The Dynamics Contributing to the Success of Populism and Far Right in Europe

1. Introduction Over the past two decades reform need arose in the European welfare states, deriving from demographic factors, employment crises and public debt (Thalassinos et al. 2010). The evolution of security benefits since the 1990s reflects that in many EU countries the dismantling of the welfare state is already obvious. These tendencies are in part explained by the reforms of pension and healthcare systems, which account for 70-80 per cent of all welfare state expenditure. The global economic and financial crisis and the subsequent weaker growth are putting under pressure the European welfare states. Cuts in services, as well as tax and contribution increases are further entrenching the process of recommodification which has characterized the reform of European welfare states for years (Busch, 2010). Nonetheless, in the EU collective coverage of risks is comprehensive (3) and welfare spending accounts for 16-30% of GDP; this is why the repercussions of the global financial crisis mark a particularly serious stress test for the European welfare states. The unequal economic development and the catch-up processes (typical for the EU) determined also the dumping. While in countries like Greece, Hungary and Portugal the economic catch-up process has gone along with an expansion of the welfare state, in other states (Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Spain) the welfare state has been retrenched, in spite of the economic progress. The new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe, with their stigmatization of socialism during the transformation from centrally planned economies to market economies, embraced the neo-liberalism typical for USA and Great Britain (4). As people sought to escape socialist paternalism and enforced entitlements such as unified corporate housing or corporate holidays, the general perception of the word social became increasingly negative (Vecernik, 1993). The global economic crisis had a dual effect for the security systems: (1) due to higher unemployment, the expenditures of insurance are increasing and (2) tax and contribution revenues are falling as a consequence of lower economic growth. Taking into consideration that most European states have used large rescue packages in response to the crisis and to bale out the financial sector, larger deficits have emerged in state budgets and in the budgets of insurance (Thalassinos and Politis 2011). Analyzing the state of the public budgets of EU countries in the wake of the global crisis, the European Commission (2009) indicated three measures: 1. the reduction of deficit and debt ratios; 2. an increase in employment rates and 3. security reforms, especially of pension and healthcare systems. These effects of the economic global crisis on the European welfare states were already investigated in a series of recent papers. For example, Diamond and Lodge (2013) present a comparative analysis of contemporary and future changes in welfare states and examine divergent trajectories of development across Europe in the aftermath of the crisis. They draw lessons from quantitative public opinion surveys in three key EU member states (France, Denmark and UK) to inform debate on the future shape of welfare states after the global crisis. Starting from the assumption that policy reactions to economic crises vary significantly across countries, Stake et al. (2012) make a comparative study on welfare state responses to three major economic crises (1970s oil shocks, 1990s recession, current financial crisis) in four OECD countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden and Australia). Another interesting contribution is that of Hemerijck and Vandenbroucke (2012), who revisit policy as productive factor and link the euro crisis to the imperative of defining a Europe. …

In contemporary political science, the extreme right phenomenon continues to attract considerable academic attention. Among major political developments in established Western-style democracies, few have provoked as much interest as the revival of different forms of right-wing radicalism and extremism in recent years (Betz 2003, 74). The number of studies focused on the subject, the number of scholars active in the field and the range of theoretical approaches have all expanded enormously (Mudde 2000, 6). In short, there has been an ‘explosive growth of the literature’ (Ignazi 2002, 22).1. Despite renewed interest in the ‘dark side of Europe’ (Harris 1994), it should not be overlooked that there exists a rich tradition of research focused upon various aspects of extreme right-wing politics. As pointed out by Norris (2005), social psychology, political psychology, political sociology and political science have all devoted significant efforts to investigating the social bases of support for a variety of manifestations commonly labelled ‘extreme right’, whether fascism and Nazism (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950), Poujadisme in France (Hoffman 1956), American phenomena such as McCarthyism and the John Birch Society (Bell 1963; Lipset and Raab 1970), or more recent developments in Western Europe (e.g. Betz 1994; Cheles et al. 1995; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Merkl and Weinberg 1997; Ignazi 2003; Carter 2005). What differentiates previous instances of extreme right success from more recent examples is that the former, for example the Poujadists in 1956 or the German Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) in the 1960s, experienced only ‘flash’ success, while contemporary extreme right parties (ERPs) have exerted an appreciable impact upon a number of party systems over the course of a number of electoral cycles. As observed by Schain et al. (2002, 16), ‘there seems to be little question that the radical right has become an important political force in Western Europe’. The principal aim of this review article is to examine the scholarly response to the extreme right phenomenon and, to this end, is composed in the following manner: first, it outlines how a preoccupation with ‘demand-side’ or ‘externalist’ explanations led researchers away from examining extreme right parties (ERPs) and towards assessing the impact of socio-economic developments on levels of ERP electoral support. Second, although contributors have in recent years attempted to redress this imbalance by focusing increasingly upon party-centric factors, to date ‘internalist’ perspectives have suffered from a glaring lack of empirical analysis. The review concludes by suggesting that researchers might gain a richer insight into internalist dimensions and the nature of contemporary ERPs through examining the political actors at the heart of this phenomenon.

The Impact of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis on the Youth and Children

The normalisation of welfare chauvinism

Economic crises have been demonstrated to have profound consequences on the tourism industry. Insights from previous global economic and financial crises can provide valuable perspectives on the economic crisis accompanying the war in Eastern Europe. Through a survey conducted during the off-peak seasons of 2008, 2009/2010, and 2010/2011, we compared satisfaction with the attributes of the Algarve—a region globally recognized by the 3S’s— before global and domestic crises and after the global crisis. Our findings reveal that the international and domestic crises have not affected the image of the Algarve. However, this observation conceals shifts in how tourists perceive the destination's attributes. The valuation of accommodations and beaches declined between the pre and post-global crises. At the same time, the friendliness of locals and safety were more negatively impacted when comparing tourists’ assessments before the domestic crisis and after the global crisis. Results indicate that price reduction strategies adversely affect tourists’ assessments of the "value for money." This impact is more pronounced for tourists with higher education levels, who employ fewer "slicing" strategies. Furthermore, non-sovereign debt tourists appear to be more dissatisfied with a price reduction policy, possibly due to changes in the composition and quality of the offered packages.

With a proliferation of scholarly work focusing on populist, far-left, and far-right parties, questions have arisen about the correct ways to ideologically classify such parties. To ensure transparency and uniformity in research, the discipline could benefit from a systematic procedure. In this letter, we discuss how we have employed the method of ‘Expert-informed Qualitative Comparative Classification’ (EiQCC) to construct the newest version of The PopuList (3.0) – a database of populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since 1989. This method takes into account the in-depth knowledge of national party experts while allowing for systematic comparative analysis across cases and over time. We also examine how scholars have made use of the previous versions of the dataset, explain how the new version of The PopuList differs from previous ones, and compare it to other data. We conclude with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of The PopuList dataset.

Since the late 2000s economic and immigration crises are testing the European Union (EU). Such challenges have opened up a period of radical change for the EU, among them, the Brexit referendum that will radically change EU’s geography. This turmoil is mirrored by the last European Parliament (EP) election results; extreme right- and left-wing parties succeeded in the electoral competition at the expense of their mainstream counterpart. These forces are generally labelled as ‘Eurosceptic’, even though the literature still lacks a clear-cut definition of Euroscepticism. Starting from this observation, this paper reviews the conceptual evolution of Euroscepticism, stressing its pros and cons and proposes a reconceptualization of it in terms of EU-opposition such that the objects of criticism are clearly identified as the EU-policies, the EU-elite, the EU-regime, and the EU-community. The paper applies ‘EU-opposition’ to examine empirically the activity of two ‘Eurosceptic’ parties in the EP: the Italian Five Stars Movement (FSM) and the British United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), using the speeches they deliver in the arena of the EP as the main source of data. From the analysis, it can be seen that UKIP and FSM are an odd couple working in the same party group in the EP, and the concept of EU-opposition is able to better disentangle UKIP and FSM’s criticism of the EU.

The phenomenon of international migration has become one of the most complex issues within the expanding and deepening security field since the conclusion of the Cold War. By the end of the 1990s, far-right parties had securitized international migration, which had previously been encouraged by many European countries to meet their workforce needs, posing a threat to the security of both the international system and developed and developing countries. Particularly after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments and actions were concentrated in the Western world in general, and Europe in particular, reaching a pinnacle during the Arab Spring. Far-right parties have risen in response to migration and anti-immigration discourses, securitizing international migration by claiming that immigrants disrupt European society’s homogeneity and increase integration problems, unemployment, and crime rates. This study examines the securitization of international migration on a socioeconomic and political level within the framework of far-right parties in Europe using the example of Hungary’s ruling Fidesz and opposition Jobbik parties. The conclusions reached show that international migration will be securitized in both Eastern and Western European countries where the far-right is on the rise.

Migration has gained an increasingly prominent place on the European political agenda in recent years. This is directly related to the rise of far-right parties, which play an important role in shaping migration policies across Europe. Parties such as the National Union in France and the Alternative for Alternative (AfD) in Germany have achieved significant electoral success by utilising anti-immigrant rhetoric in the media. In addition to the Netherlands, Austria, and Italy, almost all major countries support this trend. This situation clearly shows the impact of anti-immigrant discourse and policies in European politics on society. The rise of the far right has led to tighter border controls in Europe and increased securitising policies against migrants. This process is fuelled by the economic and security concerns of European citizens. For instance, low wages and competition for jobs increase the concerns of local citizens. Moreover, security threats, such as terrorist attacks, reinforce the public's negative attitude towards migrants, which leads to the issue of migration becoming more prominent in the political arena. By constantly raising the issue of migration, far-right parties shape the policies of mainstream parties and play a decisive role in shifting them to the right. This ‘shift’, in most cases, results in the adoption of harsher and more restrictive policies towards migrants. This study aims to analyse in detail the influence of far-right parties in Europe on migration policies and the dynamic changes this influence has on the domestic policies of countries. The growth in the electoral base of far-right parties increases social polarisation and leads to a reshaping of existing policies. Therefore, these processes need to be analysed in depth to understand how the social fabric and political climate in Europe are changing.

Received 30.10.2020. The article examines the processes of formation and institutionalization of pan-European parties (Europarties) as a new institution in the party-political system of the European Union. This institution emerged relatively recently in the mid‑1970s, on the eve of the first European elections in 1979. The main stages of institutionalization of European parties and their factions in the European Parliament are presented. The article shows the key differences between this type of a party and traditional political parties as well as the way relations between the European parties and national parties from the EU member states are developing. It analyzes the current state of these parties and the impact of the most important challenges that the European Union has faced in the last decade: the global financial and economic crisis, the migration crisis in Europe, Brexit, and the coronavirus pandemic. The article considers the legal basis for ensuring the functioning of these parties, which is contained in the Lisbon Treaty, and a number of other fundamental acts of the European Union regulating the activities of its political system. The results of the 2014 and 2019 pan-European parliamentary elections are analyzed; it is shown how positions of the leading European parties represented in the European Parliament have changed. The reasons for the change in the electoral results of these parties, including the growing popularity of Eurosceptic parties, are indicated. It is noted to which EU member states the most popular European parties belong, and what the reason for this distribution is. The article presents new trends in the development of the Institute of European parties associated with an active use of new communication technologies in party building, as well as the emergence of a new type of European parties that advocate the federalization of the European Union.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to show how socially responsible investment (SRI) could represent a powerful tool (trust recovering in political and economic institutions) in the case of failure or stagnation of economic and financial growth. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the current status of SRI in the context of the recent financial and economic crises. The main objective of this analysis is to consider the different benefits and challenges that this type of investment transactions bring into the international economy, and how SRI entrance could represent a major benefit not only for investors a different approach to corporate sustainability but as an important possibility in times of global economic and political crisis. Methodology/approach By analysing the literature about SRI, it has been developed a discussion regarding its benefits and obstacles in today’s financial scenario. By evaluating the performance of SRI in the context of the global financial crisis and the important opportunities regarding development, we would like to present the SRI as an important tool in today’s Post 2015 development agenda. Findings After revising the existent literature, it has been found that there are two important discussions in the field of SRI. The first one is related with the financial performance of SRI in contrast with the conventional investment funds while the second one is related with important considerations about the SRI in the context of the global financial crisis. After considering the arguments from the different authors, we address some conclusions regarding the importance of SRI in nowadays sustainable development discussion. Practical implications Due to failure in the traditional modus operandi of financial institutions and the recent global crises, investors, corporate executives and governments are increasingly paying more attention on the social, environmental and ethical behaviour of individual managers, shareholders and institutional investors. Therefore, it is being observed a shift and maturing process in SRI from an exclusive practice of few and specialised niche investment funds with minor financial implications and limited economic importance, to mainstream adopted by a growing number of institutional investors at the international level. This shift may influence companies and managers to adopt universal values and to assume a committed and strategic CSR agenda to respond to markets and societal expectations, in order to have guilt-free and sustainable investment and sustainable financial markets. Originality/value Within the context of the Post 2015 development agenda, the role of business and the private sector has become crucial for funding the new sustainable development goals (SDGs). This chapter not only discussed the relationship between SRI as an alternative to overcome financial crises and lack of sustainability in investment, but it does also conceptually demonstrates the potential of SRI to achieve the funding of the SDGs.

West European party systems have undergone a systematic realignment of party policy positions over the past several decades. The traditional economic cleavage that initially structured many of these systems is still important, and economic issues continue to define voters’ interests and needs. In addition, a new cultural cleavage has emerged, consisting of issues dealing with social equality, diversity, morality, and related topics. Using the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) from 2006 to 2019, we track the evolution of party positions on both cleavages over time. These analyses show the emergence of far-right parties across Western Europe and their policy evolution over time. Far-right parties now generally represent centrist views on economic policy combined with starkly conservative positions on the cultural cleavage. We discuss the implications of these patterns for parties and voters in European party systems.

This study examines the relationship between immigration and the rise of far-right parties in Europe from 2014 to 2024, focusing on the implications for societal security. It explores how far-right parties have capitalized on immigration, framing it as a critical threat to national identity and social stability. Applying the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, the research analyzes how these parties have redefined immigration as a national security issue, thereby legitimizing more stringent immigration policies and exclusionary practices. The findings indicate that far-right parties have effectively utilized public anxieties and uncertainties surrounding immigration to influence the political discourse across Europe. This shift has significant socio-political consequences, posing challenges to the European Union’s foundational principles of integration, democracy, and human rights. The study highlights concerns over democratic backsliding, the erosion of social policies, and threats to freedom of movement and human rights. Additionally, it examines the potential impacts on the EU’s cohesion policy, foreign policy, enlargement process, and environmental sustainability. The research underscores a major transformation in Europe’s political landscape with far-reaching implications for the stability of the European Union and its member states.

Geçmişte pek çok Avrupa ülkesi tarafından iş gücü ihtiyacını karşılamak amacıyla teşvik edilen uluslararası göç olgusu, 1990’lı yılların sonu itibariyle, giderek hem uluslararası sistemin hem de gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerin ulusal, toplumsal ve ekonomik güvenliğine tehdit oluşturan bir uluslararası güvenlik sorunu olarak ele alınmaya başlanmış ve aşırı sağ partiler tarafından güvenlikleştirilen bir konu olmuştur. Özellikle 11 Eylül 2001 terör saldırı sonrasında genel olarak Batı dünyasında özel olarak da Avrupa’da yoğunlaşan göç ve göçmen karşıtı söylemler ve politikalar, Arap Baharı sürecinde zirve noktasına taşınmıştır. Göç ve göçmen karşıtlığı üzerinden yükselişe geçen aşırı sağ partiler, göçmenlerin Avrupa toplumunun homojen yapısını bozduğu, işsizliği ve suç oranlarını artırdığı şeklindeki söylemler vasıtasıyla uluslararası göçü ekonomik, toplumsal ve ulusal güvenlik bağlamında güvenlikleştirmektedirler. Avrupa’daki aşırı sağ partiler çerçevesinde sosyoekonomik ve siyasal temelde uluslararası göçün güvenlikleştirilmesinin Fransa’daki Ulusal Cephe Partisi örneği üzerinden incelendiği bu çalışmada, aşırı sağın yükselişte olduğu Batı Avrupa ülkelerinde göçün yakın gelecekte de güvenlikleştirilmeye devam edeceği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

How the Economic and Financial Crisis is Affecting Children and Young People in Europe