government of Canada. The main thing is that BRDO is working to simplify the business environment and effective government regulation. In the near future we can expect a successful solution to the problems of efficiency of innovation and through the introduction of digital technologies.

زینب فاطمی امین مجید فولادیان مسئله مورد تبیین در این مقاله وجود رابطه علی دو جانبه میان بازدهی آموزشی هر کشور با میزان توسعه یافتگی آنها می‌باشد؛ بدین معنی که آموزش و پرورش در هر جامعه‌ای در عین حال که متأثر از سطوح مختلف توسعه موجود در آن است، خود نیز به عنوان متغیر مستقل در تحولات اقتصادی، اجتماعی و سیاسی جامعه تأثیر می‌گذارد. لذا سؤال اصلی مطالعه حاضر عبارت است از اینکه؛آیا توسعه یافتگی با بازدهی نظام آموزشی رابطه معنادار متقابل دارد؟ در مقاله حاضر از روش تطبیقی‌کمی یا تحلیل بین‌کشوری استفاده گردیده است؛که در آن از داده‌های ثانویه 70 کشور جهان، در بین سال‌های 2004-1999، بهره‌گرفته شده است. آزمون نیکویی برازش مدل‌های الگوی معادلات ساختاری حاکی از برازش خوب مدل عنوان شده با داده‌های مشاهده‌شده در 70 کشور جهان است و نشان می دهد توسعه یافتگی جامعه بر بازدهی آموزشی تأثیر دارد و از سوی دیگر بازدهی آموزشی نیز تأثیر معناداری بر سطوح مختلف توسعه دارد. نتایج رگرسیونی نیز نشان می‌دهند توسعه اقتصادی با 27/0، توسعه سیاسی با 14/0 و توسعه اجتماعی با 29/0 سهمی را در تبیین متغیر وابسته (بازدهی نظام آموزشی) داشته‌اند.

Introduction: The problem of the existence and application by courts of document «Rules for the Organization of Effective Civil Proceedings in the Kyiv Court of Appeal» (2023) as a source of civil procedural law of Ukraine is considered. This problem is due to the fact that the specified Rules are not included in the system of legislation on civil justice, their legal force and the order of «implementation» in the work of the Kyiv Court of Appeal remains in question, as well as the rules of conduct defined in them in the aspect of introducing new mechanisms for ensuring effective civil proceedings in Ukraine. In addition, no legislative acts authorize courts and other subjects to adopt and implement such Rules in the courts of individual regions, and courts to apply such Rules in parallel with acts of civil procedural legislation, because even in the conditions of the legal regime of martial law, courts, bodies and institutions of the justice system act exclusively on the basis, within the limits of authority and in the manner determined by the Constitution of Ukraine and by the laws of Ukraine. The purpose of the article: The purpose of the article is a scientific and practical analysis of the document «Rules for the Organization of Effective Civil Proceedings in the Kyiv Court of Appeal» (2023), primarily from the point of view of compliance with the declared objective of their content in the aspect of introducing new mechanisms for ensuring effective civil proceedings. Results: The results of the study are based on a systematic analysis of the provisions of the Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine, the theoretical foundations of the civil procedure and the text of the mentioned Rules. The legal force and possible place of the specified Rules in the system of sources of civil procedural law, as well as the «objectives» of these Rules, are determined. The description of certain provisions of the Rules, which contradict the norms of the Civil Code of Ukraine or duplicate them, is given. It was established that the specified Rules cannot be attributed to any of the types of sources of civil procedural law; they are not included in the system of legislation on civil justice. These Rules should be considered only as recommendations (non-observance of which is not a «violation of the rules of procedural law», that is, it is not a basis for challenging court judgments or applying any negative consequences to the participants in the case) with non-binding rules of conduct for the court and the participants in the case, which legally cannot ensure that the court fulfills the objectives of civil proceedings. The content of these Rules indicates that «effective civil proceedings» must be ensured by the participants in the case, actually exempting the court from responsibility for «ineffective» civil proceedings. The role of the court (judge) in ensuring effective justice is not clearly defined. Areas of ensuring the effectiveness of civil proceedings are not structured. According to the results of a systematic analysis of the content of the specified Rules, attention is drawn to the fact that not only the legal force, but also the practical value of the developed Rules causes many comments, since the Rules do not contain any new tools or new recommendations for the interpretation of the relevant procedural norms (different from the existing conclusions of the Supreme Court), which could really ensure effective civil proceedings or increase the effectiveness of the latter in comparison with the procedural regulation existing today. Conclusions: Given the existence of such Rules (recommendations), they should not be about detailing procedural issues already regulated in the Civil Code of Ukraine, but about unified approaches to solving «procedural issues» precisely through the introduction of a unified interpretation and unified approach in the legal assessment of possible procedural situations. Such objective could be accomplished by issue a structured by relevant procedural issues (chapters) «collection» of relevant conclusions of the Supreme Court and of the decisions of Council of Judges of Ukraine, which would allow judges to directly apply the relevant conclusions of the Supreme Court and decisions of the Council of Judges of Ukraine, rather than being guided by Rules that are not included in the system of legislation on civil proceedings. Key words: civil proceedings, rules, effectiveness, trial, efficiency, timeliness, procedural form, procedural issues, standards, court, participants in the case.

Reviewed by: Social and Political Development in Post-Reform China Stephen K. Ma (bio) Ka-ho Mok . Social and Political Development in Post-Reform China. Foreword by Andrew Nathan. Preface by Paul Wilding. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. x, 232 pp. Hardcover $65.00, ISBN 0-312-22488-5. In this impressive piece of scholarship Ka-ho Mok (City University of Hong Kong) offers insightful evaluations of economic development in post-reform China. The author has certainly benefited from his earlier monograph Intellectuals and the State in Post-Mao China, which probes the ideas of Chinese intellectuals and their relationship with the pro-democracy movements and with the state in post-Mao China. But what makes this book another desirable addition to the literature on this period is its author's original information based on a wide range of recent empirical studies in a variety of locations in China and his integration of quantitative data with qualitative analysis, which adds depth, scope, and perspective to our understanding of the recent changes in the world's most populous nation over the past two decades. Mok traces China's rapid economic growth and the rise of a socialist market economy, focusing on two major changes: institutional transition and structural transformation. The former refers to "a transition from a highly centralized economic planning system to the market economy" and the latter to "social change from an agricultural, rural and closed society to an industrial, urbanized, market-driven and open society" (p. 5). Mok argues that the economic reforms triggered not only structural changes in Chinese society but also a shift in people's value orientations (p. 6) that will have far-reaching significance for the nation's sociopolitical development. The book comprises three parts with eight chapters. The introduction reviews China's recent and dramatic economic and social changes. Chapters 2 and 3 examine how the economic reforms improved people's livelihoods but at the [End Page 183] same time prompted a variety of social problems. Mok believes that "[a]ll these social problems seem to be the inevitable consequences of a 'rush-to' modernization" (p. 10). Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to changes in the social structure caused by the economic reforms and the resultant social re-stratification. As Mok observes, the flourishing of the socialist market has marginalized state workers on the one hand and created ample room for the rise of intellectuals in China on the other. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 discuss how the Chinese people have become more critical of the existing regime and the socialist praxis. Mok concludes that "'social development' and 'sustainable development' depend on much more than rapid economic growth" and that "too rapid economic modernization might lead to the threat of a 'risk society' . . . , followed by socio-political implications for future development in China" (p. 12). Mok seems to be on less sure ground when dealing with the issue of prosperity versus democracy. Whether "the goals of the flourishing of the market economy and the deepening of democratic political institutions are not necessarily conflicting" (p. 175), especially in a developing country, remains to be seen. Hong Kong can hardly be a convincing example to use for this purpose. Alvin So, for instance, suggests that Hong Kong was nondemocratic in the 1970s, became a restricted democracy in the 1980s, and evolved into a contested democracy in the 1990s (Alvin Y. So, Hong Kong's Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis [Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999]). More than three years have elapsed since China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong. Development in the Special Administrative Region does not as yet offer much in terms of promoting both prosperity and democracy. It strains credulity to believe that "Hong Kong's experience on democratization may have a 'demonstration effect' to the people living in the mainland," since the "demonstration effect" of recent events in the SAR seems to point in a different direction. Criticisms aside, Mok's approach captures the complexity and contradictions of the many issues faced by the post-Mao China leadership and enables the reader to reach a more nuanced, yet knowledgeable judgment. With such a wealth of facts and data to be digested...

In the spring of 1959, with the approval of the General Assembly and the signature of Governor Abraham Ribicoff, Connecticut officially proclaimed itself the “Constitution State.” The nickname, later emblazoned on license plates from Greenwich to the Quiet Corner, represented a claim on the state's place in constitutional history. Connecticut, the birthplace of what sympathetic historians and proud state residents claim was the Western Hemisphere's first written constitution, congratulated itself for helping develop a system of government that changed the world.1Only six years later, the federal courts found Connecticut's constitution guilty of “invidious discrimination” against the state's residents and forced the “Constitution State” to completely rework its approach to political representation at a mandated and long overdue constitutional convention.2 Generations of failed attempts at reform had left Connecticut's legislature under minority rule, with the state's many small towns using their guarantee of equal representation in the state's General Assembly to overwhelm the political and legislative power of much bigger cities and towns. Despite its proud history, Connecticut was an example of constitutional failure and political inequality.3 How did Connecticut's constitution become so outdated and its system of representation so unequal, and what does this history reveal about the potential fallibility of constitutional government?From the Connecticut constitution's first iteration in 1639 to its repudiation by the federal judiciary in 1965, entrenched power, unforeseen societal change, and partisan incentives caused the state's founding document to become increasingly discriminatory against the state's population centers. Over centuries, Connecticut's struggle to reform its inequitable system of representation demonstrated how politics and partisanship can keep even the most outdated constitutional provisions firmly in place.Extensive literature has shown that state constitutions are more readily reformed than the United States Constitution. According to the legal historian Lawrence Friedman, state constitutions “have tended, on the whole, to be less durable,” receiving thousands of amendments throughout their history, compared to just twenty-seven for the United States Constitution.4 As Michael Besso wrote in a 2005 article published in The Journal of Politics, “the procedural burden for amendment of the federal constitution is significantly greater than the comparative burdens in states,” making state constitutions easier to change.5Despite this greater level of flexibility, the high bar for revising even state constitutions, combined with the forces of entrenched political power, has at times protected outdated and unequal political structures. As Friedman wrote in his classic text A History of American Law, “old rules of law and old legal institutions stay alive when they still have a purpose.”6 In the case of Connecticut's town-based system of representation, the old rules of law served a purpose for the dominant political faction, which then used its disproportionate power and the rigidity of the constitutional system to maintain discriminatory and archaic institutions and oppress rival constituencies. The story of Connecticut's constitution over three centuries demonstrates the problematic durability of written constitutions. Although written constitutions are fundamental to most modern systems of government, their inflexibility can also block crucial change, lock in enduring inequality, and cause potentially dangerous political strife.In the spring of 1638, the leading men of three Connecticut towns—Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield—sowed the seeds of future discord when they drafted one of the Western Hemisphere's first written constitutions. In this document, referred to as “The Fundamental Orders,” Connecticut's founders made a crucial and fateful choice: they established equal town representation in the colony's new legislature. “It is Ordered, sentenced, and decreed,” the Fundamental Orders declared, “that Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield shall have power, each Town, to send four of their Freemen as their deputies to every General Court.”7 With this decision to establish equal representation for municipalities rather than people, the founders of Connecticut unwittingly laid the foundation for their state's three century-long crisis of political inequality.The Connecticut Charter of 1662 further formalized this practice of equal town representation. In 1660, after Charles II assumed the throne in England, the new king negotiated with the Connecticut Colony to produce a charter that would cement the status of its government under the monarchy. The charter, which the king signed in 1662, continued the government set up by the Fundamental Orders, but with the royal stamp of approval.8 Much like the Fundamental Orders of 1639, this document provided for a legislature of “assistants” “not exceeding Two Persons from each Place, Town, or City.”9 By outlining this system in the state's supreme legal document, Connecticut's colonial political leaders embedded the principle of equal town representation in the heart of their government.The decision to grant each town equal representation in the chartered legislature was not a political choice or an ideological stand. Connecticut's founders likely derived this decision from the structure of the March Commission, which governed Connecticut from 1636 to 1637 while Connecticut negotiated its relationship with the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The March Commission consisted of eight local magistrates: two each from Windsor, Hartford, Wethersfield, and the northern town of Springfield, which later left the Connecticut colony.10 Giving each town the same number of representatives caused no grave injustice, because each of Connecticut's original towns had similarly small populations. Finally, the decision to limit representation at two per town probably reflected the repeated requests of town leaders to reduce the number of representatives in order to save money.11Equal town representation, while uncontroversial in the 1600s, contradicted a principle expressed elsewhere in the state's founding documents: People, not towns, were the fundamental unit of politics in Connecticut. “We the Inhabitants and Residents of Windsor, Hartford and Wethersfield,” the Fundamental Orders proclaimed, “do therefore associate and conjoin ourselves to be as one Public State or Commonwealth.”12 Reverend Thomas Hooker, a leading figure in Connecticut's founding, similarly emphasized the centrality of “the people” to the colony's new government. In a famous 1638 sermon before Connecticut's inaugural General Court, Hooker declared, “The foundation of authority is laid, firstly, in the free consent of the people. . . . The choice of public magistrates belongs unto the people, by God's own allowance.”13 While Hooker's address and the text of the Fundamental Orders indicated that Connecticut's government should be based on the principle of political equality between people, the equal town representation system instead granted political equality to towns. This misalignment of law and values would become a key point of contention during later debates about the apportionment rules for the Connecticut General Assembly.The process by which the people of Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield created the state of Connecticut differed from the way in which Connecticut's older sibling to the north, Massachusetts, had been established years earlier. Whereas the inhabitants of Connecticut's first three towns came together to “conjoin” themselves “as one Public State,” the Commonwealth of Massachusetts instead grew out of the Massachusetts Bay Company, and the towns of Massachusetts were each created in turn by this higher, original body.14 The precedent and proximity of Massachusetts, with its corporate town-state relationship, may have contributed to the persistent myth that Connecticut evolved from its towns, three of which had preceded the state, rather than the people, who the Fundamental Orders cited as Connecticut's true creators.In addition to establishing the people as Connecticut's basic political unit, the Fundamental Orders explicitly suggested that population should be considered when determining the representation given to new towns in the future. The Fundamental Orders stated, “Whatsoever other Town shall be hereafter added to this Jurisdiction, they shall send so many deputies as the Court shall judge meet a reasonable proportion to the number of Freemen that are in the said Towns being to be attended therein.”15 This gesture towards proportional representation never amounted to anything in the decades after the signing of the Fundamental Orders, because the similar populations of Connecticut's first collection of towns made it mostly irrelevant. The language requiring that representation be based on population then disappeared when the Charter of 1662 guaranteed two representatives to each town.Through the American Revolution and beyond, each new town in Connecticut was treated as if it were a new shareholder with equal voting rights on a corporate board. Despite the fact that equal town representation actually contradicted Connecticut's original theory of itself as a state created by its people, the practice continued even as the colony became a state. The system's longevity owed in large part to Connecticut's early leaders’ decision to include equal town representation, without much thought to its long-term consequences, in the state's founding documents. Thus, constitutional inertia exerted its power on Connecticut.Even as dozens of new towns incorporated and earned representation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Connecticut was one of only two states (the other being Rhode Island) that did not write and ratify a constitution during the revolutionary era. Instead, Connecticut allowed its constitutional charter—and its system of equal town representation—to persist into the nineteenth century.16 In the 1780s, Connecticut modified its town representation system slightly, establishing that towns created after the revolution would receive one representative as opposed to two. Notes from General Assembly business in 1786 and a letter published in the Connecticut Courant and Weekly Intelligencer in 1787 show that this decision was mostly about saving money and preventing the House of Representatives from becoming “a cumbersome over-grown body.” (At least one legislator, however, argued that the entire system of equal town representation needed reform because “the present mode of representation is very unequal.”)17 During this period, Connecticut's larger cities and towns were somewhat disadvantaged by the equal town representation system, though they still managed to exert significant influence over state politics through their power on the Council, the archaic second chamber of the Connecticut legislature which was a bulwark of Congregationalism, federalism, and “aristocratic” urban power in the state.18 The power-balancing effect of the Council, Connecticut's fairly equal population distribution, and simple political inertia allowed the state's process of legislative apportionment to continue into the early nineteenth century in much the same way as had been outlined in Connecticut's founding documents.19In 1817 and 1818, a coalition of Tolerationists and Republicans swept the long-governing Federalists out of office, and Connecticut's new General Assembly quickly called for a constitutional convention. The coalition sought to disestablish the Congregational church, expand the franchise, and create an independent judiciary. The Tolerationists and Democratic-Republicans’ electoral victory brought Connecticut its first significant opportunity for constitutional reform. Yet the delegate selection process for the constitutional convention demonstrated the self-perpetuating nature of political power: every town sent the same number of delegates to the convention as they had representatives. Thus, each town founded before 1780 sent two delegates, while the newer towns sent one each.20 Any controversy over this decision is not apparent in the historical record, possibly due to tradition and the fact that the towns were of reasonably similar sizes.Though the Constitutional Convention of 1818 focused primarily on debates over religious toleration, a few delegates called attention to the issue of equal representation. When the convention's agenda turned to Article III, Section III of the constitution, which outlined the structure of the legislature, several delegates moved to amend the system of equal town representation so that larger towns would get more seats in the General Assembly. According to an account of the convention by the Connecticut Courant, Robert Fairchild of Stratford proposed that “each town containing 2,500 persons or more, shall be entitled to two Representatives, and every town, containing a lesser number, shall be entitled to one Representative only, the population to be ascertained by the census next preceding any election.”21 James Stevens, a Tolerationist from Stamford, immediately moved to change the threshold to 4,000. With little recorded debate, however, both proposals were brought to a vote and rejected.22The somewhat equal geographic distribution of Connecticut's population during this era weakened the arguments of reformers seeking to change Connecticut's system of representation. Melbert Brinckerhoff Cary, a Democratic politician who wrote a historical account of the Connecticut constitution that was published in 1900, explained that in 1818, “Connecticut was made up entirely of country towns and the difference in population was comparatively unimportant.”23 At the time of the 1820 census, 102 of the 122 towns had between one and four thousand people, and no town had more than 8,327 people or fewer than 731. Though the population of Connecticut in 1818 was more unequally distributed than it was in 1639 or 1662, at the time of the 1818 Constitutional Convention, equal town representation did not yet severely disadvantage urban residents relative to their more rural neighbors.Following the defeat of Fairchild and Stevens’ proposals to enhance the power of larger towns, the 1818 Convention delegates continued to discuss the issue of representation, revealing a philosophical rift between advocates of equal representation and supporters of proportional representation. James Lanman, a Democratic-Republican from Norwich, spoke first. Lanman “declared himself opposed to doing any thing at all” to change the system of representation. He argued that “the people had not sent” the delegates to the convention; “the towns had sent them.” “Representation right was secured to the Towns,” Lanman claimed. Lanman, citing a belief that towns had corporate rights under state government, questioned his colleagues: “Would gentlemen destroy corporate rights?”24 “As the law now stands,” Lanman argued, “the right of franchise, was predicated on property,” a system “agreeable to the personal rights of the people, and the interest of the inhabitants.” Lanman believed that towns and property, not people, should be the basic political units in Connecticut. Additionally, he argued that the convention did not have the power to change the system of apportionment because the towns were entitled to equal representation. “It was vested in them from the beginning, and the Convention could not touch it—the spirit of the time would not admit of its being touched,” he declared.25Former Governor John Treadwell, a Federalist from Farmington, believed, by contrast, that Connecticut should operate under a system of representation based on population. Treadwell “doubted very much the correctness of [Lanman's] opinion.” He argued that the delegates “were representatives of the freemen, and not of the towns; and justice required the representation to be regulated by the census.” Treadwell believed that “the most populous towns should be entitled to the greatest number of Representatives.” While Treadwell acknowledged that complete equality in representation “was impossible,” because the number of people and legislative districts did not divide perfectly, he nonetheless argued that Connecticut should “fix on a proportion” so that the people could “have a full representation.”26General Nathaniel Terry, a leading Hartford Federalist, went further than Treadwell, arguing in favor of a theory of representation that would generations later be known as “one person, one vote.” While Terry admitted that his speech “might be unavailing” to the small-town delegations opposed to reform, he felt obligated “to advocate correct principles.” “The theory of this government is a democracy,” Terry declared. “A representative democracy,” in fact, which “is a form of government derived from the people.” Terry asked his fellow delegates to consider the first democracies, in which every citizen convened to make decisions: “If the people meet as originally, to transact their business, would there not be an equality of their votes? Would not each vote count, and the vote of one individual be equal to that of another? If so, ought we not then, to follow the same rule?” Terry warned of a future Connecticut when population imbalances between towns might lead to extreme inequalities of representation: The time will come, when certain towns in the state will have fifteen thousand inhabitants, and shall no provision be made for such a state of things? We are sanctioning the very principle, which was the cause of the unequal representation in England—if you sanction this principle, you break down the land marks of democracy, and you destroy the foundations of democratic government.27Terry believed the 1818 convention presented an opportunity to save Connecticut from the “evil” of continuing political inequality, and he urged his fellow delegates to consider the fundamental democratic principles of Connecticut's government during this window for change.28Despite Terry's forceful case for population-based representation, political opposition from the smaller towns thwarted reform, and the “land of steady habits” kept its 180-year-old system of legislative apportionment. Article III of the Connecticut Constitution of 1818 stated, “The number of Representatives from each town shall be the same as at present practiced and allowed. In case a new town shall hereafter be incorporated, such new town shall be entitled to one Representative only.”29 Ultimately, too many delegates, especially those from rural areas, agreed with Lanman's belief that equal representation “was vested in [the towns] from the beginning, and the Convention could not touch it.” U.S. Congressman Timothy Pitkin, a Federalist from Farmington, exemplified the common sentiment that it would be “inexpedient” to change the system of representation. “The representation of Connecticut has always been by towns, and I would keep it so,” said Pitkin.30 The small-town delegates agreed that reform would be an objectionable overruling of tradition and far too disruptive, not to mention detrimental to their political interests, and their disproportionate majority prevailed.Connecticut's legislative apportionment system became increasingly imbalanced after 1818, as societal changes began to concentrate more and more residents in urban areas. The growth of industry and urban commerce in the state, spurred on by the passage of Connecticut's Joint Stock Act in 1837, caused “economic changes of great importance,” according to a historical account in the New York Times. As “a of the people came according to the Times. “The from the to the cities and for the population of Connecticut's centers. As the cities small towns while to no population changes the more population distribution of Connecticut's In of the state's population in in to expand the during this the of the in and the of after the also the number of in Connecticut's the in representation between and small population had become a with a population of had the same representation of two as New which had a population of Hartford, a with a population of the same legislative power in the state House of Representatives as a town in Connecticut with a population of just As Connecticut's cities the system of apportionment outlined by the Constitution of 1818 became increasingly out of with any of political equality individual to reform the system of equal town representation as Connecticut's apportionment system grew more to democratic the Hartford Courant called for a constitutional convention to the in the mode of representation which the present of The Courant We that no who system of representation and who is not by the power which it into the small towns, will continue to advocate its when they the and of its and its system, the Courant argued, had only the 1818 convention because the delegates had been to the defeat of the of that constitution's as the small towns might have down the entire document their unequal representation were from them.” The Courant “the system in this state, is a representation of not of the the and legislature, however, to be Though the General Assembly used the legislative amendment process to change the 1818 Constitution a number of times during the nineteenth Connecticut's small towns, by their in the legislature, always constitutional reform to the system of legislative apportionment. for a over the state's system of representation, of the General Assembly to a constitutional convention in and their In the early advocates the of Governor Charles a New who served from to In however, the the House a for a constitutional convention by a vote of to with the small towns Representatives from Hartford and New the most populous in the state, to in but the of the state's to The failed in Connecticut, always by its dozens of small and towns, a system those rural power, granted by the constitution, to the reformers did to make small According to Melbert Connecticut the of the census of were the of the system had become so that there was a in many of the state to the the Constitutional a to Connecticut's system of representation. According to Cary, of the leading of both political were and the throughout the state and to the legislature to a constitutional In the legislature to this a constitutional amendment every town of at least people two representatives in the state In the legislature on this reform by amendment that said that no new town after that point could have any representation at in the General Assembly it had at least 2,500 amendments to of the most inequalities caused by the legislative apportionment system, such as the fact that a new but town with a population of more than had only one while many towns with fewer than residents had two with Connecticut's system of representation went far the state House of Connecticut's state was also of the state's population. The 1818 constitution had mandated that there be with no mention of districts or In a constitutional amendment the state into had been the number of from to a larger number, set by the legislature at in The amendment that the districts should be with being had to the and that the General Assembly have the power to the districts “to a equality between said in to the number of inhabitants According to The Connecticut State however, was to make the districts the to become A in the amendment that each of the state's eight receive at least two to the between districts that later over the of the nineteenth The of state that by the Connecticut's state had times the population of its with inequitable representation went the General for both federal and as first used in Connecticut in were not between and 1900, the state's districts continued to be using the At the of this in each had between and By however, Connecticut's second had while the had only less than as This was the in the and had significant population between several of their but this to the of the seventeenth amendment to the federal Constitution in the Connecticut General Assembly the state's United States the system of equal town representation in the legislature further to the will of the majority or of According to the New York Republicans in six out of between and During this period, the legislature and therefore the power to Connecticut's In and Connecticut's legislature United States even though the state's Democratic Despite Democratic in only Republicans represented Connecticut in the United States between and the of the this the rules for the state legislature yet way to its disproportionate the 1662 Charter and then the 1818 if no an majority in an for office, the General Assembly between the two the of and the legislature this power to in who had not or were In three during the the Democratic more on but the General Assembly his as of even more and than those in preceding the that Democratic had more than he needed for an the House of Representatives to citing what they were if would the of the vote that he needed to the The General had more than fewer than With the and House to on which should as the state's

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