The Firm, the Bank, and the Family: Military Intelligence and the Wallenbergs in Sweden’s Cold War

Russia's <i>Very</i> Secret Services

The intelligence war in Russia 1941-45 was waged on a scale unmatched in any other theatre of the second world war. Nevertheless, for various reasons, the conflict between the German and Soviet intelligence services has not received the attention that it deserves. In this paper, an effort is made to discuss certain facets of German intelligence operations on the Russian Front, specifically, the work of Fremde Heere Ost (FHO), 'Foreign Armies East', the department of the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) responsible for the evaluation of all military intelligence about the Soviet Union, including the analysis of Soviet intentions and strategy; and Amt Ausland/Abwehr, the military intelligence service under the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), whose field headquarters in the East were responsible for clandestine collection, special operations, subversion, and counter-espionage and counter-intelligence. Abwehr operations against the Soviet Union did not fall within the strict scope of FHO activities. However, these operations are noted here, because Abwehr headquarters in Berlin furnished intelligence to FHO from the beginning, and the Abwehr field organization in the East responsible for espionage, sabotage, and counter-intelligence, Stab WALLI, was placed under the control of FHO in the spring of 1942 (departments I (espionage) and III (counter-intelligence) only). A forthcoming paper will examine Soviet intelligence operations on the Russian Front.2 For lack of space, there is no detailed treatment of the other German intelligence organizations that provided information to FHO, in particular, Fremde Luftwaffe Ost, German Air Force intelligence, and the Wehrmacht signals intelligence organization in Russia, Leitstelle fir Nachrichtenaufkldrung Ost. The operations of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), including the sabotage and subversion organization in Russia,

(Summary) n the last days of the Second World War, in the moments when the final operations for the liberation of Yugoslavia were coming to an end, and the outlines of the future Cold War and post-war alliances were becoming clearer, the need to establish a peacetime armed force was imposed in front of the Yugoslav General Staff. An important segment in the establishment of the future armed forces was the organization and work methods of the military intelligence service. Previous war experiences, mostly based on the legacy of guerrilla military operations conducted by the partisan movement during the liberation and civil wars, could only be partially used in the process of peacetime formation of the military intelligence service. That is why it was necessary to create a new model that involved relying on national experiences, primarily the intelligence services of the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World War and the experience of the allied armies, especially the Soviet Red Army in the war conflict that was coming to an end. The study on the organization of the post-war military intelligence service with emphasis on the organization, scope of work and personnel of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army was prepared by Colonel Frane Biočić. Colonel Biočić's report contained the burden of the ideological and geopolitical environment in which it was written. Written near the end of the war in the conditions of the absolute triumph of the partisan movement under the leadership of the communists over the occupying, Quisling and rival anti-fascist forces in the liberation and civil war, it contained the undisguised glorification of the partisan war heritage, as well as the negation of the value of the experiences of the pre-war Yugoslav intelligence service, whose professional value was not only denied, but was already declared absolutely unusable due to open accusations against the professionalism and patriotism of its officers and associates. On the other hand, absolutely in accordance with the policy of close wartime alliance with the Red Army and projected post-war cooperation, harmonization with the Soviet intelligence model was forced, reliance on the Soviet war experiences, the Soviet assistance in training and education of intelligence personnel was requested, and close cooperation along military intelligence lines was planned between the Yugoslav and Soviet General Staff.

Since it regained its independence in 1948, Burma has developed a complex structure of intelligence and specialized security agencies. After General Ne Win's coup d'etat in 1962, and led by the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), this apparatus was completely dominated by the armed forces, which used it not only to gather combat‐related intelligence but also to stamp out any challenges to continuing military rule. So powerful did the MIS become that, at times, it was seen as a threat to the Ne Win regime, and purged of key personnel. After the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1988, the resources devoted to Burma's intelligence agencies greatly increased. Under the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence, more attention was given to purely military intelligence, but there was also closer surveillance of both the armed forces and the civilian population. Since late 1997, this policy has continued under the State Peace and Development Council. Several intelligence failures in recent years, however, have raised serious questions about the ability of even this expanded apparatus to meet all the demands being placed upon it.

East Germany was one of the main actors in Cold War military and security policy intelligence. Due to the opening of the archives of the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) of the German Democratic Republic it is possible today to analyse methods and goals of the East German civil and military intelligence services on this field in more detail. The article summarises the state of research on staff and sources of these services. Based on this information, main directions and operational fields are exemplified for military and international strategic intelligence in the era of détente of the 1970s. Contents and quality of intelligence results are focused with respect to their potential influence on East German and Warsaw Pact (i.e. Soviet) decision-making processes.

An enduring paradox lies at the heart of Brazilian politics. The Brazilian Army has long suffered from corruption at the highest levels so extreme as to create disquiet throughout the institution. Yet the Brazilian military, like other armed forces in Latin America, has justified its involvement in politics and society by accusing civilians of corruption. Despite repeated revelations of military corruption, soldiers and civilians as well have sometimes accepted the armed forces' use of this moral discourse. For example, an anonymous businessman wrote General Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro on 30 November 1954: “The country is on the brink of financial and economic ruin. This state of things is the result of the abuses of past governments and of the deceased President Vargas and the generalized corruption. … The only solution for the reestablishment of confidence in the exterior would be the delivery of the government to a military dictatorship” (emphasis in the original).2 Thirty years later, at the close of authoritarian rule in Brazil, a daring journalist named Carlos Alberto de Carli exposed rampant corruption within the military's intelligence services. Yet Carli himself dedicated his book in part to “the armed forces—the moral reserves of our people” (cover page, Carli 1985).

ABSTRACTHow can we understand intelligence assessments and intelligence work? The intelligence literature offers several plausible causes of failures and the consequences of such failures. However, there is a direct lack of theories or frameworks that connect these variables, that is, there is an incomplete understanding of both how those variables interact and their underlying mechanisms. Failures as such do only give one part of the picture. Why intelligence succeed is equally if not more important to understand. The military intelligence service from an institutional perspective may help to give this understanding.This study connects these variables with Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, which yields a model to understand the mechanisms of institutional on the assessment and lays a foundation for a common terminology. The study uses the Swedish military intelligence institution active in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2012 as a case.

Book Review| July 01 2008 Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II, James C. McNaughton. Eiichiro Azuma Eiichiro Azuma Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Journal of American Ethnic History (2008) 27 (4): 132–133. https://doi.org/10.2307/27501869 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Eiichiro Azuma; Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II. Journal of American Ethnic History 1 January 2008; 27 (4): 132–133. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/27501869 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectiveUniversity of Illinois PressJournal of American Ethnic History Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright 2008 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois2008 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Subject The future of Russia's military intelligence body. Significance Russia's military intelligence service, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), has enjoyed rising fortunes in recent years. Its success is in large part due to its late head, Colonel-General Igor Sergun, who died on January 3. The agency specialises in working with proxy forces abroad as well as conventional espionage, and has seen action in Ukraine and Syria. Impacts The government will continue to use deniable methods of foreign intervention including mercenaries and other paramilitaries and sabotage. GRU espionage abroad will continue to be active and aggressive. If the GRU is divided up, other army structures may take over some of its roles.

Under the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a certain amount of documents relating to a German–American intelligence co-operation that began almost immediately after the German surrender of May 1945; it lasted until 1956 when the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) was founded, today's German foreign and military intelligence service. The Americans assembled, supervised, and largely financed what is often referred to as the “Gehlen organisation,” named after its leader, former Wehrmacht general, Reinhard Gehlen, who was chief of the BND until his retirement in 1968. Whilst the existence of this co-operation had been known since the 1940s, largely due to Soviet subversion and propaganda, very little reliable information and virtually no original source material was available before the release of this, somewhat redacted, material in 2002 and 2007. This article provides a sketch of how former Wehrmacht officers, and even a number with an ominous SS past, who might well have been war criminals, came to work, first for United States military intelligence and, from 1949, for the CIA. It looks at some of their operations during those turbulent post-war years, which include the Berlin airlift and German rearmament in response to the Korean War. The potential of those newly declassified documents, unfortunately, cannot be corroborated from other sources as long as German and Russian archives remain closed. Despite its manifold limitations, this material provides an exciting window into transatlantic intelligence history.

During the 1930s, Shanghai was a major center of Soviet espionage. By 1935 Chinese and Japanese agents of the USSR's military intelligence service, the Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie or RU, had successfully penetrated key Guomindang, Japanese, and U.S. targets, providing critical intelligence for Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These accomplishments collapsed after the detention of RU leader Yakov Bronin (commonly known as Joseph Walden) and several of his Chinese associates in May 1935, the culmination of a series of tradecraft errors and misjudgments. As attempts to establish Bronin's nationality foundered, a classic confrontation developed between Chinese authorities seeking Bronin's immediate rendition and those of the International Settlement and French Concession, both determined to uphold the principle of extra-territoriality. Once Bronin's fraudulent claim to French nationality was exposed he was duly extradited and received a 15–year jail sentence for espionage, leaving RU netw...

This chapter examines the significance of the Anticommunist Spider Web to anticommunism. Members of the Anticommunist Spider Web formed a conspiracy against democracy that was far more influential than the “communist” conspiracy they fought. Protecting economic advantage was only part of the Anticommunist Spider Web's purpose. Business and political interests also used anticommunism as a tool to control foreign and domestic policy in the challenging environment created by the Great War, socialist revolutions in Europe, and the bitter industrial disputes of the postwar downturn. Government intelligence operatives were among those most concerned by anticommunism, and the Red Scare put state and military intelligence services at the heart of the Spider Web. This chapter discusses the relationship between the Bureau of Investigation, the US Army Military Intelligence Division, the US Navy Office of Naval Intelligence, and the private intelligence networks run by the Spider Web.

Second-generation Japanese Americans (Nisei) in the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) were engaged in critical work during the US-led Allied Occupation of Japan from 1945 through 1952. After Japan’s surrender in August 1945, Nisei in the MIS played an important role in areas such as interpretation, translation, and Cold War intelligence gathering in Occupied Japan. They have often been called the cultural bridge that was crucial to the success of the occupation of Japan and development of close ties between Japan and the United States after 1952. Their upbringing in areas like Hawaii and California and military training prior to their deployment in Japan provide insight into the nature of their contributions in key areas of the occupation, such as censorship, repatriation, and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Their work and experiences illuminate the complex dynamics of both Japanese American military history and the postwar occupation of Japan more generally.

This paper analyses the systemic framework of the operation of the Intelligence and Security Service – ISS, and the parliamentary supervision of its operations. It takes as its focus a case that occurred last year and was related to the Defence Minister’s commissioning of working materials from the Service on the effects that the privatization of the national telecommunications provider – Telekom Slovenije would have on the operation of the Service in the light of Slovenia’s defence interests. This work also presents a linguostylistic analysis of the media reports covering this case. The findings show that while after 25 years as an independent state Slovenia has established the institutional framework for the operation of the ISS and regulated parliamentary supervision of its work, it has not as yet managed to achieve the harmonized operation of all state policies in the field of national security. Rather than contributing to the solution of certain dilemmas regarding the legal, political and professional aspects of the operation of this civil intelligence and security service in the context of Slovenian national defence, the media reporting used a selection of foregrounded (marked) linguistic means in headlines to characterize the event as a scandal, and designate the ISS as a military intelligence service.

This chapter describes the uniquely harsh and dangerous external environment that Israel faces, along with its implications for the country's national security choices. It begins with an overview of Israel's national security environment and goes on to consider its proportional representation (PR) system. More specifically, it explores how the PR system causes chronic political instability and creates a need to govern through coalition governments, along with its consequences for the roles of the Knesset, cabinet, and subcabinet forums and for governability generally. Finally, it discusses the national security decision-making capabilities and the formal structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the National Security Council. The chapter argues that these organs' national security decision-making capabilities are weak, especially when compared with the highly developed capabilities and stature of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and military intelligence services.