Abstract
ABSTRACT This article conducts a fresh analysis of the key developments – strategic and technological – that resulted in the world’s first penetrating stealth bomber. It explores the tectonic shift in defense thinking, which began in the late 1960s as it became widely understood that the Soviet Union had matched the United States’ advantage in nuclear weaponry. It then examines how the United States grappled with the issue of Soviet conventional numerical superiority and whether advances in air defenses rendered penetrating airpower – the air leg of the nuclear triad and a critical component of the United States’ emerging strategy – impotent.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
