Abstract
This article describes the sources of electoral corruption in postwar Japan, in particular the relationship between demand for political funds by politicians and its supply by corporate donors. The weakness of legal and political sanctions, it is argued, allows this relationship to continue. The article concludes by examining the possibilities and limitations of recent efforts to curb electoral corruption.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
