The Impact of EU Media Policies on national frameworks in Albania and the Western Balkans

This article explores the correlation between Russian influence and the European Union (EU) integration process in the Western Balkans. The focus is on analyzing the impact of Russian influence expressed through political, economic and cultural means on the region’s integration into the EU. The article argues that the Russian foreign policy toolkit inhibits the EU accession process for the six countries of the Western Balkans, as it interferes with the internal functioning of these countries, which, in turn, affects their ability to fulfill EU requirements. Using a comparative case approach this study has found evidence that Russian cultural, political and financial support negatively affects the Western Balkans’ European integration process, hindering progress towards accession. Additionally, the findings support the argument that Western Balkans countries with Slavic populations are more susceptible to Russian influence. The article highlights the significant impact of Russia on the EU integration process in the Western Balkans and underscores the need for EU policymakers to address this issue to ensure a smooth and successful accession process for the region.

Political actors bear a pivotal importance in advancing/hindering the European Union (EU) integration process in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia). All countries of the Western Balkans have marked similarities but also significant differences in relation to their dynamics and developmental outlook. In order to make the article more concrete, we focus the attention on Kosovo, North Macedonia and Albania. The article uses a comparative method to pit against each other indicators pointing to similarities and differences among these countries, in the context of finding the factors of progressing and hindering towards the EU integration for the three countries. The factors in focus are: ruling majority-opposition and political parties, international actors, civil society, the media, public perceptions, and ethnic and nationalistic divisions (a specific factor in North Macedonia and Kosovo). The analyze show that there has been improvement is some aspects. The political parties, the ruling majority and opposition, give both tendencies towards the more inclusive political situation and pragmatist one of their interests fulfilling. International actors, civil society and the media show contribution to the EU integration. For the last factor, results indicate that in North Macedonia ethnicity is a major cause behind political conflicts, with a clear impact on the EU integration process. Kosovo is to be located somewhere in the middle, as interethnic relations play a role, but also internal strife is significant in terms of defining the forcefield between the different political and ethnic actors.

This paper examines the interplay between the European Union (EU) identity and the identities of countries in the Western Balkans, focusing on shared values, lifestyles, and the role of EU conditionality. It explores how EU-promoted values and lifestyles affects political, social, and economic landscapes in the Western Balkans, especially among the Western Balkan Six (WB6) aspiring for EU membership. Through qualitative case studies of the WB6, the paper analyses the influence of EU conditionality on the adoption of EU values and lifestyles, highlighting the comparison and dynamics of identity transformation during the EU integration process. By drawing on media interviews with policymakers, EU officials, and local stakeholders, as well as policy documents and academic literature, the paper discusses how EU conditionality shapes national identities in the region. It also addresses the challenges and opportunities these countries face in aligning with EU values, presenting obstacles to integration and opportunities for deeper engagement with the EU framework. The findings contribute to understanding the complexities of the EU’s enlargement policy, emphasising the strategic importance of the Western Balkans for the future of EU integration.

The EU Response to COVID-19: From Reactive Policies to Strategic Decision-Making.

The Austrian Case C-347/14, New Media Online v. Bundeskommunikationssenat, of October 2015 gave the Court of Justice of the European Union the opportunity to clarify whether the video content of a newspaper website is covered by the European Union (EU) audiovisual media services directive (AVMSD). Advocate General Szpunar explained what was, in his view, the EU legislature’s alleged intention underlying the Directive’s definition of an audiovisual media service. The Court was not convinced by his argument and instead unambiguously concurred with the two Austrian regulatory authorities: not only films and broadcasts of long duration are governed by the AVMSD but also shorter forms of moving image material, even when these are part of a newspaper’s online offering. Assuming that this decision will significantly influence the European Commission’s plans for a ‘new’ Directive, what are the implications for a new media framework for the 21st century?

Editorial: Governing the EU's climate and energy transition through the 2030 Framework

The links between climate change and conflict have been well-documented in recent observations and academic literature: far from being causally direct, these links often depend on specific conditions and occur through certain pathways (Koubi, 2019). For example, conflicts have been found to be more likely in areas with poor access to infrastructure and facilities (Detges, 2016), or where government distrust and political bias are prevalent (Detges, 2017). As such, climate change has often been described as a ‘threat multiplier’, making it imperative for security and development actors to consider these fragility risks collectively in their policies and strategies. In addition to the expected impacts of climate change on the European Union (EU), such as increasing temperatures, extreme weather events or rising sea levels, climate change also has “direct and indirect international security impacts” for the EU’s foreign- and security policy (Council of the European Union, 2016). These affect for example migration, food security, access to resources and socio-economic factors that possibly contribute to disruptions (ibid.). The resulting fragility may affect the EU by contributing to changes in geopolitical power dynamics, whilst at the same time needs for support in neighbouring and partner countries could increase (Brown, Le More & Raasteen, 2020). The EU has increasingly acknowledged climate-fragility risks over the last years, as is evident from several key foreign policy strategies, agreements, and decisions. The European Green Deal, for example, aims to cushion climate and environmental impacts that may exacerbate instability (European Commission, 2019). At the regional level, individual policies underline the links between climate impacts and security in partner regions, such as for the Sahel (Council of the European Union, 2021a) and the Neighbourhood (EEAS, 2021a), stressing the importance in tackling those risks. To that end, the EU has been at the forefront in providing multilateral support for its partner regions, through its various instruments related to climate, environment, development, and security. According to official EU sources, EU funding for official development assistance (ODA) rose by 15% in nominal terms from 2019 to €66.8 billion in 2020 (European Commission, 2021a). Furthermore, the share dedicated to climate action is also growing: the EU initiative Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (GCCA+) received an additional €102.5 million for the period 2014-2020 compared to the previous phase 2004- 2014 (European Commission, n.d.). Looking ahead, the EU’s recently approved Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027 is set to provide €110.6 billion in funding for external action and pre-accession assistance to its Neighbourhood and rest of the world (European Commission, 2021b). Despite the increased recognition of climate-related fragility risks in EU policies and the funding committed to climate action and international development, implementation of concrete measures to address these risks are lagging behind, with only a handful of EUfunded projects addressing climate-fragility risks (Brown, Le More & Raasteen, 2020). Compounding these challenges is the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the current vaccine rollout worldwide, and with some countries seeing a potential end to the health crisis, the pandemic has taken – and continues to take – its toll in many parts of the world. The unprecedented nature of COVID-19 could ultimately make it more difficult for the EU to address the impacts of climate change on fragility and security in its partner regions. In other words: How does the pandemic affect the EU’s ability to address climate-fragility risks in its neighbourhood? To answer this question, this paper will explore the implications of COVID-19 on relevant EU policies and strategies that address the climate security nexus, focusing on three regions: the Sahel, North Africa, and Western Balkans. These regions were chosen for geographical representativeness (i.e., being the EU’s southern and eastern neighbouring regions), as well as being priority regions for EU external action, and, in the case of the Western Balkans, for EU accession.1 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines, in general terms, the impacts of the pandemic on the political priorities and ability of the EU to address climate-fragility risks. Section 3 explores, for each focus region, how the pandemic affects key objectives of EU policies aiming at reducing climate-fragility risks in that region. Section 4 provides several recommendations on how the EU can better address the interlinking risks associated with climate-fragility and COVID-19.

Eighty-six EU policy options for reducing imported deforestation

The European Union (EU) has a potential major influence on patients' global access to medicines. Historically, this influence most notably came through the EU's trade and aid agendas that intentionally targeted foreign markets. Now, the EU's own internal pharmaceutical policy appears to indirectly shape global access to medicines (ex. EU's large-scale Covid-19 vaccine procurement and export bans). To understand the ways the EU's internal and external policies impact on global access to medicines, this Scoping Review synthesises evidence of the EU's global regulatory influence and its impacts on access to medicines in non-EU low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). By searching 8 databases and grey literature, documents published in English, Spanish, Portuguese, or Russian between 1995-2021 that addressed an EU law, regulation, or policy in relation to access to medicines in LMICs were included. This review identifies three mechanisms through which EU action impacts on medicines in LMICs. One, the EU's external, treaty-based agreements with LMICs can affect their pharmaceutical trade, sales, and use. Two, EU's internal market regulation, standards, and methods are used as models or sources of inspiration for pharmaceutical governance in LMICs. Three, ‘soft' forms of EU influence manifest through the EU's technical assistance, its research and development (aid) funding, and its ‘capacity building' activities towards LMIC actors in the field of pharmaceuticals. Examples of impacts of EU action ranged from the development of new medicines primarily for LMICs, to changes in the availability of generics and on medicines spending in LMICs, and the potential for a more efficient yet less autonomous local market approval process. Most evidence of impact was not peer reviewed. This study raises the question of how to support resilient and efficient global pathways for drug development and regulation while still being responsive and accountable to the local public interest.Key messages There are 3 mechanisms through which EU action impacts on medicines in LMICs: treaty-based agreements, EU internal market regulation, and ‘soft' EU influence.EU decision makers need a reliable understanding of how the EU’s internal and external policies impact on pharmaceuticals globally.

Trade agreements with the European Union (EU) and Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) significantly influenced the liberalisation of agri-food products in Western Balkan (WB) countries. In all Western Balkan countries, there has been an intensification of the trade of agri-food products and a partial change in the regional and commodity structures of trade. This paper aims to identify comparative advantages of agri-food sectors and consider its tendencies during the EU integration process. Additionally, this paper will discuss some opportunities for improvement of the export positions of agri-food products. In that context and based on the literature review, the indexes of revealed comparative advantages and its modified version will be used as a main method for analysis in this research. Results showed that all Western Balkan countries, except Albania, have comparative advantages in exporting agri-food products. It is evident that Serbia has the highest level of comparative advantages in this sector. Moreover, this paper suggests that all countries should aim to provide the best possible positions for their agri-food products during pre-accession negotiations for EU membership and take the necessary steps towards increasing the level of competitiveness in the common EU market.

Despite the European Union (EU)-sponsored economic and political reforms, the Western Balkans has made little to no progress in several fields, including post-conflict reconciliation, post-socialist economic transformation, and democracy. This situation threatens both regional stability and, more importantly, the EU integration process in the region. On the other hand, the EU is in crisis and its enlargement policy has lost its momentum. If alternative policies are not put in place in the Western Balkans, it would once again be dragged into a whirlpool of conflict. This study asserts that the EU Strategy for Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR), which is a Macro-Regional Strategy could serve as a more realistic integration tool in the Western Balkans and an alternative for EU membership.

THE COHERENCE OF EU LAW: THE PROMOTION OF INVESTMENTS VS. THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The European Union (EU) is actively aiming a transition to clean energy as part of its Green Deal strategy (European Commission, 2019), which aims for climate neutrality by 2050. This shift involves moving away from traditional fossil fuels such as coal, petroleum and natural gas, towards renewable energy sources (e.g., sunlight, wind, geothermal heat, or flowing water), and law carbon energy sources, such as hydrogen and biomethane. While the EU’s efforts focus on achieving sustainability, its strategy also prioritizes energy security. The Western Balkans, heavily reliant on imported natural gas, face unique challenges and opportunities in aligning with the EU's energy policies, particularly the recently updated gas directives. This paper examines the legal and economic implications of these directives for the Western Balkans, particularly in the context of economic security. It highlights the role of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in driving the transition to clean energy and explores how aligning with EU standards can attract critical investment to develop hydrogen ready infrastructure. The paper also discusses the legal frameworks governing energy supply chain security and the implications for regional integration. By addressing these issues, the paper aims to provide a roadmap for harmonizing economic security with the clean energy transition in this strategically important region.

Among the objectives of the European Union (EU) there is the protection and improvement of European citizens’ health. To this end, several instruments can be enacted at EU level, both of binding legal nature- such as regulations, - and not binding -. EU regulations are binding legislative acts that must be applied across all the EU member states (MS). In the context of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, proposals are initiated by the European Commission and their development involves two more actors, namely the European Parliament, representing EU citizens, and the Council of the EU, representing EU governments. These act as co-legislators, are requested to review the proposal, and have the right to propose amendments to reach a final agreement on a joint text, often through tripartite meetings on legislative proposals between representatives of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission; these are referred to as ‘Trilogue’ meetings. The EU regulation on Health Technology Assessment (HTAR) was adopted in January 2022, and will become legally binding in January 2025. It provides a first input for the reorganisation of the pharmaceutical market across all EU strategy (Pharmaceutical Strategy). The Pharmaceutical Strategy aims to future proof regulatory frameworks; support industry in promoting research; and foster EU citizens’ access to safe, effective, and high-quality medicines that are used in diagnosis, treatment and prevention of diseases. HTA allows for evidence-informed policy- and decision-making, disentangling the comparative value of health technologies and permits for informed negotiation in terms of pricing, reimbursement and, of course, in terms of establishing priorities for procurement decisions. The HTAR framework allows to overcome specific key challenges stemming from the highly divergent and fragmented HTA procedures across EU MS, ultimately aiming to allow a more timely and equitable access to medicines, vaccines and devices, at EU level, including by allowing a more harmonised approach in terms of dossier submission for companies too. The preparatory phase for the implementation of the HTAR is underway with the establishment of the Coordination Group on HTA (HTACG) and of the HTA Stakeholder Network, the set up of a secure intranet for the exchange of information and the planning of capacity building initiatives. This workshop is intended to provide the attenders with insights into the process behind the development of EU regulation with a focus on HTA regulation and its following implementation. Key messages • European legislative acts set the framework for the protection and the improvement of European citizens’ health and for member states policies. • The EU regulation on Health Technology Assessment will foster European citizens’ access to safe, effective, and high-quality medicines, vaccines and devices and its implementation is underway. Speakers/Panelists Jose A Valverde European Commission, DG Health and Food Safety, Brussels, Belgium Amandine Garde Law & Non-Communicable Diseases Unit, Liverpool, UK Marco Marchetti Italian National Agency for Regional Healthcare Services (AGENAS), HTA unit, Rome, Italy Iñaki Gutiérrez-Ibarluzea Basque Foundation for Innovation And Research (BIOEF), Barakaldo, Spain

Defense industrial policy is not an area that normally comes to mind when one thinks of European Union (EU) policies. As will be evident from the following discussion, the EU’s involvement in defense industry matters remains limited. Yet some EU policies do have an effect on European defense firms, and significantly more of an effect today than in 1958 or even 1978. An explanation of why the EU has become involved in this policy area will be the focus of this chapter. EU policies in this sector did not just appear from out of nowhere. In fact, few of these policies were explicitly created with Europe’s defense industry in mind. Most policies were developed for other reasons, but now have a direct effect on the armaments sector. This chapter attempts to answer two questions: ‘What are the EU policies that affect European defense firms?’ and ‘What roles have the three primary institutions within the EU — Council of Ministers, Commission, Parliament — played in bringing defense industry issues onto the EU agenda?’