The idea of the person as a collective representation

Abstract

Durkheim's conceptions of "collective representations" and the "collective consciousness" have stimulated debate in sociology, but have not been seriously taken up as part of a school of modern sociological thought. This, in our opinion, is to be regretted because both concepts are potentially of great value, especially that of "collective representations." But a moment's reflection is needed to see that all of the ordinary, everyday elements of ' 'social reality' ' are collective repre? sentations, e.g., offices ("the Presidency," "judges," "captains"), "laws," "norms," "marriage," "divorce," "common shares," "bonds," "mort? gages," "deeds," "churches," "prayers," "parents," "children,"?all are in effect collective ideas. These entities have been treated in social science as struc? tures, systems of actions, social objects, and functional elements,?indeed in ev? ery way, except as collective ideas. In order to demonstrate the feasibility of a Durkheimian approach to these phenomena of social life, we propose here to treat the "person" as a collective representation. This requires us, first of all, to overcome what may be called the "naturalistic illusion" of the person in everyday life. We are ordinarily disposed to regard the persons whom we encounter in face-to-face situations as presented directly to us. We believe that we are able to directly grasp the "reality" of the other. This atti? tude also applies to our apprehension of others in the "mitwelt" and the "vorwelt."1 Thus, we believe that we can discern the "real" intentions and motives of political leaders and other celebrities. Historians write of persons of the past as if it were possible to actually know their inner thoughts and designs. To be sure, we understand in the ' 'natural attitude' ' there there are problems in? volved in this direct apprehension of the other. We discover that our assessments have been incorrect, as the behavior of the other belies the estimate that we have made of his character. These problems of assessment generate distinctive and im? portant types of reflection as concerns the persons of the "mitwelt" and the "vorwelt. " Thus, most political journalism is given to speculations and reassess? ments concerning what presidents, prime ministers, kings, and party leaders are "really" like, and what they "really" intend. In history, and in the historical branches of political science, we find constant reinterpretations, "revisionist" in