Abstract
In the era of the knowledge economy, it is urgent for organizations to solve the problem of knowledge hiding of internal members to accelerate the speed and efficiency of knowledge dissemination and innovation and adapt to rapid changes in the market. At present, research on knowledge hiding has received extensive attention from Western countries, but there are few relevant studies in China. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of second-level knowledge hiding of organizational members and analyzes the main factors affecting the stable equilibrium point using MATLAB numerical simulation. The results show that knowledge leakage risk is positively correlated with knowledge hiding. The ability of knowledge absorption and transformation is positively correlated with the behavior of knowledge hiding. There is a negative correlation between collaborative innovation ability and knowledge hiding. There is a negative correlation between knowledge stock and knowledge hiding. Only when the incentive reaches a certain level can organizational members be encouraged to give up knowledge hiding. This paper provides a more comprehensive and dynamic picture of the evolutionary game of knowledge hiding among members in the organization and provides a new idea of knowledge management for organizational managers.
Highlights
With the emergence of knowledge-based view theory and the development of strategic management theory, knowledge is widely regarded as an important resource for organizational development [1]
A successful knowledge management system depends on the behavior of organizational members, especially the behavior of knowledge sharing among organizational members [12]
The knowledge hiding of organizational members changes dynamically with changes in the organizational environment and leadership behavior; it is difficult to scientifically and comprehensively reflect the process of the generation and change of knowledge hiding among organizational members only by analyzing knowledge hiding from a static perspective. erefore, this paper intends to build an evolutionary game model of organizational member knowledge hiding, analyze the dynamic changes and stabilization strategies of organizational member knowledge hiding from a multidimensional perspective with different parameter variables, and use numerical simulation to reflect the influence of dynamic changes in different parameters on knowledge hiding strategies
Summary
With the emergence of knowledge-based view theory and the development of strategic management theory, knowledge is widely regarded as an important resource for organizational development [1]. Knowledge hiding is the deliberate hiding of individuals in an organization when faced with knowledge requests, which will inhibit innovation and weaken organizational performance [17]. It will harm the interpersonal relationships between the members of the organization and affect the creativity of the members [18]. For a long time, knowledge hiding has not received enough attention from theoretical circles In recent years, it has attracted wide attention from scholars and developed into a frontier topic of organizational behavior research [19]. It can provide a useful practical reference for managers to prevent the occurrence of knowledge hiding of organizational members in advance and break the vicious circle of knowledge hiding afterwards
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