Abstract
Recent work in moral theory has argued against according shame any moral value in virtue of its supposed heteronomy. Authors who have defended shame's moral value have generally argued that shame is, in fact, autonomous. In the present article, I draw on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Stanley Cavell and Adam Smith to develop an argument for shame's moral worth based on its heteronomy. I then contrast my defence with work that holds shame's moral value to be based on its autonomy. I argue that that view goes wrong by construing shame on the model of private experience. This psychology is unconvincing in its own right and can underwrite moral failings.
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