Abstract
AbstractThis article tracks the development of Philippa Foot’s philosophy and how she came to the insights in Natural Goodness about the continuity of moral usages of ‘good’ with our evaluations of plants and animals. The article focuses on Foot’s understanding of ‘good’ as an attributive adjective, her work on life and function, and the relationship between the Aristotelian naturalism project and biological sciences. A key claim is that we should understand Foot’s naturalist project as part of a Wittgensteinian investigation into our use of language rather than as a relegation of ethics to the biological sciences. This culminated in a form of ethical naturalism importantly distinct from those that attempt to derive ethics from the conclusions of evolutionary science.
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