The enlightened romantic : Kantian philosophy and Coleridge's ideological revolution in religious musings and France : an ode

Kant's Idea of Universal History from Cosmopolitan Point of View was written, without apologies, from teleological point of view. Read in conjunction with treatments of teleology in Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment, Kant's essay philosophy of history acquires greater significance for his overall philosophy than is generally acknowledged. With its teleology in mind we can see as being something more than by-product of Kant's moral and political convictions and his belief in progress. We can relate directly to his theory of knowledge, especially his distinction between reason and understanding, and read as an attempted application to historical inquiry of principles that Kant elsewhere develops in more abstract manner. Kant begins his essay by making three important points: (1) that human actions are determined by universal laws; (2) that history affords by and large repugnant spectacle; and (3) that we may yet be able to discover in history a clue as to what universal laws of human actions are, and that such discovery may help us make sense of seemingly senseless character of much of human history. Kant argues that (1) is true regardless of views one may hold concerning freedom of will. What appears to be tangled and unrelated in case of individuals can be recognized, according to Kant, in the history of whole species as continually advancing, though slow, development of its original capacities and endowments. He cites marriages, births, and deaths as examples of things that appear to be greatly influenced by man's free will; but he notes triumphantly that the annual statistics of great countries prove that these events take place according to constant natural laws. The optimism of (1) is, however, qualified considerably by Kant's admission that, because man's actions are neither purely instinctual nor purely rational, it appears as if no regular systematic history of mankind would be possible. Kant confesses to certain repugnance upon looking at man's conduct: with but few exceptions seems on examining externally as if whole web of human history were woven out of folly and childish vanity, and frenzy of destruction ... .91

In Freedom and the End of Reason, Richard L. Velkley offers an influential interpretation of the central issue of Kant's philosophy and an evaluation of its position within modern philosophy's larger history. He persuasively argues that the whole of Kantianism - not merely the Second Critique - focuses on a critique of practical and is a response to a problem that Kant saw as intrinsic to reason itself: the teleological problem of its goodness. Reconstructing the influence of Rousseau on Kant's thought, Velkley demonstrates that the relationship between speculative philosophy and practical philosophy in Kant is far more intimate than generally has been perceived. By stressing a Rousseau-inspired notion of reason as a provider of practical ends, he is able to offer an unusually complete account of Kant's idea of moral culture.

Kant holds a key position in the history of modern philosophy as the last great figure to belong both to the Anglo-American analytic tradition and the Continental tradition. A scholar of Kant and German idealism, Dieter Henrich combines an encyclopaedic knowledge of Kant's texts with an understanding of the philosophers of preceding and succeeding centuries. Henrich's distinctive contribution has been to break through the entrenched stereotypes of the ontological and neo-Kantian schools of Kant interpretation in order to place Kant's major ideas in their historical and developmental context, demonstrating their enduring philosophical significance. Henrich has shown how Kant's attempt to overcome the dichotomy between rationalism and moral-sense philosophy led to a lifelong struggle to establish the unity of theoretical and practical reason and the inseparability of the motivational force of the principle of ethics from its function as a principle for ethical judgement. But Henrich has also shown how Kant's project of unification contained fundamental tensions that called forth the projects of such post-Kantians as Schiller, Fichte and Hegel, which explored new approaches within the Kantian framework. The essays in this book present a persuasive picture of the development of Kant's moral philosophy and give an account of the argumentative strategies determining all aspects of Kant's philosophy. They reflect Henrich's general interest in the unity of reason as well as his special interest in self-consciousness as both a key concept of modern philosophy and the key to the highly disputed interpretation of Kant's transcendental deduction of categories.

Background. On the occasion of the 300th anniversary of Immanuel Kant, this study is dedicated to exploring his influence on theatrical art, even though Kant himself did not show much interest in theater. The article attempts to examine the theater of his time, its presence in Königsberg, and the impact of Kant's philosophy on the development of theatrical theory. To study the relationship between German theatrical art of the 18th century and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, as well as to explore the influence of his philosophical ideas on the development of theatrical art in general. Methods. The article employs general scientific methods such as analytical, comparative, and generalization. Results. The analysis of Immanuel Kant's influence on theatrical art is an atypical area of philosophical research. Although Kant did not leave any works specifically dedicated to theater, his aesthetic theories, particularly those presented in "the Critique of Judgment", had a significant impact on the development of theatrical art and its theory. Kant's ideas, especially his concepts of the beautiful and the sublime, influenced Romanticism and notable figures such as Friedrich Schiller and Johann Goethe. The article also explores the historical context of theater development in Königsberg, where Kant lived and worked. Special attention is given to Kant's role in establishing aesthetic ideas that became the foundation for subsequent changes in theatrical art. The article emphasizes that Kant's philosophy remains relevant and influential in contemporary theater, providing new tools for analyzing and understanding aesthetic ideas. When considering the social role of theater and theatrical art, Kant also emphasized the importance of social interaction in the creation of art. He viewed aesthetic judgment as a serious act that is not merely private but concerns all of humanity. Aesthetic judgments form a public sphere, making them an important subject for philosophical analysis. According to Kant, aesthetic judgment is a way of seeking truth that unites people into a common human community. Similarly, theater is an instrument for seeking truth, a platform for questioning and finding answers to relevant issues. The article also highlights Kant's significance for understanding theater as an art form that unites different types of creativity and reveals its potential for fostering aesthetic taste and moral values. Conclusions. Due to the lack of studies on the connection between Kant's philosophy and theatrical art, there is a vast field for analyzing his influence on the aesthetics of theater, as confirmed by the history of theater during his lifetime.

Kant's ideas about, questions, and challenges to the Western tradition of philosophy reverberate into the third century of the reception of his texts. The writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the twentieth-century French existential and hermeneutic phenomenologist, are interlaced with engagements with Kant's ideas. Often these incidents are marked by Merleau-Ponty's critique, yet there is a noticeable recurrence of his efforts to contend with Kant's philosophy. In Merleau-Ponty's course notes, Nature (2002), he wrestles with Kant's version of nature in the Critique of Judgment (1790), specifically citing “the happy accident” between sensibility and the understanding. This opens upon realms of metaphysical thought that remain deeply contentious within Kantian scholarship. An interrogation of this “happy accident” leads to insights about Merleau-Ponty's conceptualization of an existentialized metaphysics the implications of which shed light on theology and the judgment of God.

This study examines the qualitative difference between human intelligence and artificial intelligence (AI) through the lens of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. This difference is based on the human mind’s idea of unity and its intuitive ability to limit this unity. Kant argues that, through the regulative use of reason, it is able to obtain conceptual wholes such as God, soul, and universe. We argue that this idea of unity, derived through regulative reason, plays a significant role in distinguishing the human mind from AI. Based on Kant’s idea of unity, our study determines that the human mind constructs a unity such as a formal system. Artificial intelligence, which is made possible by this construction, is inadequate in solving many problems that have shown surprising developments in recent years. We attribute this inadequacy to the inability of computers to model the aforementioned idea of wholeness. We justify this claim through the problem of “narrowing the brute search space” in computational complexity, which is a significant issue in computer science. This problem arises from the lack of a formal procedure for narrowing down a problem space with very large boundaries. When computers lack an efficient procedure or an analytical solution to the problems they aim to solve, they are forced to try all available solutions. In contrast, the human mind has cognitive abilities that allow it to intuitively narrow down these large problem spaces. Kant’s use of regulative reason provides a framework for understanding this human faculty. According to Kant, the regulative function of reason supplies the concepts of pure reason that guide scientific inquiry. For example, through a concept of pure reason, such as the cosmos, the human mind is able to limit the physical domain in such a way as to conduct physical science. Through Kant’s use of regulative reason, we consider that the human mind, by bringing together a set of formal signs, makes a limitation such as a formal system. Since we can conceptualize a unity such as a formal system, we can discuss algorithms that operate according to this system. The regulative use of reason, which enables the establishment of such wholes, creates a qualitative difference between AI and the human mind when combined with the human’s intuitive thinking ability. However, establishing the link between Kant’s idea of unity and intuitive thinking based solely on Kantian philosophy is quite difficult. Thus, we refer to the views of Henri Bergson and Nazif Muhtaroğlu to establish this connection. Bergson, while explaining the concept of motion, argues that the mind reaches such an idea of unity through an instinctive synthesis. In this respect, movement is a mental synthesis, insofar as it is a transition from one point to another. Similarly, Muhtaroğlu, after emphasizing that the intuitive cognition that accompanies reason is a direct, unmediated and rapid cognition, identifies the type of intuition that leads to the idea of unity as immediate intuition. Stating that this type of intuition is a cognitive intuition, Muhtaroğlu cites Archimedes’ discovery of the laws of fluids as an example of this way of thinking. In our study, we use the example of Archimedes to show how intuition accompanies the narrowing of the field of brute force search. Thus, when the regulative use of reason and intuitive thinking come together, a difference emerges in the cognitive abilities of the human mind and artificial intelligence. Thanks to the regulative use of reason, the human mind is able to have an awareness of the unity of the object field it is confronted with. The fact that this awareness is accompanied by intuitive thinking allows this field of unity to be narrowed. Since artificial intelligence cannot model both the use of regulative reasoning and intuitive thinking, it is subjected to the brute search method. We argue that such a deficiency underlies the lack of analytical solutions to problems of computational complexity. This deficiency reveals the difference between the human mind and artificial intelligence in problem solving and narrowing down large search spaces.

Sociopolitical changes are often associated with ideological shifts at the individual and mass level. The study of how sociopolitical and ideological change interrelate has been the subject of debate for decades. Here, however, the authors develop and defend a new theory that treats ideologies as complex cognitive systems that are internally articulated around prioritized principles and values. Focusing on the transition to democracy in Latin America, the book examines the changes in mass beliefs that accompany democratization in an effort to offer a more sophisticated theory of the relationship between belief, ideology, and action in social change. Ultimately, the authors argue for a cognitive-based model that can account for how social actors come to define democracy in current contexts. Taking democratization as a case study, Conceptual Structure and Social Change focuses on third-wave transitions to democracy of the 1990s because they are evidence of very complex ideological changes and alignments. Using comparative survey data as a tool to track ideological shifts, several ideological uniformities are identified, such as the rise of a unified opposition, the paradoxical support of the masses to the authoritarian party in power, and the ideological shifts and strategies used by ruling and opposition elites to gain mass support. Viewing these changes as the mechanics of ideological systems in flux paves the way for a general theory of ideological change.

Owing to a longstanding commitment to the autonomous, self-transparent subject, many roads have not been taken in rhetorical studies. Our present conversation about Lacanian psychoanalysis represents one of those roads, which is the most radical route stemming from the little traveled thoroughfare of the “rhetoric of the interior.” Insofar as its central category is the dynamic unconscious, psychoanalysis in general represents a theory of an inside or interiority that has largely been ignored, and sometimes attacked, in favor or defense of surfaces and exteriorities (e.g., fantasy themes and rhetorical visions, rational argument in ideal speech situations, and so on). Despite the pioneering work on Jung and mythic criticism by Janice Hocker Rushing and Thomas S. Frentz, despite articulate calls for psychoanalytic research by Barbara Biesecker, Michael J. Hyde, and Loyd S. Pettegrew, and despite the remarkable, interdisciplinary work of Henry Krips, among NCA-style rhetorical studies scholars, psychoanalysis has been the place of dead roads, indeed, the place of dead subjects. Christian Lundberg’s welcome and insightful critique of “Refitting Fantasy” ought to be read as a road sign of sorts, indicating not only an exciting route for research, but also the number of places it might go. In general, Lundberg argues that a critical perspective that begins in the imaginary overlooks the master’s focus on the Symbolic order, thereby missing the true locus of rhetoric in Lacan’s work (principally, “tropology”). Further, Lundberg argues that a critical attention to fantasies is limited to discrete texts and intersubjective encounters, thereby avoiding an opportunity to do true Lacanian rhetorical criticism. The consequence of an approach focused on the criticism of (pre-)conscious and unconscious fantasies, he implies, is twofold. First, it promotes a perspective akin to the project of “ego-psychology” and, thus, relies on the “naive psychologism of solely intersubjectively mediated accounts of subject formation,” which bars scholars from the pursuit of a deeper, more

I discuss the changes taking place in higher education in the United States. I argue that the changes in higher education are the result of a distinct development rationality termed academic capitalism by Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades and not a neoliberalization dynamic. This process implies a different relationship to the state and society than other analyses would lead us to believe. I employ William Connolly’s concept of symbiogenesis to discuss how the dynamics of this relationship are displayed. Further, I employ Louis Althusser to explain the difference between ideology and rationality and then posit that the changes in higher education and state are not a shift in ideology but in rationality according to Wendy Brown. I argue that: (1) that the changes happening in universities cannot be merely the result of ‘neoliberalization’; (2) the dynamics inherent in the social changes of neoliberalism and academic capitalism are the result of a symbiogenesis as a response to the conditions of the new economy; and (3) neither neoliberalism nor academic capitalism can be understood as ideological shifts but must be understood in terms of rationalities that are redefining the interpretation of extant relationships that are the product of liberal ideology without positing new relationships implied by an ideological shift.

Reviewed by: The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Pattern of Identity Andrea Tschemplik (bio) The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Pattern of Identity by Christine Battersby. London: Polity Press; New York: Routledge, 1998. Christine Battersby, author of Gender and Genius: Towards a Feminist Aesthetics (1990), undertakes the difficult task of arguing on behalf of metaphysics in the antimetaphysical environment of postmodern and reconstructive feminist theory. In The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Pattern of Identity (1998), Battersby engages ancient, continental, and analytic philosophy, constructing a metaphysics of self and identity, a metaphysical position that takes the female subject position as its norm. Her search for a metaphysics of becoming rather than being is motivated by her observation that much of contemporary feminist theory is ensnared in an epistemological web of strands traceable to Emmanuel Kant's transcendental idealism. According to Battersby, the problem with Kant's philosophy is its dependency on "the other" in construction of the self, the interdependence of the constitution of the transcendental subject and transcendental object. Kant is the "culprit" of modernity, whose metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics—transcendental subject, personhood, the sublime—marginalize, even exclude the female subject position. To rectify that omission, Battersby turns to Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, and Theodor Adorno, and finally to Søren Kierkegaard, to establish a "flowing" concept of self and identity that derives from the female subject position. In the first three chapters of The Phenomenal Woman, Battersby analyzes the features that make the female subject position a unique object of analysis, the [End Page 157] basis for a "new" concept of identity. Stressing natality, birthing, caring—as well as fleshiness and woman's exclusion from the (male) norm when denied personhood, autonomy, and freedom—Battersby has sufficient ammunition to shoot down the metaphysics of substance, which she finds inaugurated by Aristotle, transformed into nominalism by John Locke, and reconstructed by Saul Kripke into natural kinds. In Chapter Four, "Kantian Metaphysics and the Sexed Self," Battersby provides ample textual evidence that Kant's metaphysics leads to a hylomorphic sense of identity, where mind shapes inert matter into essences: a "top-down" way of doing identity. The central role of space leads Kant to differentiate between what is within him and what is outside, creating a chasm between active form and passive matter, shaped into identifiable things by the spontaneous activity of the understanding (67). Kantian metaphysics is consonant with Newtonian physics, but that raises the question of the demands and allowances of the new physics and mathematics for a metaphysics of identity. Battersby does not shy away from current investigations in topology and quantum physics to further her rejection of Kant and to fuel her search for a new metaphysics. As Battersby points out, Kant's philosophy explicitly excludes the female from the moral realm by locating woman halfway between personhood and animality, pointing to a somewhat monstrous status for the female. Kant's greatest shortcomings are his inability to reconcile his metaphysics with biology and his failure to come to terms with sexual difference. In the second section, Battersby gives sweeping critiques of deconstruction and postmodern feminism, showing how some thinkers remain boxed in the subject/object dualism and others treat the entire history of philosophy as homogeneous. Jacques Lacan, she says, still works within the Kantian subject/object antagonism, clearly seen in his treatment of woman as "the other": the unattainable and scary object of desire in need of being overcome and ruled by the law of the father. This, she illustrates through a critique of Lacanian analysis of infant development, where the mother provides the boundless "otherness" whose negation and exclusion ultimately give rise to the conception of the "I." Battersby reinforces her analysis of Lacan's reading of Antigone: "Woman is simply 'the otherness' against which the oedipalized/masculinized self constructs itself as itself" (111-12). Jacques Derrida fares no better: his position can either be construed as an undoing of Martin Heidegger's metaphysics of presence or, in a Lacanian framework, as another way of building identity on the "binary" ground of self/other, where the cut from the feminine constitutes the masculinized self. Battersby accuses Derrida of being afraid or...

The philosophies of Kant and Hegel have experienced a renaissance for the past thirty years, and a debate continues as to whether Hegel's objections to Kant's moral philosophy are sound, and/or whether Hegel's ethics are an improvement on Kant's. This debate takes many forms, and most recently, theorists have been interested in measuring Hegel's objections against contemporary theories following in the Kantian tradition. 'Critics,' (theorists defending Hegel's moral point of view) suggests such reconstructed theories leave themselves open to identical criticisms Hegel wielded at Kant almost 200 years ago. 'Defenders,' (theorists supporting Kant's moral philosophy, or a revised version) reply in one of two ways. They either suggest that Hegel's criticisms of Kant are unwarranted, meaning Hegel misinterprets Kant's ideas and/or purposes; or, they maintain that Kant's ethics are vulnerable to Hegel's objections, however some newer version of Kant's ethics is not because it has been purged of those Kantian elements which Hegel attacks. Clearly, both views render Hegel's critique of Kant obsolete. So, why are we witnessing such an aggressive resurgence of Hegelian-styled arguments in the contemporary literature? In seeking to answer this question, this thesis reconsiders Hegel's actual critique of Kant. In this way, the thesis falls into a specific category of political philosophy. It is a study in the 'history of ideas.' Rather than considering the question of whether contemporary Critics or Defenders have the better argument concerning the merit of reconstructed Kantian theories, I intend to re-evaluate the soundness of Hegel's objections to Kantian ethics. Kant's moral and political thought on the proper ordering of society is deeply embedded in the pluralist democracies of the western world. As such, those Kantian ideas/elements should be defendable against Hegelian criticisms. Following an in-depth consideration of Hegel's critique of Kant, I argue that whereas Hegel accurately identifies weaknesses in the system of Kant's moral philosophy, his critique does not successfully achieve its goal. It does not show that Kant's ethical theory is an inadequate prescription for the rational agent seeking to act morally. Rather, it serves as a warning of the dangers inherent in democratic liberal theory.

Immanuel Kant pioneered a new path in moral philosophy (ethics) and profoundly influenced many philosophers and thinkers who lived after him. Kant's philosophy exerted a strong influence on the work of several classical German philosophers. The influence of his philosophy, particularly his ethical views, on 20th-century Turkish philosophy- the work of Hilmi Ziya Ulken- is undeniable. Hilmi Ziya's ethical and philosophical views are reflected in his works "Morality" and "The Ethics of Love." According to Ulken, who was influenced by Kant's ideas on morality, duty, and obligation, duty is subjective in one respect, as it is based on an internal structure. However, duty is also objective in another respect, as it only becomes a duty when it is embodied in life, realized in action, and generalized in judgments.

This paper analyzes the historical context and systematic importance of Kant's hypothetical use of reason. It does so by investigating the role of hypotheses in Kant's philosophy of science. We first situate Kant's account of hypotheses in the context of eighteenth-century German philosophy of science, focusing on the works of Wolff, Meier, and Crusius. We contrast different conceptions of hypotheses of these authors and elucidate the different theories of probability informing them. We then adopt a more systematic perspective to discuss Kant's idea that scientific hypotheses must articulate real possibilities. We argue that Kant's views on the intelligibility of scientific hypotheses constitute a valuable perspective on scientific understanding and the constraints it imposes on scientific rationality.

The purpose of the article is to study the relationship between space, time, consciousness (self-awareness) in the philosophy of I. Kant and in modern philosophy and science. In I. Kant's philosophy, space and time form an empirical environment in which objects reside, and on the other hand, they are a priori (intrinsically inherent in pure reason) forms of our cognition. Transcendental apperception (self-awareness and the judgment "I think") are a condition for the synthesis of consciousness (perceptions, representations, pure reason). The novelty lies in the position put forward by the author that space and time are not only conditions and forms of cognition, but are necessary for modeling thinking as such, before connecting with cognition. The results of the research are as follows: self-awareness, according to Kant, includes the flow of perception, through inner feeling it becomes representations in consciousness, awareness arises in pure reason, the judgment "I think" unites these three structures into a single whole. Space and time are not only a priori forms of cognition, but also forms of thought itself: differentiation (the formation of concepts) leads to the idea of space, and the movement of thought leads to the idea of time. Modern science is moving away from absolute three-dimensional space and time towards a four-dimensional, relative spacetime, the interrelation of object and subject of experience, the interrelation of the informational and material components of the world – that is, it is moving in line with Immanuel Kant's ideas about space and time. However, modern science has not yet discovered the interconnections between space, time, and consciousness. Future research may lie in the search for such interconnections, investigating the impact of consciousness on the formation of events, as well as on the characteristics of space and time.

There is perhaps no thinker in the modern world who has laid the way for the development of philosophy so influentially as Immanuel Kant. He is the towering figure in the wake of whose work philosophy finds its different directions. And it is hard to think of the philosophy of education, especially in its modern incarnations, without some sense of Kant in the background, whether as the pillar of reason, the supreme proponent of deontological ethics, or the philosopher who leads Michel Foucault to raise the question again: ‘What is enlightenment?’ Yet for many, both enthusiasts and detractors, Kant's ideas are encountered indirectly, with over-reliance on dominant interpretations and acquiescence in received ideas. Encyclopaedia entries, simplified exegesis, and synoptic accounts abound, and the general effect is to provide an image of the man and his ideas that readily succumbs to caricature. It is against this background that Sheila Webb has been motivated to write the remarkable monograph that follows. On the strength of a growing suspicion of the shortcomings of so much that has been written and said about this great philosopher, and conscious also of the new waves of Kantian scholarship that have recently been challenging received views, she has embarked on a ground-breaking study. Her targets are familiar interpretations in both philosophy and education, but her purpose is certainly not exclusively critical. As her main title, Interpreting Kant in Education, indicates, her intention is to provide a more accurate interpretation, dispelling barriers to understanding, but also revealing Kant's special relevance to thinking well about education. Indeed, the motivation for the book is by no means narrowly scholarly: its author is struck by the impoverishment of so much policy and practice in education today, mired as it is in a culture of performativity and accountability, both of which are pervasive threats to what might truly be quality in education; and she is committed to the view that a new reading of Kant can do much to remedy this. As the book's subtitle—Dissolving Dualisms and Embodying Mind—indicates, the dismantling of the ways of thinking that have sanctioned these harmful practices involves release from the sclerotic dualisms of fact and value, subject and object, and body and mind. Through a spiralling series of arguments, the book leads the reader to an appreciation of ways in which Kant's philosophy can provide this release.