Abstract
This is the true story of the actual use of a formal, decentralized division procedure to allocate silver heirlooms among eight grandchildren fairly and efficiently without distasteful direct monetary payments. Each grandchild's stated preferences for objects in contention were roughly represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Allocations were made as they would be in a market for probability shares in the objects, assuming each grandchild had a fixed amount of an artificial currency and made optimal purchases. The market-clearing equilibrium prices were chosen as in a second-price auction to reward honest reporting. Although the procedure was decentralized and most participants did not fully understand it or the preference information desired, it handled all major considerations well and was regarded as equitable.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.