Abstract
The main characteristic of the general policy-making process in Brazil is the dominance of a fiscal imperative that leads the president to use his/her substantial powers to pursue monetary stability and fiscal responsibility. The fiscal imperative means that environmental policy is only attended to if the macroeconomic constraint permits. However, Brazilian public prosecutors exert a significant countervailing constraint that impedes the president from simply pushing environmental policy to the sidelines. This article describes the role of the public prosecutors in the environmental policy process and provides statistical analysis supporting the claim that their involvement exerts a positive effect on environmental policy outcomes.
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