Abstract
Exploring the interplay between managerial compensation, agency costs, and corporate governance, this study investigates how chief executive officer (CEO) duality (combined CEO and chairman roles) moderates the relationship. Using data from Vietnamese listed industrial firms (2013–2022), the research reveals that under weak governance (CEO duality), compensation has no significant impact on agency costs. However, with strong governance (separate CEO and chairman roles), compensation’s influence on agency costs weakens. Building on this analysis, the study proposes recommendations for enhancing corporate governance practices and mitigating the influence of remuneration on agency problems.
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