The Geopolitics of AI-Driven Arms Races

For the United States the ‘international law of global security’ is, in a unique sense, synonymous with the entire project of constructing global legal order. Uniquely preponderant power enjoyed since the end of the Second World War has allowed US preferences to manifest not merely in specific rules and regimes, but in purposive development of the entire structure of global legal order to favour American security interests. Perceptions of a recent decline in this order now find expression in advocacy for a ‘liberal’ or ‘rules-based’ international order, as the claimed foundation for global prosperity and security. This working paper seeks to map out the parameters of US contributions to the global security order by uncovering the strategic and political foundations of its engagement with the international law of global security. The paper begins by reflecting on competing US conceptions of the relationship between national security and global order as they evolved across the twentieth century. The focus then turns to three significant trends defining the contemporary field. First are US attitudes toward multilateral institutions and global security, and the ongoing contest between beliefs that they are mutually reinforcing versus beliefs that US security and global institutions sit in zero-sum opposition. Second is the impact of the generational ‘War on Terror’, which has yielded more permissive interpretation and development of laws governing the global use of violence. The final trend is that towards competitive geopolitical interests restructuring international law, which are evident across diverse areas ranging from global economics, to cybersecurity, to the fragmentation of global order into spheres of influence. Looking ahead, a confluence of rising geopolitical competitors with divergent legal conceptions, and conflicted domestic support for the legitimacy and desirability of US global leadership, emerge as leading forces already reshaping the global security order.

Xi's Global Campaign for Chinese Security Carla P. Freeman (bio) Since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, China's leader Xi Jinping has frequently invoked the Chinese idiom that in crisis, there is opportunity (CGTN 2020). In 2022, even as China continued its COVID state of emergency, Xi Jinping doubled down on promoting China as a source of answers to the world's security challenges. Making a case that the US-led international order lacks the capacity to address current international threats and is also a source of instability, Xi began a global campaign to assert that China had an alternative and better vision for managing global security. Beijing has yet to provide many details about what it has in mind for a new global security order. What can be inferred is that China perceives the current fraught international environment as a chance to win support for security norms that align more closely with its national capabilities and preferences. Beijing's principal vehicle in this undertaking is a "Global Security Initiative" (GSI), introduced by Xi at the Boao Forum in April 2022 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). The initiative is purposively bold: as then Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi elaborated soon after Xi's roll out of the concept, it promises nothing less than "a new approach to eliminating the root causes of international conflicts" (Wang 2022). A GSI concept paper published by China's Foreign Ministry in February 2023 repeats this phrase, adding that "China stands ready to work with all countries and peoples…to create a better future for mankind …" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023). It remains to be seen if the GSI concept will itself win China significant international followership as it takes form. Chinese media reports that 80 countries have already endorsed it (Global Times Editors 2023). Public commentary in non-aligned countries suggests, however, that there are concerns the GSI could be a new bloc in the making (Giri 2022). What is clear is that Chinese arguments that something needs to [End Page 313] be done to improve global security resonate with large swathes of the global public (Yiu 2022). Beijing has almost certainly launched the GSI with multiple policy outcomes in mind. At minimum, the GSI provides a framework for China to amplify its preferred narrative that the US-led international environment is deteriorating and strengthens perceptions that China is a willing provider of global security (Sun 2022). At the time it was launched, Beijing may have seen the GSI as an opportunity to buffer China from criticism on a number of fronts. First, that its own zero COVID policies had contributed to the global economic slowdown; at minimum, it has used narratives critical of Western handling of not just international security but also the pandemic to win support for the GSI in the developing world. Second, the GSI may also have been timed to counter rhetoric that Beijing sought to maximize its opportunities in the Ukraine crisis by maintaining an ambiguous position on Russia's invasion. In early 2023, Beijing associated the GSI with a number of high profile diplomatic initiatives, including a position paper enumerating principles for a political settlement of the Ukraine war and a key role in brokering a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Recent developments also offer evidence that the GSI could be operationalized as a channel for the export of Chinese technologies and techniques China uses to implement its domestic security goals (Freeman and Stephenson 2022b). As this suggests, the development of a new international security architecture with Chinese characteristics is about much more than just buttressing Chinese hard power or diplomatic influence: it is about enhancing a comprehensive vision of Chinese security that encompasses the entire state, domestic society, and, to an increasing degree, the international community as well. 2012–2021 Comprehensive National Security with Xi Jinping Characteristics Securing China has been a dominant theme of Xi Jinping's leadership since he succeeded Hu Jintao a decade ago. A number of institutional changes and new policies that followed the 18th Party Congress and the 2018 Two Sessions made clear that, under Xi's leadership, China would pursue a security strategy that...

In 1993, the Russian Federation set out a new military doctrine that would determine the direction of its armed forces until President Putin set out the next doctrine in 2000. The Russian Federation creating the doctrine was new; the USSR had recently collapsed, Gorbachev - the creator of the predecessor to this doctrine in 1987 - was out of office, and the new Russian military had only been formed in May, 1992.1 The analysis of the 1993 doctrine is as follows: a definition of how doctrine is defined; a short history of Russian military doctrine leading up to the 1993 doctrine (officially the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation); and finally, what the doctrine established. An overview of the 1993 doctrine is: (1) Russia's 1993 doctrine was a return to older, more aggressive doctrine as a result of stability concerns surrounding the recent collapse of the USSR; (2) Russia turned from Gorbachev's 'defensive defense' in the 1987 doctrine to aggressive defense with the option of preempting or striking back against an aggressor; (3) Russia was deeply concerned about how nationalism would affect the former Soviet Republics, particularly in respect to the ethnic Russians still living abroad;more » and (4) Nuclear doctrine pledged to not be the first to use nuclear weapons but provided for the potential for escalation from a conventional to a nuclear war. The 2000 doctrine (officially the Russian Federation Military Doctrine) was created in a more stable world than the 1993 doctrine was. The Russian Federation had survived independence and the 'threat of direct military aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies' had diminished. It had secured all of the nuclear weapons from its neighbors Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and had elected a new president, Vladimir Putin, to replace Boris Yeltsin. Yet, even as the doctrine took more defensive tones than the 1993 doctrine, it expanded its nuclear options. Below are a new definition of what doctrine meant in 2000 and an outline of the 2000 doctrine. An overview of the 2000 doctrine is: (1) The 2000 doctrine was a return to a more defensive posture; the threat of nuclear retaliation, rather than that of preemptive force, would be its deterrence; (2) In order to strengthen its nuclear deterrence, Russia extended and redefined the cases in which nuclear weapons could be used to include a wider range of conflict types and a larger spectrum of attackers; and (3) Russia's threats changed to reflect its latest fear of engaging in a limited conflict with no prospect of the use of nuclear deterrence. In 2006, the defense minister and deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov announced that the government was starting on a draft of a future doctrine. Four years later, in 2010, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was put into effect with the intent of determining Russian doctrine until 2020. The 2010 doctrine, like all previous doctrines, was a product of the times in which it was written. Gone were many of the fears that had followed Russia for the past two decades. Below are an examination of the 2010 definition of doctrine as well as a brief analysis of the 2010 doctrine and its deviations from past doctrines. An overview of the 2010 doctrine is: (1) The new doctrine emphasizes the political centralization of command both in military policy and the use of nuclear weapons; (2) Nuclear doctrine remains the same in many aspects including the retention of first-use; (3) At the same time, doctrine was narrowed to using nuclear weapons only when the Russian state's existence is in danger; to continue strong deterrence, Russia also opted to follow the United States by introducing precision conventional weapons; (4) NATO is defined as Russia's primary external threat because of its increased global presence and its attempt to recruit states that are part of the Russian 'bloc'; and (5) The 2000 doctrine's defensive stance was left out of the doctrine; rumored options for use of nuclear weapons in local wars and in preemptive strikes were also left out.« less

This introductory chapter discusses the role of BRICS in the changing global order. BRICS is primarily understood as a foreign policy grouping with an ambitious reform agenda on global order issues with the aim to seek a more equitable recognition considering recent changes in the global power balance. BRICS favor a multi-polar order based on a conservative conceptualization of state sovereign emphasizing non-interference and uncompromised sovereignty. It is argued that how BRICS respond to armed conflict is constitutive for how the global security order is forming especially as institutional reforms in global governance institutions have been minimal until today. The chapter systematically explores summit declarations with regard to peace and security and presents an analysis of individual foreign policy positions and power capabilities of BRICS countries. It is providing the necessary background information for the following conceptual chapter. The two guiding research questions are: How do BRICS countries respond to large-scale armed conflict and how can we explain the choice for a particular response type?

China and India are self-appointed anti-imperialist Global South leaders seeking recognition for their heritage as great states, and neither is an enthusiastic supporter of incursions on the traditional sovereignty norm that underpins global governance. At the same time, both states view the United Nations as a crucial forum for advancing interests and bolstering status, though they have taken the opportunity to modify the global security order in entirely different ways. This chapter proceeds with brief studies of two facets of the global security order. First, it addresses China and India’s peacekeeping profiles, focusing on why these states deploy and the contrasting issues that arise out of their contributions. It then analyze how China and India engaged with the responsibility to protect since the introduction of the norm in 2001, through norm institutionalization at the 2005 World Summit, and through implementation in the seminal case of the 2011 Libya crisis, when both states were at the UN Security Council. The chapter concludes with analysis of the implications for these rising states regarding global governance.

The current Sars-CoV-2 (COVID-19) has been challenging the global security order in unintended negotiation whether to maintain or revamp the status quo of global security order. From the onset on COVID-19 since the last quarter of 2019, it has already presented negotiators with new rules and new players even from the unexpected actors. The pandemic has not only wrecking havoc the economic tendencies of each state but it has definitely showing many parameters of negotiation which have remained fairly constant through the transition (crisis, collation building, mediation, issue linkages, and related factors and indicators). The determination of national interest has been greatly complicated for governments, democratic and non-democratic alike. For the democracies of the world, diplomatic agenda setting is highly subject to strong domestic pulls; for the non-democracies, deliberations are clearly influenced by international and public opinion. In the contemporary process, it is also clear that culture and identity play greater roles in shaping negotiation positions and moves, as manifested in the application of new techniques such as culture-based mediation and track-two facilitation.

An “arms race” is a competition over the quality or quantity of military capabilities between states in the international system. The arms race phenomenon has received considerable attention from scholars over many decades because of the ubiquity, throughout history, of states building arms as a means of deterring enemies, but disagreement persists over whether that policy is effective at avoiding war. The Latin phrase si vis pacem, para bellum, meaning “if you want peace, prepare for war,” dates back to the Roman Empire but the sentiment is likely much older. That states should rapidly build up their militaries in the face of potential threats is a common thread that runs through much of the modern international relations scholarship influenced by realism and deterrence theory. Meeting force with force, the logic went, was the only way to ensure the security or survival of the sovereign state. These states faced a paradox, however, best articulated by the “security dilemma.” Anything a state does in the name of defense, like a rapid military buildup, decreases the security of other states and will be viewed with hostile intent. This set up a debate over competing expectations regarding the relationship between arms races and war (peace). On one hand, deterrence theory posits that rapid arming is necessary to raise the cost of an adversary attacking and, consequently, preserves peace. On the other hand, the spiral model argues that the reality of the security dilemma means that arming produces mistrust, hostility and, thus, increases the likelihood of war. Scholars set out to test these competing hypotheses using large data sets and statistical techniques, but there was widespread disagreement on how to measure arms races, appropriate research design, and the statistical findings were somewhat mixed. Critics of this approach to studying arms races note a number of important weaknesses. First, scholars primarily focus on the consequences of arms races—whether they lead to war or peace—at the expense of understanding the causes. Those who advance this position believe that a theory of arms race onset might well inform our understanding of their consequences. Second, security dilemma, taken as the primary motivation for arms races, suffers from significant logical flaws. Third, assessment of the arms race-war relationship consists of comparative theory tests of deterrence theory and spiral model, yet these ideas are underdeveloped and expectations oversimplified. More recently, scholarship has shifted the focus from the consequences of arms races to developing theories and empirical tests of their causes. These efforts have been informed by insights from bargaining models of war, and their application to this context holds promise for better future understanding of both the causes and consequences of arms races.

The global security order has been evolving since 1989, led initially by the USA to expand its post‐1945 order in Europe to the rest of the world but propelled as well by competition and debates within that post‐Second World War alliance, as collective victors in the Cold War, about how to define a new international order. This article identifies three US policies that began this restructuring; their parallel redefinitions of security, and the tensions provoked by this agenda and its consequences, both within the ‘North’, replacing the ‘West’, between North and ‘South’, replacing the‘East’and the resulting multiple opportunities for alternative political coalitions, North against South, between North and South, and within the South, that have yet to play themselves out fully. The resulting fluidity has not yet stabilised into a new international security order.

On February 19, 2018, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres claimed that he was “absolutely convinced” that “the next war will begin with a massive cyber-attack to destroy military capacity . . . and paralyze basic infrastructure.” The Secretary-General’s greatest concern, however, is that he believes “there is no regulatory scheme for that type of warfare, it is not clear how the Geneva Convention or international humanitarian law applies to it.” Although Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I) targeting laws generally identify who and what States may target in war, it expressly limits itself to attacks affecting people and objects on land. But what about online? This Note discusses the limited applicability of the current targeting laws to cyber warfare. Specifically, it asks whether the land-centric AP I targeting laws adequately address cyber-attacks. It analogizes the unique features of cyber warfare to those in air warfare. Because both cyber and air warfare, unlike land combat, are fought beyond the traditional battlefield and closer to civilians, are object-prime targeting methods of warfare, and serve strategic attack objectives, AP I land-centric targeting laws cannot adequately regulate these types of warfare. This Note finds that, like airspace, the cyberspace domain is sufficiently different from land and, thus, requires specific rules similar to those provided under the laws of air warfare.

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and persistent nuclear threats have significantly heightened the risks of a potential nuclear conflict. These threats are widely seen as attempts by Moscow to deter Western governments from providing substantial support to Ukraine and to prevent NATO from intervening directly in the conflict. Despite this, Russia's nuclear rhetoric has profound consequences; if Moscow successfully employs nuclear deterrence to shield its conventional warfare, it could lead to greater instability in Europe and disrupt the global security order. Russia's approach to the conflict, influenced by perceived threats and strategic imperatives, has prompted shifts in its nuclear posture and deterrence strategies. The analysis will focus on Russia's shifting nuclear doctrine, NATO's strategic responses to these developments, and the conflict's wider consequences for international security. Additionally, it will evaluate the complex challenges confronting both Russia and NATO in managing this precarious situation. By employing a thematic approach to qualitative research, reinforced with quantitative insights, this study examines the far-reaching impacts of Russia's nuclear deterrence strategies across multiple dimensions.

This paper investigates the emergence of an arms race dynamic in the international cyber domain. The numerous claims made of an ongoing cyber arms race by the media and other analysts have not been backed up by careful empirical analysis. Characterised by the competitive and rapid mutual build-up of capabilities between pairs of states, arms races are a long standing aspect of study in international relations, with statistical evidence suggesting a relationship between these factors and war. Our work extends the tradition of arms race scholarship to the field of cyber security by providing a methodology for accounting for the build-up of cyber capabilities by nation states. We examine the concept of the cyber arms race and provide a plausibility probe for a macro study by examining the cases of the United States and Iran, and of North Korea and South Korea. We employ time series data on a number of indicators to measure each state's scale of increase in cyber capabilities, before investigating whether the states in question are directing their efforts against one another. Our findings suggest that these state dyads have indeed been engaged in cyber arms races, as defined by their competitive and above-normal mutual increase in cyber capabilities. This work furthers our understanding of state behaviour in the cyber domain, and our methodology helps to establish a pathway for the future extensive data collection of this new phenomenon.

The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into military operations has significant implications for global stability. Understanding these implications is crucial for policymakers, researchers, and the international community. This study addresses the impact of AI-driven technologies on defence systems. It examines autonomous weapons, surveillance, and cyber warfare, highlighting the potential for an arms race. The main argument is that responsible AI deployment is essential for maintaining peace and security. The study is anchored on Deterrence theory. This study adopts qualitative research methods as a means of data collection which is secondary source based, and were merely obtained from textbooks, Journal articles, conference proceedings, Newspapers, and reliable internet materials. The data collected were analysed thematically. The study however revealed that AI enhances military capabilities while raising legal and ethical concerns. The study therefore recommends among others, the need for AI governance via international norms, and cooperation to prevent misuse.

The Deterrence theory was formed after the World War II to describe the tensions between nuclear-armed states. Because of its origins, deterrence is mainly researched from the point of view of powerful states. However, deterrence nowadays is essential for any state to include in their strategies. The ever-increasing dependence on technology forces states to protect their sovereignty in cyberspace as well as in other domains. Cyber operations should be considered not just as a means to protect the cyber domain, but as means of deterrence. Cross domain deterrence (CDD) is a theory that includes all the warfighting domains in creating deterrence, including cyberspace. Despite these new perspectives, the use of military cyber operations as a deterrent has been studied mainly in terms of offensive strategies. Incorporating all types of military cyber operations into deterrence strategies is understudied. This study focuses on the possibilities of a small state to use cyber operations to create deterrence. The research question is: “How can a small state use cyber operations as a deterrent?” According to the Finnish understanding, cyber operations can be divided into three types: offensive, defensive and supportive operations. Using Finland as a case study, this paper argues that using military cyber operations is noteworthy for any state dependent on cyberspace, not only for military purposes, but for building CDD. The CDD theory and characteristics of cyber operations are studied in order to form better understanding of the topic and provide ideas for academic discussion. The research methods are content and SWOT analysis. The key observation presented is that each type of cyber operation has a role in forming CDD. For a small state, it´s profitable to use every type of cyber operations and thus expand the tool box for deterrence.

With two years having passed since the infamous cyber conflict between Estonia and Russia, on 08 May 2009 international society still lacks a coherent set of principles, rules, and norms governing state security and military operations in cyberspace. For parties committed to promoting the cause of peace and stability in a multipolar world, this is a troubling notion since history shows that the likelihood of a new arms race is high when disruptive technologies dramatically alter the means and methods of war. As more nations aspire to project national power in cyberspace, a new digital arms race appears to be imminent if not already upon us. Thus, there is a central question confronting international society and Nigeria in cyberspace: What steps can be taken both today and into the future to forestall a major arms race and interstate competition in cyberspace? In order to begin addressing this complex question from the perspective of the Euro-Atlantic Community, this paper discusses both the challenges and opportunities of regulating 21st century cyber warfare. The paper is divided into sections, which examine the evolution of the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) since the late 19th century, how the LOAC apply to cyber warfare as viewed primarily from a US perspective (since US scholars have dominated the international regime discourse thus far), and the historical facts on cyber warfare. The Nigerian roles in cyber defense strategy and what is needed to be done to meet up with a global regime for cyber warfare in respect of cyber defense are also highlighted. Global cyber strategies, threats/attacks, and types of cyber weapons d

In the context of an increasingly multipolar world and evolving geopolitical tensions, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence remains a pivotal yet contentious component of international security. This article provides a comprehensive reassessment of nuclear deterrence, analyzing its impacts on global security and international relations. The paper begins by reviewing the historical evolution of nuclear deterrence, highlighting its role during the Cold War and its adaptation to post-Cold War contexts. It then explores the implications of modern advancements such as cyber capabilities, precision-guided munitions, and emerging strategic technologies on nuclear deterrence. By evaluating the effectiveness of deterrence in preventing nuclear escalation and its influence on arms control agreements and regional security dynamics, the study underscores the complexity of maintaining strategic stability in a rapidly changing global environment. The primary research question that arises is: Is nuclear deterrence still effective in preventing wars in an age of shifting global power structures? To answer this question, a descriptive-explanatory research method has been employed, and information has been gathered through library sources. The findings suggest that while nuclear deterrence continues to be a significant factor in national security strategies, it is no longer as effective as it used to be in the cold war era. The study of this topic is crucial for understanding how evolving geopolitical dynamics and technological advancements influence the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence strategies. It provides insights into adapting traditional deterrence models to address contemporary threats, ensuring continued global stability and conflict prevention in a rapidly changing international landscape.