The Impact of Geoeconomic and Political Factors in the Middle East on the Development Prospects of IMEC

Middle East region can be realized as region which is susceptible with conflict. The conflict in Middle East which is increasingly needed constructive and sustainable effort in order to reduce a conflict potential. The problem that concern of international community is conflict involving Iran and Saudi Arabia after death penalty to Syekh Nimr Al-Nimr by Saudi Arabia government. Firstly, conflict that happened between Saudi Arabia and Iran caused by sectarianism dimension that’s mean Sunni and Shi’ah rivalry in Middle East. Then, sectarianism dimension can evolve into geopolitical competition that Saudi Arabia and Iran’s implication in Syria, Iraq and Yemen conflict. Therefore, Middle East conflict requires a peace settlement. Furthermore, the author who takes as Saudi Arabia government in order to solve Saudi Arabia and Iran conflict more likely using Islamic Cooperation Organization (OIC) involvement. Moreover, the author argue that OIC can be conflict resolution agent and Saudi Arabia has affected an OIC. On one hand, the Saudi Arabia was influencing an OIC as the largest country that invest a fund and his domination in OIC structure itself. Therefore, through his influence, Saudi Arabia more profited than military approach. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has also utilized an OIC as instrument to gain its national interest such as to repress Iran’s influence in Middle East

The appearance of “India - Middle East - Europe Economic Corridor” (IMEC) is not accidental. On the one hand, this is the desire of the United States of America in the new context of the existence and development of a multipolar world, to create a basis for maintaining its influence in the Middle East, on the other hand – to create a system under its auspices that can withstand the growing power of China and its “One Belt One Road” (BRI). The purpose of this transport trade and economic corridor is to stimulate economic integration between Asia, the Persian Gulf and Europe. The planned corridor will connect India, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the State of Israel and the European Union through seaports and rail routes to make trade faster and cheaper, and develop economic cooperation and digital connectivity in the region. Despite the potential for significant economic and strategic benefits, the project faces a number of challenges and risks. Among them are interstate tensions, geopolitical rivalries and security threats, among others, especially the beginning of a new conflict in the Middle East.

Objectives: The research aims to highlight a geohistorical study of Saudi-Chinese relations and their historical contentAdditionally, it seeks to emphasize the role and impact of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a variable in Sino-Iranian relations, especially in light of the sectarian, ideological and geopolitical conflict in the Middle East region in general and the Arab region in particular. Methods: The study followed the historical method to analyze the history of Saudi-Iranian relations, as it is considered the closest approach to political geography, geopolitics, and international relations studies. Additionally, the inductive method was used to track positions, statistics, official data, and others. The descriptive method and analytical approach were also relied upon to prove the research hypothesis. Results: The results showed that Saudi Arabia had a direct impact as an obstacle in Sino-Iranian relations. The Saudi influence in Sino-Iranian relations forms a regional strategic triangle in the Arabian Gulf region, with its two sides being the regional powers (Saudi Arabia and Iran) and the third side being China as an emerging global power. Saudi Arabia affects China's relationship with Iran on different levels, including: (the bilateral relations between China and Iran by preventing China's entry into the Gulf region through the Iranian gateway), (the global competition between China and the United States), and (the regional competition and sectarian, ideological, and geopolitical conflict). This conflict has long-term implications for the countries of the region, especially since the conflict has taken on a religious dimension between the two states and among the Arab countries. Conclusions: The relationship between China and Iran has raised concerns among traditional Arab powers, particularly Saudi Arabia, especially with China's entry into the Arabian Gulf via Iran. Saudi Arabia has played a role as a variable in the existing relations between China and Iran through its foreign policy as a regional power. The geopolitical competition and the ideological and identity conflict have played a significant role in the ongoing conflict between the two countries, especially following the outbreak of the revolution in Iran in 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in the country.

The rotation of Iran-Saudi Arabia relations in two dimensions of geopolitical interaction and confrontation and the grounds for their formation

Purpose. The aim of the article is to assess the main security challenges in the Middle East, determine their impact on economic development and social progress in the region, and outline priorities for ensuring the social and economic development of countries in current conditions. Methodology of research. The methodological basis of the study is based on a dialectical approach. A combination of general scientific and special research methods was used to achieve the set goal, ensuring the reliability of the results: historical-logical method – to substantiate the historical nature of security challenges in the Middle East, system analysis method, methods of induction and deduction – for formulating hypotheses and conclusions about the impact of security challenges on social progress in the region, comparative method – to identify differences in the economic development of Middle Eastern countries, graphical visualization method. Findings. It is substantiated that the Middle East is a region of geopolitical significance but is also characterized by a complex interaction of external influences and security challenges. The main external influences in the Middle East are systematized and classified. The main security challenges in the Middle East are identified and detailed. The main factors of tension in the countries of the Middle East are revealed. The role of external actors in deepening tensions in the region is confirmed, and attention is focused on the growth of regional competition. The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East is characterized by regional rivalry for power, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is argued that problems in the social and economic sphere are an additional source of instability in the region. The level of unemployment in Middle Eastern countries is analysed, and attention is focused on the need to reduce the proportion of unemployed youth. Significant differences between countries in the region in terms of GDP per capita are confirmed. An assessment of the impact of security challenges in the region on the social progress of countries and the identification of the main dependencies are conducted. Originality. The main factors of tension in the Middle East region are identified, and the main external influences on the Middle East, which can have historical, political, economic, cultural, and religious character, are detailed. Further development is given to identifying the consequences of the intervention of external actors in the domestic policy of countries, leading to the aggravation of the security situation in the region. The impact of security challenges on the economic development of countries, which has significant inequality, is argued and the level of impact on ensuring social progress is assessed. Practical value. The substantiated results of the study and the obtained conclusions can be used in determining the strategic vectors of the social and economic development of countries in the context of security challenges and external influences. Key words: security challenges, geopolitical competition, regional actors, external influences, Middle East, economic development, unemployment, GDP per capita, social progress, Global Terrorism Index, Democracy Index, Peace Index, Corruption Perceptions Index.

Iran–US relations – strained at the best of times since the 1979 Iranian revolution – have never been worse than during the past six years, due to the much more intense interaction between the two ...

With his highly engaging and painstakingly researched Digital Authoritarianism in the Middle East, Marc Owen Jones makes a much-needed addition to the field of post-truth and disinformation studies. The focus of the book on the MENA region—more specifically on the Gulf area—allows its author to provide a wealth of examples that demonstrate how sophisticated disinformation operations are not the prerogative of well-known purveyors of state-sponsored propaganda and deception such as Russia and China or of outlets operating within the populist and right-wing information ecosystems in the United States and in Europe. Deception as a tool of public opinion control and as an instrument of aggressive foreign policy has been embraced by a growing club of authoritarian or autocratic regimes in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Egypt, and Qatar, among others are also active contributors to the growing “deception order” (6) influencing both regional and global politics, which Owen details through a series of thoroughly analyzed case studies.The book’s focus on the Middle East, which a decade ago was the theater of a series of epochal popular uprisings fueled by the advent of digital technology, also offers the author the opportunity to present important caveats against the rhetoric of liberation technology, prominent during the Arab Spring. Owen Jones contends that the current rise of digital authoritarianism is inherently linked to the experience of the Arab Spring, which has prompted a backlash by many regimes in the region in the form of surveillance, censorship, and strict control of digital technology to prevent future uprisings. The author also vigorously debunks the somehow simplistic techno-utopianism prominent a decade ago by showing how the liberation paradigm hailed by progressive forces in the West and in the region has served, perhaps unwittingly, as a cover for the spread of neoliberal digital capitalism, eager to push a powerful and underregulated technology into problematic and politically volatile geographical contexts, regardless of the consequences.The field of disinformation, computational propaganda, and post-truth studies, which since 2016 has generated increased academic interest and research output, has clearly illustrated how digital media, especially social media platforms, are not necessarily liberating or emancipatory. Instead, they can be exploited to spread deceptive and manipulative communications in support of demagogic, populist, and authoritarian political actors. While there is now considerable literature on how the phenomenon is affecting Western democratic countries, as well as on how prominent autocratic or authoritarian regimes such as those ruling Russia and China use deception in both domestic affairs and foreign policy, still relatively few studies have extended their focus to include countries in the Middle East, a region with high digital technology adoption and very little safeguards to protect citizens from deception operations. Aware that a rapidly shifting global scenario, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, requires new perspectives and vantage points on international relations, Digital Authoritarianism in the Middle East pushes the academic discourse and research on disinformation beyond the Cold War framework, which has traditionally pit Russia and China as the main forces undermining Western security. In the process, Owen Jones opens a plurality of fascinating and troubling perspectives on Middle East politics, to demonstrate how profoundly they have been influenced by authoritarian forces that have mastered the use of digital technology and how the fallout of such new forms of authoritarianism can have repercussions beyond the region.Owen Jones defines “digital authoritarianism” as “the use of digital information technology by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress and manipulate domestic and foreign population” (2) through a plurality of different techniques such as cyberattacks, internet shutdowns, the use of bots and trolls to push or suppress narratives, and targeted persecution against journalists and users. While the book makes it clear that deception and disinformation are illiberal practices appearing in both democratic and authoritarian regimes; in the latter, such practices operate generally unfettered and unchallenged. The “truth decay” effect has been identified as one of the most problematic features of digital information ecosystems, where objective truths have been rendered plastic and slippery by a plurality of technological and cultural factors. In authoritarian countries, this phenomenon can be easily leveraged by powerful actors intent on misleading populations and strengthening their grip on political power. In the MENA region, and especially in the Gulf, deception via digital media—aided and abetted by loosely regulated communication technology—contributes to the perpetuation of political systems functioning through corruption, human rights abuse, and inequality.The harmful political effects of digital authoritarianism are not limited to the region but easily transcend borders and spill over into other world regions, with significant implications for foreign policy decision-making and global geopolitics. One of the book’s main arguments is that digital authoritarianism involves the “decoupling and despatialization of authoritarian practices” (11), which resonate beyond traditional state boundaries. Owen Jones discusses such practices as inherently transnational endeavors, due to the borderless nature of digital communications, through which new digital powers, nodes, and hubs can extend their influence globally. To understand why such deceptive practices are becoming so frequent and pervasive in the region, creating what the author calls a “Gulf post-truth moment” (13), the book examines the discursive, tactical, and strategic qualities of a significant body of deception operations that have emerged in the region since 2011.Specifically, Owen Jones identifies Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as the primary drivers of digital authoritarianism in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia is presented in the book as a digital media superpower, launching deceptive and manipulative influence operations in a sustained manner on both a domestic and an international scale. The geopolitical context within which the Saudi Kingdom developed into a main player in the global field of deception operations is defined by two main elements: a new era of Gulf politics, jump-started by the Trump administration and characterized by renewed pressure on Iran and on the normalization of the relation between Israel and various Gulf countries. This, according to the author, has provided fertile ground for the seeding of disinformation and deceptive narratives into the media ecosystems of the region at the service of a new geopolitical vision spearheaded by autocratic and at times tyrannical leaders such as Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi. Both rulers seek to carve a place of prominence for their countries in Gulf politics, and to this end they have also fueled a rise in disinformation operations. The geopolitical vision pushed forth synergistically by these leaders, sometimes in coordination with right-wing sections of the American political spectrum, is predicated on a permanent state of mobilization of their public opinion against a perceived threat represented by hostile political actors such as Qatar, Turkey, Iran, and Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.Before delving into some of the many examples that the author uses to support these claims, it is worth further probing the theoretical framework that Owen Jones lays out in the introductory chapters as a foundation for his empirical work. It is also worth appreciating his methodological approach to the study of disinformation and post-truth. The lack of an in-depth theorization of the notion of “post-truth” is probably the main weakness of an otherwise outstanding book. In his discussion of the concept, Owen Jones doesn’t acknowledge the existence of a recent body of literature that has discussed post-truth as a political and cultural phenomenon rooted in the decline of the Foucauldian “regime-of-truths” traditionally enforced by legacy media and cultural or scientific institutions in Western liberal democracies,1 in the emergence of fictional counter-narratives such as conspiracy theories by technologically empowered publics,2 in the epistemic relativism that some scholars trace back to the postmodern turn in politics and culture,3 and in the crisis of authority of Western democratic politics and values in the global geopolitical arena.4Neglecting such a multilayered cultural and political dimension of the term post-truth, which also gives publics and audiences a role in producing and participating in fictional narratives, Owen Jones takes a more traditional political economic approach in discussing the most salient aspects of the Gulf post-truth moment. The author seems particularly concerned with the alignment between authoritarian regimes and global technology companies. In Owen Jones’s engaging but ultimately bleak view, the Middle East appears as a “Wild West” for disinformation, dominated by despotic regimes and completely subjugated to the neoliberal logic that has fueled the rise of the data extractive business models underpinning commercial social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. The extraction of self-disclosed data and personal information by platform users is not only profitable for the technology companies, but also necessary for authoritarian regimes seeking to maintain control of the population, since profiles of subjects can be used to monitor and control citizens’ behavior and opinions.The “datafication” of users, or their transformation into collections of data points that can be used for a plurality of manipulative and predictive ends, is thus of primary interests for both Western private corporations and Middle Eastern authoritarian rulers. Both resist attempts to protect users’ privacy, as they would hinder advertising revenues and the governments’ surveillance abilities. In Owen Jones’s reading, a capitalist model based on data mining and information extraction can lead to new forms of “techno-colonialism” (17) or the exploitation of a poorer country by a richer one through technology, as well as to the strengthening of existing authoritarian regimes.The analysis is correct, but perhaps laying part of the blame for the rise of deception and authoritarianism in the region at the feet of Western neoliberalism and Western technology companies might appear to be not only a Western-centric conclusion, but also a deterministic one, overly emphasizing the importance of technology and of its business models to the detriment of a more nuanced cultural analysis of people’s engagement with technology, which should also consider individual gratification, identify formation, and social-bonding that digital media provides to its users.While I agree with Owen Jones that the narrative of liberation technology prominent a decade ago in the region appears now anachronistic, as well as overly deterministic and dubiously instrumental to profit-seeking ventures, I also think it might be premature to dismiss the liberating element of digital networking technology, which has demonstrated the ability to empower and mobilize citizens in the past—in some cases leading them to previously unthinkable political outcomes—and to this day continues to provide outlets, albeit restricted and closely monitored, to express their views on culture, religion, sexuality and also politics.Where the author really excels and offers his most useful contribution to the field of disinformation research is the part in which he presents his sophisticated methodology to study deception operations and puts it at the service of a vast selection of studies and investigations on disinformation in the region. Combining a wide array of tools and skills, the author uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to conduct the research showcased in the book, including “digital ethnography, open-source research, as well as computer-assisted analysis of datasets, including anomaly detection, corpus analysis, network analysis and, well, good old-fashioned investigative work” (19).The platform of choice for most of the case studies in the book was Twitter, which allows generous access to its data for research via the Application Programming Interface (API), and which has allowed the author to gather millions of tweets and hundreds of hashtags to study the function and reach of deception operations. What also impresses about the book, on top of the technological savvy demonstrated by the author, is the narrative flare with which Owen Jones recounts his investigation in the dark corners of social media, where he has spent a considerable amount of time chasing trolls, unmasking fake journalists, exposing sock puppet accounts, and detecting large-scale information operations by automated bots. Faithful to the academic approach of public impact scholarship, which seeks to “create social change through the translation and dissemination of research to non-academic audiences” (22), Owen Jones’s multiple investigations are narrated with rigorous analysis, political engagement, as well as with humor.Among the multiple case studies discussed in the book, I chose to focus on a couple discussing the role of Saudi Arabia’s growing digital media power in shaping the deception order in the Gulf. In Owen Jones’s definition, digital media power can be summarized “as an actor’s ability to use or co-opt digital media technologies in order to assert ideological influence and power over a community” (81). Owen Jones argues that the manipulation of social media to promote propagandistic narratives and to suppress criticism of the Saudi regime has become a key element of Mohammed bin Salman’s vision for Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabia attempts to dominate the Middle East and Arabic-language media industry date back to the 1990s, it was after the Arab Spring and especially with the spread of social media in the country that the Kingdom’s tactics and strategies to expand its media power, also through deception operations, have evolved in reach and sophistication.Saudi Arabia is one of countries in the world with the highest penetration of digital technology, with some of the highest numbers of social media users, and with a very young population that forms a potentially volatile “youth bulge” using social media as a space for discussion and information consumption. As argued by Owen Jones, managing and pacifying its youth is one of the cornerstones of the Kingdom’s security strategy to maintain a hold on power. The deployment of digital media power to praise the country’s leadership and to attack or silence critics of the ruling dynasty has been one of the central tenets of Mohammed bin Salman’s rise to power.A technique used to boost Saudi popularity both regionally and globally, especially during the Kingdom’s UN-sanctioned war in Yemen was that of “astroturfing,” or manufacturing the illusion of a vox populi, through sock-puppet accounts (fake social media profiles) and bots (nonhuman automated accounts), which were instructed to support specific narratives or to censor sensitive topics through distracting content. For example, hashtags in Arabic carrying messages in support of Mohammed bin Salman during his visit to London in 2018 were made to trend, in order to give the illusion of international grassroots support, thanks to the coordinated work of hundreds of fake accounts with Western-sounding names. In his research of this deception operation, Owen Jones estimated that at least 30 percent of the accounts promoting such pro-Saudi hashtags were either sock-puppets or bots, known in the region as “electronic flies.”Still in the context of Saudi’s war in Yemen, the book discusses the controversial role of Mohammed bin Salman’s right hand, Saud Al-Qahtani, in orchestrating Saudi’s deceptive operations via social media. The book points to Al-Qahtani’s involvement in managing pro-regime “troll farms”—often drawing manpower from the unemployed and digitally active Saudi youth—to solicit services from international hackers to develop software that could either delete and promote social media posts about Saudi involvement in Yemen and to suspend and hack the Twitter account of Medicines Sans Frontier, a humanitarian organization that had exposed Saudi’s war crimes in Yemen.Another chapter discusses how the abundant disinformation circulating around the coronavirus was exploited, especially in the earlier phase of the pandemic, to further foreign policy objectives of some Gulf states. Specifically, the chapter examines how actors connected to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates used coronavirus disinformation to attack regional opponents. Among the multiple examples provided, it is worth recounting that of an information operation taken down by Twitter that revealed how accounts connected to Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt had targeted Qatar—specifically its national airline, Qatar Airways—accusing it of spreading the new virus around the world because of negligence and incompetence. Qatar was also the target of outlandish claims by a pro-UAE journalist, who accused the country of having financed China’s engineering of the virus and for deliberately spreading the virus in the region to damage the Emirati and Saudi economies. Owen Jones rightly points out that social media platforms took a tougher stance on combating health disinformation during the pandemic, often in coordination with the World Health Organization. However, less scrutiny was given by the platforms to the false information on the pandemic circulating in non-anglophone markets, which allowed, especially in 2020, such deceptive narratives to spread unfettered in the Gulf region.One last example appears in the chapter dedicated to the deceptive methods used by Saudi-linked entities to manipulate public opinion in the aftermath of the gruesome murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who, especially via his collaboration with The Washington Post, had expressed criticism of the reforms initiated by Mohammed bin Salman. The murder of Khashoggi inside a Saudi consulate in Istanbul marked the most blatant and tragic episode of a Middle Eastern government silencing a critical journalist. However, the event had serious consequences for Mohamed bin Salman’s efforts to brand himself as a progressive reformer in the eyes of the world. The vast amount of international media coverage and the near-total condemnation that the murder elicited around the globe put the Saudi propaganda machine to the test, forcing it to go into damage-control mode in attempt to regain control of the narrative around the events that led to the murder of Khashoggi.In the aftermath of the murder, as hashtags started to circulate on Twitter implicating Saudi Arabia in the disappearance of the journalist, “electronic flies” at the service of the Saudi government started to manipulate the algorithm governing Twitter trends to promote narratives exonerating Saudi from Khashoggi’s death, to sideline those alleging a Saudi involvement, and to smear the memory of the journalist. Perhaps the most poignant observation offered by Owen Jones in recounting the case is the following: “Khashoggi was a real person . . . amidst a sea of unverified bots, trolls and hyper-partisan foot soldiers” (244) who was killed because he didn’t want to align with the hyper-nationalist propaganda pushed by millions of social media accounts and because he disrupted the media order desired by Mohammed bin Salman.Digital Authoritarianism in the Middle East is a significant achievement in the study of disinformation and computational propaganda, providing a necessary and timely update in the field, not only because it expands the scope of the research beyond the Western world and its well-known foes Russia and China, but also because it provides a fascinating and in-depth look into the modus operandi of a scholar with an extensive knowledge of the Gulf region who can artfully combine critical abilities and impressive technological skills to expose deception operations.

This is an attempt to analyse contemporary balance in the Middle East region. The main aspects of the formation of its new landscape are the change of the model of «US presence» in the region. Geopolitical competition between global and regional power centres – US, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel that leads to new division lines between regional actors to the creation of new alliances and blocks.The D. Trump’s decision to remove American troops from Syria became the manifestation of change of the US role in the Middle East region that would have serious geo-political consequences.US are trying to mobilise it allies in the region into anti-Iran coalition with the help of such military-political project as Middle East Alliance. One can see complete approaching of the position of Israel and the number of Arab Gulf countries, but this process faces the unsettled Palestinian problem and Arab public opinion. The Warsaw ministry Middle East conference became a new US attempt to strengthen anti-Iran coalition and to close Israel with the Arab World.

This chapter discusses the intersection of Chinese, Iranian, Saudi (and to a lesser extent, American and Russian) interests in the Middle East. It introduces a brief history of China’s links with the Middle East and explains how Beijing’s regional role has, until recently, tended to be relatively limited. But China’s ties to the region have grown significantly, especially in terms of energy trade and investment. The chapter explores how Iranians perceive economic and strategic value in China as a means to sustain the ruling regime, resist pressure from the United States, and compete with Saudi Arabia. It explores Saudi-China ties as well, finding that the monarchy sees China as essential to its strategy for economic development. The chapter concludes that both Tehran and Riyadh will continue to court Beijing and that the Middle East is primed for greater Chinese involvement, less reform, and more geopolitical competition.

Global Oil Trends and their Effect on the Middle East

Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Corona virus, MERS-CoV. Conclusions from the 2nd Scientific Advisory Board Meeting of the WHO Collaborating Center for Mass Gathering Medicine, Riyadh

The Red Sea and the Aden Gulf area, where from time immemorial ancient sailors paved trade routes, and the North-East Africa (the Horn of Africa) are rapidly turning into an important strategic region. It's about ensuring free access to the Red Sea and, therefore, to the Suez Canal, that significantly reduces the delivery time and cost of goods, including energy resources. It facilitates and cheapens the trade between Europe and Asia. However, such a strategically important region is extremely unstable and turbulent. Navigation here is carried out, including along several narrow straits, which have been named as “suffocating” and “shock points” of modern geopolitics. We note a trend towards increasing competition in this once “sleepy” region. Arab countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE are striving to secure their interests here in competition with other Middle Eastern “heavyweights” - Turkey and Iran. Qatar has recently joined the above non-Arab actors. The accelerated dynamics of events leads to changes in the balance of power, which affects politics of non-regional actors - China, the United States and others. This article aims to comprehend the prevailing political realities in the area under consideration, to identify the military-political and trade-economic factors that determine the geostrategic importance of the Red Sea and adjacent territories, to determine the features of relations between the countries of the region, as well as their interaction with non-regional players.

Introduction The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the Middle East. Lying within the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, it borders the Red Sea to the west; Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait to the north; the Persian Gulf, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to the east; and Oman and Yemen to the south. The foundation of Saudi Arabia may be largely credited to two main historical figures who lived in the first half of the eighteenth century. The first figure, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, was a devout Islamic scholar and religious activist who fervently condemned the increasing tendencies of local peoples toward idolatrous practices. He preached the need for a return to stricter adherence to the original principles of Islam, based on devotion to the doctrine of the ‘absolute unity of God’ as passed through, and enunciated by, the witness of God’s word, Prophet Muhammad (Rentz). In present-day Saudi Arabia, reverence to Prophet Muhammad’s divine revelations and divinely appointed role, as accentuated by al-Wahhab, remains inscribed on the national flag (fig. 1), which states: “there is no god but Allah; Muhammad is the messenger of God”. Figure 1: The flag of Saudi Arabia Although initially met with opposition, al-Wahhab’s eventual encounter in 1744 with the ruler of the Najd town of Diriyah, Muhammad ibn Saud, led to “the drastic change in the course of Arabian history” (Rentz 16), after both men pledged an oath and alliance in pursuit of a successful religious, political, and military expansion campaign that saw Diriyah become the first Saudi state and original home to the Al-Saud dynasty (MoFA). It was not until 1932, however, that the nation-state of Saudi Arabia was officially formed, establishing Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud (often known as Ibn Saud) as the first officially recognised ruling monarch and patriarch of the modern House of Saud. In only a few short decades since the date of unification, the once poor desert landscape comprised of rivalling nomadic tribes has undergone astonishing transformations, making the present-day unified Kingdom a key strategic regional and international actor within world politics, and a major economical, technological, and military power and rival. In addition to being a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for example, Saudi Arabia is also an active and founding member of international organisations such as the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (OAS). Notably, Saudi Arabia’s influence and eminence in the international arena specifically pertains to its leading role within OPEC, given that Saudi Arabia’s command economy is largely petroleum-based. Here, Saudi Arabia is the “largest generator of net oil export revenue” for OPEC, and the “largest OPEC crude oil exporter” (Statista); in 2022, Saudi Arabia’s oil export revenues totalled US$311 billion (Statista). Unsurprisingly, the House of Saud is the wealthiest royal family in the world, worth an estimated US$1.4 trillion (Hieu), a figure four times the combined wealth of billionaires Elon Musk (worth an estimated US$236.1 billion) and Bill Gates (worth an estimated US$119.7 billion). The combined wealth of the House of Saud also significantly surpasses the worth of the renowned British royal family, whose combined wealth pales in comparison at an estimated US$28 billion (Hieu; Srinivasan). Arguably, the net worth of the House of Saud not only financially ranks them among the top tier of elites, but also makes them one of the most powerful royal families in the world (Hieu). Presently, the nation remains an absolute monarchy under a Sharia legal system, in accordance with Islamic law as principally derived from the Quran (holy book) and Sunnah (the saying, traditions, and practices of Prophet Muhammad). Absolute monarchism denotes that no political parties or national elections are permitted, and that the reigning monarch executes predominant control over legislative and internal civil affairs. Comparatively, a constitutional monarchy such as that of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland denotes that the powers held by the reigning monarch in their position as head of state are more symbolic and ceremonial. As such, the House of Windsor often rely significantly on consumerist culture as a means for maintaining their monarchical legitimacy, and relevance and ‘celebrity’, particularly within its Commonwealth settler nations (Randell-Moon). The rule of the House of Saud has often been controversially labelled by critics as totalitarian (Bandow), particularly for the limited freedoms of expression and association afforded to its citizens, where “controversy is discouraged, and conformity is encouraged” (Faksh & Hendrickson 1171); as Faksh and Hendrickson (1171) surmise, “the system offers little scope for the expression of competing views, much less for acting on them”. Nonetheless, the prevailing system of government in Saudi Arabia, currently under the patronage of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, led to the creation of one of the most uniquely curated sovereign powers, whose rise and affluence is, in part, largely testament to the loyalty of its citizenry to its monarchy. The Saudi government provides its citizens with a range of benefits, including exemption from personal income tax, free education (including tertiary) and healthcare, as well as government-subsidised handouts. In 2018, for example, King Salman ordered the government to pay around 1.18 million Saudis working in the public sector 1,000 Saudi Riyals (SAR) (approximately US$266) per month to “offset increasing costs of living” (Perper); for Alawwad (cited in Perper), “the allocation of 50 billion Riyals (approximately US$13 billion) for this decree indicates the leadership’s concern for the people’s comfort and quality of living. The modern-day rule of Saudi royalty may be seen as reminiscent of the foundational traditions and customs on which the nation was formed, “much like a sheikh of a tribe who is in close touch with the concerns of his tribesmen and keeps those concerns in balance” (Faksh & Hendrickson 1171). The Saudi monarchy that has thus emerged may be seen to radically differ from Western concepts of the institution: “no Sun King, no pomp elevating the monarch far above the common breed, not even a crown or a throne” (Rentz 15). This article discusses the growth of the House of Saud – from nomadic warriors principally guided by the foundations of Islam to entrepreneurs determined to bridge the gap in the Kingdom between tradition and modernity, conservatism and social liberalism, nationalism and internationalism. The Founding Monarchs, Black Gold, and Foreign Relations Prior to the official unification of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the House of Saud considered the UK a close ally, particularly with regard to British support received in relation to the defeat of the Ottoman conquest in the Arabia Peninsula (Nonneman). During World War I, for example, Ibn Saud (then ruler of Najd and al-Ahsa, and later founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) signed the 1915 Treaty of Darin (or ‘Anglo-Saudi’ Treaty) with the British government, granting the regions under Ibn Saud’s rule the status of a British protectorate (Wilkinson; Dahlan). In the years that followed the signing of the treaty, Britain also granted Ibn Saud “a loan of [₤]20,000 and a shipment of arms”, as well as a monthly stipend of ₤5,000 from 1917 to 1924 (Nonneman 640). This stipend was granted as a token for the “consolidation of the new Saudi polity, through military means and acts of patronage and generosity towards both [Ibn Saud’s] supporters and many of his vanquished foes” (Nonneman 640). In 1927, the Treaty of Darin was supplanted by the Treaty of Jeddah, which affirmed the British government’s recognition of absolute independence of Ibn Saud’s rulership as King of Najd and Hejaz and its dependencies – the ‘dual Kingdom’ later unified and renamed to Saudi Arabia (Nonneman). Undoubtedly, the discovery of ‘black gold’ in Saudi Arabia had, and continues to have, significant influence on the nation’s identify formation, the extent of its socioeconomic growth, and the Saudi monarchy’s political prowess. Given the strength of the alliance between the state under Ibn Saud and the UK in the early twentieth century, Ibn Saud awarded a UK-based company its first petroleum concession in 1923; after four years, however, the company was unable to strike any oil and the contract was not renewed. A second sixty-year concession that was awarded to the US-based Standard Oil Company of California (now known as the Arabian American Oil Company, or ARAMCO) in 1933 would, however, not only mark a significant turning-point for the Saudi economy, but also for Saudi foreign relations thereafter (Al-Farsy). According to Al-Farsy (45), Ibn Saud’s “concession to the American firm at that time represented a major break with what was virtually a British monopoly of petroleum concession in that part of the world”. Notably, the House of Saud also received ‘advantageous’ offers from both Japan and Germany for oil ‘diplomacy’ in the late 1930s (Al-Farsy). Ibn Saud believed, however, that the Axis Powers were instead “motivated by political considerations” (Al-Farsy 47) and were “aware of the strategic value of the Middle East, situated as it was on the lines of communication with her new European partners” (Katakura 263). As such, Ibn Saud “preferred to continue his association with the Americans” as it had “the advantage of assuring the economic development of the country without incurring political liabilities” (Al-Farsy 47). World War II, thus, markedly represented a unique epoch for the House of Saud, characterised by an expansion of diplomatic missions beyond Europe to America (Beling). From Warrior to Diplomat Ibn Saud was considered a warrior of “towering a

No AccessFeb 2023Legal, Institutional, and Governance Challenges Facing Land Use in MENA CountriesAuthors/Editors: Anna Corsi and Harris SelodAnna CorsiSearch for more papers by this author and Harris SelodSearch for more papers by this authorhttps://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1661-1_ch2AboutView ChaptersFull TextPDF (0.9 MB) ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract: Describes the current institutional and legal contexts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) governing land issues, highlighting how they have taken shape historically, and presenting the key regional land governance and land administration challenges. Major challenges common to MENA countries that weaken land governance, resulting in inefficient and opaque land administration and management, include (1) complex, outdated legal frameworks; (2) institutional fragmentation with overlapping mandates; (3) disproportionate involvement of the state in the sector; and (4) weakness of property taxation. These challenges have historical roots and reflect current political economy constraints preventing or slowing reforms. Generally, the quality of land administration services proves greater in wealthier and smaller countries, possibly due to higher capacity or a limited number of transactions exerting less pressure on land administration systems. Low levels of geographic coverage, in combination with lack of publicly available information and poor reliability of infrastructure, have likely contributed to a significant number of land-related disputes. 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Google ScholarWorld Bank. 2020. Doing Business 2020: Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/business-enabling-environment. LinkGoogle Scholar Previous chapterNext chapter FiguresreferencesRecommendeddetails View Published: February 2023ISBN: 978-1-4648-1661-1e-ISBN: 978-1-4648-1738-0 Copyright & Permissions Related RegionsMiddle East and North AfricaRelated CountriesEgypt, Arab Rep.Related TopicsCommunities & Human Settlements KeywordsCASE STUDYLAND MANAGEMENTLAND-USE REGULATIONLAND-USE POLICYLAND-USE CONFLICTSPROPERTY TAXESPOLITICAL ECONOMYTRANSPARENCY PDF DownloadLoading ...

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