Abstract
In recent years, the number and types of institutional investors in China have achieved rapid development, and gradually become an important part of China's capital market. Institutional investors pay more attention to the long-term performance of enterprises in order to maintain their long-term and stable return on investment. This paper uses the investor relationship data of the "interactive easy" platform of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the data of listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2019 to construct the index of institutional investor attention, and empirically examines the influence mechanism of institutional investor attention on enterprise performance. Furthermore, a chain-type multiple intermediary effect model is constructed to investigate investor attention affecting enterprise performance. The results show that institutional investor attention can significantly improve enterprise performance. The attention of institutional investors can reduce the quality of economic development by increasing the innovation investment of enterprises and strengthening the incentive intensity of executive compensation, as well as the chain-type intermediary channel of “Executive Compensation Incentive Increase → Enterprise innovation investment increase”, the independent intermediary effect of executive compensation incentive is the most prominent. Furthermore, the results show that institutional investor attention promotes the performance of non-state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises. However, the state-owned enterprises can only improve their performance through the compensation incentive independent intermediary channels.
Highlights
In recent years, Chinese institutional investors have achieved rapid development in number and type, and gradually become an important part of Chinese capital market
The results show that the attention of institutional investors can improve the performance of enterprises through two independent intermediary channels: increasing executive compensation incentive and increasing enterprise innovation investment, and improve the performance of enterprises through the chain intermediary channel of "executive compensation incentive increase → enterprise innovation investment increase "that is, executive compensation incentive channel plays both independent intermediary effect and chain intermediary effect, assuming H1 and H2 are verified
The results show that the estimated coefficients of institutional investor attention are all significantly positive at 1% level, indicating that institutional investor attention promotes the performance of non-state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises
Summary
Chinese institutional investors have achieved rapid development in number and type, and gradually become an important part of Chinese capital market. Investor attention has become a hot topic. Existing literature has found that the research and attention of external investors to listed companies can reduce the inefficient investment level of enterprises [1], improve the return of stocks, reduce transaction costs and risks [2], promote the implementation of equity incentive plans [3], improve the innovation efficiency of enterprises [4], and influence the enterprise strategy [5]. The existing literature has enriched the research on the impact of Investor attention, but there are little literatures on the impact of enterprise performance. Does institutional investor concern have an impact on corporate performance? How does executive compensation incentive and enterprise innovation investment play a role in the relationship between institutional Investor attention and Does institutional investor concern have an impact on corporate performance? How does executive compensation incentive and enterprise innovation investment play a role in the relationship between institutional Investor attention and
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