The Imperial Gaze: Affective Governance, Hybrid Cartography, and China’s U-Shaped Line

Out of Its Comfort Zone:Indonesia and the South China Sea Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto (bio) During a visit to Tokyo in 2015, Indonesia’s president Joko Widodo publicly rejected China’s so-called nine-dash or U-shaped line claim in the South China Sea. Yet shortly thereafter in Beijing, he also agreed with Chinese president Xi Jinping that Indonesia’s “global maritime fulcrum” (poros maritim dunia) concept is complementary to China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.1 Widodo’s statements give the impression that Indonesia is conveying a conflicting message to China, expressing concern about the U-shaped line while simultaneously trying to cultivate a closer economic relationship through maritime cooperation. This approach appears to reflect a hedging strategy that Indonesia and other Southeast Asian nations take in both accommodating and confronting China’s rise at the same time.2 In the long run, however, Indonesia could face a fork in the road where it will be unable to have closer cooperation with China while concurrently resisting intimidation and coercion whenever and wherever China attempts to impose the U-shaped line. This essay examines Indonesia’s perspective as a non-claimant state on the South China Sea disputes. The first section discusses Indonesia’s interests in the South China Sea. The essay then considers the relevance of Indonesia’s status as a non-claimant state for its role in the disputes and assesses the implications of the South China Sea disputes for Indonesia’s relationships with China and the United States. Finally, the conclusion discusses the future that Indonesia envisages for the South China Sea. [End Page 21] What Is at Stake? The territorial disputes in the South China Sea place Indonesia’s interests at stake, namely the security of the resource-rich Natuna Islands, the sanctity of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the security of sea lines of communication, and nonalignment vis-à-vis the major powers. The security of the Natuna Islands is Indonesia’s immediate concern in the South China Sea. China has never claimed the islands, yet neither has it clarified to Indonesian policymakers the meaning of the U-shaped line. Indonesia rejects the U-shaped line and claims to have neither territorial nor boundary disputes with China.3 However, Indonesia is increasingly concerned with the potential spillover effects of conflict between China and other claimants as a result of Beijing’s assertive enforcement of the U-shaped line. The Natuna Islands are scattered across over 100,000 square miles of ocean—more than ten times the size of their total land area—and only 27 out of the 154 islands are inhabited, with a total population of around 76,000 people.4 Despite the lack of infrastructure, the Natuna Islands are one of Indonesia’s richest regencies in offshore natural resources. Fisheries are estimated to yield a potential of 500,000 tons annually, but in reality the locals manage to haul in only a third of it through traditional methods. Chinese fishermen continually venture south into the fishing grounds around the islands, escorted by Chinese government fishery patrol vessels. A number of incidents have occurred between these vessels and Indonesian maritime authorities while the latter were trying to apprehend illegal Chinese fishermen, including one threatening encounter in which a Chinese government vessel trained its guns on an Indonesian patrol boat.5 Beneath the seabed also lie vast energy resources. Located within the purported overlap of the U-shaped line, the East Natuna block (block D-Alpha) is estimated to contain one of the world’s largest gas reserves at around 46 trillion cubic feet. Indonesia’s oil and gas company, Pertamina, in partnerships with U.S.-based ExxonMobil, France’s Total SA, [End Page 22] and Tailand’s PTT Public Company Limited, plans to begin production in 2024.6 Additionally, Pertamina holds some shares in the offshore blocks near Vietnam in the Nam Con Son Basin with PetroVietnam and Petronas that might overlap with the U-shaped line. Chinese insistence on the U-shaped line also devalues Indonesia’s belief in the sanctity of UNCLOS. Jakarta has been consistently advocating for the convention, which recognizes Indonesia as an...

The U-shaped line in the South China Sea, despite its existence on the official Chinese maps for more than six decades and never challenged until very recently, has drawn wide attention globally and become the hottest subject in the discussion of East Asian maritime disputes, particularly after the map showing the U-shaped line attached to China’s Notes verbale was submitted to the UN in May 2009. The legal implications of the U-shaped line were also touched upon by the South China Sea Arbitration, in which the arbitral tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) for China to claim exclusive historic rights to resources within the U-shaped line. As a response, China issued the Statement on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea on 12 July 2016, which can be seen as the most recent clarification of China’s sovereignty and maritime rights within the U-shaped line. This chapter provides a whole picture with regard to the origin, evolution and most recent developments of China’s practice relating to the U-shaped line, reviews a wide range of interpretations of the legal implications of the line, and discusses the definite and potential rights of China within the line. It concludes that the legal implications of the U-shaped line should be interpreted in the context of the post-WWII reconstruction of international order and the rebuilding of maritime legal frameworks; and the validity of the U-shaped line has never been disrupted or terminated until very recently. China has not given up maritime claims based on the U-shaped line and recent practice has demonstrated that China has further consolidated the effectiveness of the line by carrying out massive land reclamations, intensified law enforcement patrols, and fishery conservation activities in the South China Sea within the line.

This chapter examines the underlying issues complicating and intensifying the South China Sea disputes, and analyses the implications of the ongoing tension for the region. It explains the significance of the South China Sea's natural resources, strategic position and international navigation routes, and provides a portrait of the competing claims. The chapter illustrates the intensified competition triggered by the continental shelf submissions of some claimants, the involvement of non-regional States, leading particularly to Sino-United States spats, and unilateral actions and maritime conflicts in disputed areas. It evaluates on China's undefined claims in the South China Sea represented by the commonly known 'U-shaped line' and related issues. Finally, the chapter offers some general considerations for China to take effective steps to secure its claims and recommendations for all the claimants to reduce the prospects for conflicts and to resolve the South China Sea disputes. Keywords: continental shelf; maritime conflicts; Sino-United States; South China Sea disputes

Many non-“Chinese” do not have adequate understanding of Chinese history, and most of them cannot read nor write Chinese characters. As such, they would tend to think that human behavior is universal, that is, what they had done in the West will be repeated by the Chinese. For example, Graham T. Allison, Jr., writing in June 2013, reminded us that, in 11 of 15 cases since the year 1500 in which a rising power rivaled a ruling power, the outcome was war. That may well be one of the leading reasons that they cannot appreciate the Chinese U-shaped or nine-dotted line, which was presented in an official map by the Republic of China (ROC) Government for the first time in December 1947. (Another source mentioned February 1948. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-12/15/c_122426612_2.htm, accessed on February 10, 2013. For the genesis of the (broken) U-shaped line, see my article, “The Chinese (Broken) U-shaped Line in the South China Sea: Points, Lines, and Zone,” Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asia (JCSA), Vol. 25, No. 3 (December 2003), p. 407). This certainly presents a big problem, which must be solved or resolved.

A New Map of the People’s Republic of China was discovered through investigating a large number of historical maps. This map was published in April 1951, both continuous national boundary line and administrative region line were applied in this map to represent China’s national U shaped boundary line (U-boundary) in the South China Sea (SCS). It is an important historical material that supports the U-boundary line is the border of China’s South China Sea. This is the first research of this newly-discovered map. In the map, the U-boundary in the SCS (SCS U-boundary) is not only presented by a continuous boundary map symbol (·>—— —— This New Map of the People’s Republic of China was edited by the Guanghua and Geosciences Club and was published by SDX Joint Publishing Company. The continuous U-line in this map clearly shows the accurate boundaries of China’s border in the SCS. It is an important historical map that clearly proves the U-boundary line is the border of China’s territorial sea in the SCS. Moreover, the red solid administrative-line overlaying the U-boundary definitely indicated that the sovereignty of the sea within the U-boundary belonged to China. The regions of the SCS U-boundary include Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha Islands, Zhongsha Islands, Taiwan Island, Beibu Gulf and the Zengmu Reef. This study compared maps of historical U-line which were published before 1951, and also analyzed the domestic and international maritime situation, and drawing methods of the maritime boundary lines in the history. The results show that “the continuous line” was recognized by the international community in the corresponding historical period, and both the “intermittent (dotted) line” and “the continuous line” are appropriate descriptions and drawing-methods for the sea boundary in historical period. Analysis of six maps, including the historical maps and the latest vertical world map, showed that the territory of U-boundary line inherited the territory of China’s SCS in the “South China Sea Island Map” that was officially published and recognized worldwide in 1948. This study recommends using “the South China Sea U-Shape boundary line” (SCS U-boundary) to describe the border of China’s sea in SCS. “SCS U-boundary” not only emphasizes the U shape borderline of China’s sea in the SCS, but also can be easily expressed and remembered worldwide. Using “SCS U-boundary” is a better way to avoid problems of “number” and “number of segments”, and can further express the certainty of the integrity, continuity and border of the China’s seas in the SCS as well. In summary, the study points out: (1) SCS U-boundary is the border of China’s sea in the SCS, and its sovereignty belongs to China; (2) both “continuous U-boundary line” and “intermittent U-boundary line” are internationally recognized to describe sea borders; (3) “SCS U-boundary” is more vividly, accurately, completely and scientifically to characterize China’s sea border in the SCS.

A principal aspect of the territorial and boundary delimitation disputes in the South China Sea is the so-called U-shaped line. This article addresses the genesis and substantiation of the U-shaped line claims as well as the possible change in positions of the governments of the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China with respect to the historical waters claim, which is an integral part of their U-shaped line positions. A legal analysis of the various communications of the South China Sea players with respect to the U-shaped line helps to clarify and identify the nature of four kinds of legal disputes. It is also possible to differentiate the various degrees of difficulty involved in settling each of these disputes.

Introduction Since the emergence of international law in relation to land, air(space), and sea, points (or dots, dian), lines (xian), and zones (or planes, mian or qu), both real and imagined, have become of vital importance. The relation of points, lines, and zones is governed by the laws of geometry: two connected points make one line, at least two points are needed to draw a line, and a minimum of one line is required to form a zone. In legal maritime parlance, points can be labelled basepoints or trijunction points (among other things). The description of lines is quite complex, ranging from the general: baselines, straight lines, agreed closing lines, (1) and thalweg lines (imaginary lines along the deepest part of the main channel of, for example, a river); to the specific: for example, the Green Line separating East and West Beirut in Lebanon, or the Mogadishu Line (in existence since early 1993), or the Attila Line dividing the Turkish Cypriot Zone in the north of Cyprus Island from the southern Greek Cypriot Zone, or the unilateral North Limit Line between North and South Koreas, or the Line of Control in disputed Kashmir (between India and Pakistan). Lines can also become maritime zones of one kind or another: the coastal zone, for example, which is not defined in the April 1982 United Nations Third Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter 1982 Law of the Sea) and which suggests that the 1982 Law of the Sea has ambiguities and legal loopholes. This article focuses on the Chinese (broken) U-shaped line. This line is the traditional Chinese maritime boundary in the South China Sea (SCS), the fifth largest body of water on earth, and it intersects waters off four Southeast Asian countries. The first section discusses the positive and negative aspects of this line, while considering some other points of interest that are more ambivalent. The second section examines the relationship between the U-shaped line and other maritime concepts. It should be noted at the outset that this author is of the view that, due to the lack of an effective form of world government, which could enforce international law and punish culprits, politics of one kind or another dominates in the international arena. War may also follow political struggle. Many experts in international law concede that political will, among other things, is necessary to resolve legal disputes at sea, especially in view of the fact that there has been no consistent pattern of human behaviour in this area. It can, therefore, be argued that it is generally brute (political and/or military) force, not international law, which determines the fate of points, lines, and zones at sea; and that this will be the case for at least the next few decades. (2) A good example of this is what is happening to Huangyan Dao (also known as Democracy or Scarborough Island), which is part of the Zhongsha Island Group (Macclesfield Bank). (3) Until recently, the fate of this island has been immaterial to most Chinese and foreign experts, because (as Chiu Hungdah observes) the Zhongsha is submerged and, therefore, according to international law, both Taiwan and mainland China cannot say that they possess it. (4) Nevertheless, in what can be described as an act of gerrymandering, Beijing has laid claim to Huangyan Dao, incorporating it as part of the Zhongsha Island Group. This act can, from the Chinese point of view, be compared with the appropriation of Hawaii by the United States. The example of Huangyan Dao, must, however, be seen in the context of the Chinese (broken) U-shaped line, which will be discussed in detail below. The U-shaped Line I shall begin by discussing the genesis (5) of the U-shaped line, which was first delineated by Hu Jinjie, a Chinese cartographer, in December 1914, after the Republic of China's recovery, in October 1909 (according to the Chinese lunar calendar), of the Dongsha (or Pratas) Island Group from Imperial Japan. …

Despite its existence on the Chinese maps for more than six decades, the U-shaped line, as a traditional maritime boundary line of China in the South China Sea, has never received a wide recognition in the world community, much less by the other claimant states in the South China Sea. The U-shaped line is a legal conundrum not only for China but also for the world community, particularly after the map with the U-shaped line, together with China's Notes Verbale with respect to the claims to the outer continental shelves made by Malaysia and Vietnam, were submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf in May 2009. This article discusses China's recent practice relating to the U-shaped line as well as the external factors that affect the validity of the line and tries to unravel the legal puzzle posed by the line.

This article focuses on China's strategy in dealing with the US factor in the South China Sea conflicts. While the USA is not directly involved in the South China Sea quagmire, its concern with the security of the sea-lanes and its insistence that peaceful means must be used to solve the region's problems have cautioned China to tread carefully in its plans to recover its ‘lost territories’. China would like to see ASEAN and the individual ASEAN claimant states weanedoff their reliance on Washington. However, US surveillance and military power, particularly in the post-11 September period, play an important role in ensuring that disputes in the South China Sea do not escalate to unacceptable levels. It seems likely that the impasse in the discussions on the South China Sea will continue for some time.

China's U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea: Possible Interpretations, Asserting Activities and Reactions from Outside

The existence and relevance of historic rights in the South China Sea (SCS) appear to be at the core of the dispute between the states in the region. This aspect of the dispute was triggered by China’s official pronouncement of the so-called U-shaped line in 2009 as a response to claims to the outer limit of the continental shelf by other states in the region. However, how China’s historic claim relates to the U-shaped line, or to specific waters in the SCS, is not clear. Historic rights were one of the central issues examined by the Tribunal in the arbitration between China and the Philippines concerning the Philippines’ submission that “China’s claims based on its ‘nine-dash line’ are inconsistent with the Convention and therefore invalid.” This chapter examines three interrelated issues with respect to the existence of historic rights in the South China Sea in the light of China’s historic claim and the Award of the SCS Tribunal. Firstly, this chapter explores the nature and the type of the historic claim raised by China by examining China’s statements and pronouncements, their interpretation by authors, and by the Tribunal in the SCS arbitration. This chapter then turns to assess two types of historic rights that might be potentially relevant in the SCS context, namely historic rights short of sovereignty and historic fishing rights. For each of these categories of rights, this chapter examines in turn their post-LOSC existence and relevance (in general and with reference to specific claims in the SCS), and then the requirements for the ascertainment of these rights. Finally, it draws some conclusions regarding the potential existence of historic rights in the SCS.

Recent deep-sea benthic foraminiferal distributions in the South China and Sulu Seas

This chapter assesses the development and content of Taiwan's South China Sea (SCS) policy under the Tsai administration since May 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen was inaugurated as the 14th Republic of China (ROC) president. It emphasizes how the policy decision-making process and the implementation of Taiwan's SCS policy have been influenced by the US government's concerns and interests. It mentions Taiwan's support for the US-led Indo-Pacific strategic alliances and partnerships and Washington's efforts to develop a multilateral joint patrolling force in the SCS. The chapter details how the Tsai administration avoids mentioning the “U-shaped line” and historic right claims in the SCS as a partial recognition of the ruling made by the Arbitral Tribunal in the arbitration case. It covers cross-Strait dialogue on the SCS issue, which has become much more difficult, if not completely suspended.

The U-shaped line in the South China Sea has been recently challenged in the international community and this challenge reached its climax when the Philippines presented China with a Notification and Statement of Claim under Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) on 22 January 2013. In its Statement of Claim, the Philippines requests the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal to adjudge and declare that China's maritime claims based on the U-shaped line are contrary to the LOS Convention and invalid. Against this background, this article will analyze the issues concerning the related submissions of the Philippines.

In recent years situation on the South China Sea facing an escalationcondition, especially affected from China maritime activities. That conditionemerged when China put South China Sea territory at China's official map,which called 9/10/11 dashed line or u-shaped line. This paper addresses theIndonesian Government respond about territorial disputes with China'sofficial map on Natuna. The U-shaped line at China's official map actuallybecame challenges for Global Maritime Axis idea and Indonesia foreignpolicy under Jokowi-JK administration.Keyword: Global Maritime Axis, South China Sea, Foreign Policy