The impact of financial uncertainty shocks on firm creation across US states

The extraordinary events surrounding the Great Recession have cast a considerable doubt on the traditional sources of macroeconomic instability. In their place, economists have singled out financial and uncertainty shocks as potentially important drivers of economic fluctuations. Empirically distinguishing between these two types of shocks, however, is difficult because increases in economic uncertainty are strongly associated with a widening of credit spreads, an indication of a tightening in financial conditions. This paper uses the penalty function approach within the SVAR framework to examine the interaction between financial conditions and economic uncertainty and to trace out the impact of these two types of shocks on the economy. The results indicate that (1) financial shocks have a significant adverse effect on economic outcomes and that such shocks were an important source of cyclical fluctuations since the mid-1980; (2) uncertainty shocks, especially those implied by uncertainty proxies that do not rely on financial asset prices, are also an important source of macroeconomic disturbances; and (3) uncertainty shocks have an especially negative economic impact in situations where they elicit a concomitant tightening of financial conditions. Evidence suggests that the Great Recession was likely an acute manifestation of the toxic interaction between uncertainty and financial shocks.

The macroeconomic impact of financial and uncertainty shocks

The extraordinary events surrounding the Great Recession have cast a considerable doubt on the traditional sources of macroeconomic instability. In their place, economists have singled out financial and uncertainty shocks as potentially important drivers of economic fluctuations. Empirically distinguishing between these two types of shocks, however, is difficult because increases in economic uncertainty are strongly associated with a widening of credit spreads, an indication of a tightening in financial conditions. This paper uses the penalty function approach within the SVAR framework to examine the interaction between financial conditions and economic uncertainty and to trace out the impact of these two types of shocks on the economy. The results indicate that (1) financial shocks have a significant adverse effect on economic outcomes and that such shocks were an important source of cyclical fluctuations since the mid-1980s; (2) uncertainty shocks, especially those implied by uncertainty proxies that do not rely on financial asset prices, are also an important source of macroeconomic disturbances; and (3) uncertainty shocks have an especially negative economic impact in situations where they elicit a concomitant tightening of financial conditions. Evidence suggests that the Great Recession was likely an acute manifestation of the toxic interaction between uncertainty and financial shocks.

The macroeconomic impact of economic uncertainty and financial shocks under low and high financial stress

While the negative effect of uncertainty shocks on economic activity is well documented in many empirical studies, little is known about the extent to which the effect differs across various kinds of uncertainty, especially in the emerging market economy context. Using the newly available economic policy uncertainty index from six emerging market economies (Brazil, Chile, China, India, Korea, and Russia), we compare the impact of financial uncertainty shocks—measured by stock market volatility—and that of policy uncertainty shocks on the economy. We find that financial uncertainty shocks have much larger and more significant impact on output than policy uncertainty shocks, except for China where the government has direct controls over financial market activity. While our finding differs from the existing studies about advanced economies that find no smaller effects of policy uncertainty shocks on output than financial uncertainty shocks, it is consistent with the recent emphasis on financial frictions as a propagation mechanism of uncertainty shocks.

Financial vs. Policy Uncertainty in Emerging Economies: Evidence from Korea

I estimate a structural VAR identified using sign restrictions to separately identify financial, macro uncertainty, and financial uncertainty shocks. The novelty of the estimation procedure relies on the qualitatively different response of corporate liquidity: Financial shocks lead firms to draw down their liquidity as they lose access to external finance, while uncertainty‐type shocks drive‐up liquid assets as a precautionary measure. While all three shocks have contractionary effects on the US economy, only macro uncertainty shocks trigger deflationary patterns. Existing theoretical frameworks can rationalize this finding.

This article shows that firm entry dynamics are an important part of the propagation of financial shocks to the real macroeconomy. A VAR documents empirically that adverse financial shocks are associated with significant declines in both new firm creation and equity values. A DSGE business cycle model combining endogenous firm entry and financial frictions, where firms have a choice of financing entry through debt or equity, can explain these facts. The model implies that adjustment in firm numbers can moderate the impact of financial shocks on aggregate output, as it buffers the equity value and financial stance of surviving firms.

The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks in the United Kingdom

Firm entry dynamics are an integral part of the propagation of financial shocks to the real economy. A VAR documents that adverse financial shocks in the U.S. postwar period are associated with a fall in new firm creation and a fall in firm equity values. We propose a DSGE model with endogenous firm entry and financial frictions that is able to explain these facts. The model is novel in giving firms a choice of financing up-front entry costs through a combination of debt as well as equity, so that financial shocks directly impact the financing of firm entry. The model is also novel in making use of the asset pricing implications of the firm entry condition to explain the equity price response to a financial shock. The model indicates that free entry of new firms limits the ability of incumbent firms to respond to negative financial shocks through endogenous capital restructuring. Also, allowing the number of firms to fall after an adverse financial shock is a useful margin of macroeconomic adjustment, reducing the overall impact of the shock on aggregate output. This is because the remaining firms become financially stronger and better able to withstand a financial shock.

We study the spillovers of US real uncertainty and financial uncertainty shocks on Euro area economic activity in an SVAR framework. We find that a rise in US real or financial uncertainty triggers a decline in industrial production and an increase in credit spreads in the Euro area. The adverse effects of financial uncertainty shocks on Euro area industrial production are larger than those stemming from real uncertainty shocks (−0.8% versus −0.4%) due to a larger extent of financial friction. The contribution of US financial uncertainty shocks, vis-à-vis US real uncertainty shocks, to the Euro area is quantitatively more important.

In this paper, we empirically investigate the role of stock market illiquidity shocks, stemming from Amihud's illiquidity measure, in explaining U.S. macroeconomic fluctuations from 1973 to 2018. We find that the impact of illiquidity shocks on economic activity is substantial, and historical decomposition analysis shows that cumulative illiquidity shocks were an essential contributor to the prolonged economic slump of the Great Recession. Moreover, our identified illiquidity shocks represent a distinct source of macroeconomic instability. This suggests that illiquidity shocks, measured by the stock price impacts, may contain more information than other types of shocks in recent studies, such as financial shocks and uncertainty shocks. ( JEL C32 , E32)

Uncertainty shocks and business cycles in the US: New insights from the last three decades

Asian economies are increasingly integrated to the global economy through trade and financial linkages, exposing them to the international financial cycle. This paper explores how external shocks are transmitted to Asian economies and whether the use of policies, such as the monetary policy interest rate, foreign exchange intervention (FXI) and macroprudential measures (MPMs), can mitigate the impact of these external shocks. It uses panel quantile regressions on a sample of 14 Asian advanced and emerging economies (AEs and EMs) to assess the impact of financial and real shocks on investment and GDP growth at the median and 5th percentile tail. It finds that external financial shocks tend to have a larger effect on Asian economies than real shocks, and that the main transmission channels through which shocks are propagated are capital flows (particularly via corporate and bank balance sheets) for EMs, and credit for AEs. It also finds evidence that for Asian EMs, FXI may help dampen the capital flows and real exchange rate channels and mitigate financial shocks in the short run, and monetary policy transmission tends to be relatively weak; meanwhile MPMs can help mitigate the credit channel for both AEs and EMs.

Asian economies are increasingly integrated to the global economy through trade and financial linkages, exposing them to the international financial cycle. This paper explores how external shocks are transmitted to Asian economies and whether the use of policies, such as the monetary policy interest rate, foreign exchange intervention (FXI) and macroprudential measures (MPMs), can mitigate the impact of these external shocks. It uses panel quantile regressions on a sample of 14 Asian advanced and emerging economies (AEs and EMs) to assess the impact of financial and real shocks on investment and GDP growth at the median and 5th percentile tail. It finds that external financial shocks tend to have a larger effect on Asian economies than real shocks, and that the main transmission channels through which shocks are propagated are capital flows (particularly via corporate and bank balance sheets) for EMs, and credit for AEs. It also finds evidence that for Asian EMs, FXI may help dampen the capital flows and real exchange rate channels and mitigate financial shocks in the short run, and monetary policy transmission tends to be relatively weak; meanwhile MPMs can help mitigate the credit channel for both AEs and EMs.