Abstract
Why are some behaviors governed by strong social conventions while others are not? We experimentally investigate two factors contributing to the formation of conventions in a game of impure coordination: the continuity of interaction within each round of play (simultaneous vs. real-time) and the stakes of the interaction (high vs. low differences between payoffs). To maximize efficiency and fairness in this game, players must coordinate on one of two equally advantageous equilibria. In agreement with other studies manipulating continuity of interaction, we find that players who were allowed to interact continuously within rounds achieved outcomes with greater efficiency and fairness than players who were forced to make simultaneous decisions. However, the stability of equilibria in the real-time condition varied systematically and dramatically with stakes: players converged on more stable patterns of behavior when stakes are high. To account for this result, we present a novel analysis of the dynamics of continuous interaction and signaling within rounds. We discuss this previously unconsidered interaction between within-trial and across-trial dynamics as a form of social canalization. When stakes are low in a real-time environment, players can satisfactorily coordinate ‘on the fly’, but when stakes are high there is increased pressure to establish and adhere to shared expectations that persist across rounds.
Highlights
Many everyday activities are governed by strong societal conventions: the side of the road we drive on, the meaning of “red” and “green” on traffic lights, the currency we use to pay for our coffee, and the way we greet the cashier [1,2,3,4]
We conjecture a theory of social canalization to explain these results, by analogy to the mechanisms of genetic assimilation and canalization in biology
Genetic assimilation occurs when a phenotypic characteristic that is elicited from an environmental condition becomes genetically encoded
Summary
Many everyday activities are governed by strong societal conventions: the side of the road we drive on, the meaning of “red” and “green” on traffic lights, the currency we use to pay for our coffee, and the way we greet the cashier [1,2,3,4]. Many real-world activities often used as examples of convention formation— driving, walking, greeting one another—take place in real-time environments, yet empirical studies of conventionalization have exclusively relied on traditional, discrete-time environments We directly compare these two environments in our task by using a navigational interface: each player controls an avatar, and earns payoffs by navigating their avatar to one of two target locations (see Fig 1). Given the increased capacity for signaling and immediate reaction, we expect that the dynamic conditions of our coordination game will lead to more efficient outcomes than the ballistic conditions, regardless of the stakes It is less obvious how a pair of players will implicitly negotiate the within-round unfairness induced by the asymmetric payoff structure, or how our two manipulations will affect the stability of the conventionalization process
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
