Abstract
Agglomeration payment schemes aim at increasing the spatial connectivity of conserved land. Such payments are offered by a conservation agency to landowners subject to the condition that the conserved land is sufficiently connected to other conserved land. Facing this connectivity condition, landowners with conservation costs below the payment may need to offer some of their surplus through side payments to other landowners with high costs so that these conserve their land and the connectivity condition is met. Previous papers that modelled side payments in agglomeration payment schemes ignored that landowners may be sensitive to fairness and distributional issues. To incorporate fairness issues I relate a model of an agglomeration payment scheme to the well-known ultimatum game and show that if landowners are concerned about fairness and distribution the agency must offer higher payments and has to expect lower levels of cost-effectiveness.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
