Abstract

I present an equilibrium existence result for games with perturbed payoffs by extending Milgrom and Weber’s [Mathematics and Operations Research 10 (1985) 619] proof of existence of equilibrium in incomplete information games to integrable utility functions and show that their assumption of ‘Equicontinuous Payoffs’ is redundant. I apply this result to games with randomly, for example, normally, logistically, or double exponentially perturbed payoffs studied in experimental economics.

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