Abstract

At the turn of the century, regulators introduced policies to control bank risk-taking. Many banks appointed chief risk officers (CROs), yet bank holdings of new, complex, and untested financial derivatives subsequently soared. Why did banks expand use of new derivatives? We suggest that CROs encouraged the rise of new derivatives in two ways. First, we build on institutional arguments about the expert construction of compliance, suggesting that risk experts arrived with an agenda of maximizing risk-adjusted returns, which led them to favor the derivatives. Second, we build on moral licensing arguments to suggest that bank appointment of CROs induced “organizational licensing,” leading trading-desk managers to reduce policing of their own risky behavior. We further argue that CEOs and fund managers bolstered or restrained derivatives use depending on their financial interests. We predict that CEOs favored new derivatives when their compensation rewarded risk-taking, but that both CEOs and fund managers opposed new derivatives when they held large illiquid stakes in banks. We test these predictions using data on derivatives holdings of 157 large banks between 1995 and 2010.

Highlights

  • In the 1990s and 2000s, risk-taking among big U.S banks reached new heights, eventually setting off a massive global financial crisis with severe and wide-ranging consequences

  • Organizational theorists have focused on the design of risk modeling and relationships between financial market participants (MacKenzie 2011; Millo and MacKenzie 2009; Pernell-Gallagher 2015), and economic sociologists have highlighted the failure of credit rating agencies (Carruthers 2010; Rona-Tas and Hiss 2010), gaps in the regulatory oversight of financial innovations (Funk and Hirschman 2014), and the perverse incentives that accompanied the vertical integration of financial firms (Goldstein and Fligstein 2017) and the growing complexity of financial instruments (Fligstein and Roehrkasse 2016)

  • We offer a complementary account that calls attention to the role of chief risk officers, who were charged with managing regulatory compliance, and to the interests of chief executive officers (CEOs) and professional fund managers

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Summary

Introduction

In the 1990s and 2000s, risk-taking among big U.S banks reached new heights, eventually setting off a massive global financial crisis with severe and wide-ranging consequences. We predict that banks that appoint CROs will increase holdings of new derivatives. When CEOs and fund managers hold large illiquid stakes in banks, we expect they will resist exposure to new derivatives.

Results
Conclusion
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