The ethics of life expectancy.

Abstract

Some ethical dilemmas in health care, such as over the use of age as a criterion of patient selection, appeal to the notion of life expectancy. However, some features of this concept have not been discussed. Here I look in turn at two aspects: one positive--our expectation of further life--and the other negative--the loss of potential life brought about by death. The most common method of determining this loss, by counting only the period of time between death and some particular age, implies that those who die at ages not far from that one are regarded as losing very little potential life, while those who die at greater ages are regarded as losing none at all. This approach has methodological advantages but ethical disadvantages, in that it fails to correspond to our strong belief that anyone who dies is losing some period of life that he or she would otherwise have had. The normative role of life expectancy expressed in the 'fair innings' attitude arises from a particular historical situation: not the increase of life expectancy in modern societies, but a related narrowing in the distribution of projected life spans. Since life expectancy is really a representation of existing patterns of mortality, which in turn are determined by many influences, including the present allocation of health resources, it should not be taken as a prediction, and still less as a statement of entitlement.