The dual status of rivers in Bangladesh as legal persons and public trust properties: the likelihood of legal complexity

The United States has a north coast along its ‘inland seas’—the Laurentian Great Lakes. The country enjoys more than 4,500 miles of Great Lakes coastal shoreline, almost as much as its ocean coastal shorelines combined, excluding Alaska. The Great Lakes states are experiencing continued shorefront development and redevelopment, and there are growing calls to better manage shorelands for enhanced resiliency in the face of global climate change. The problem is that the most pleasant, fragile, and dangerous places are in high demand among coastal property owners, such that coastal development often yields the most tenacious of conflicts between public interests and private property rights. Indeed, those conflicts implicate fundamental debates over the state’s authorities and prerogatives to regulate privately owned shoreland (the police power), the public’s interest in coastal resources (the public trust doctrine), and private property owners’ rights to use and to exclude others from their shorelands (referred to collectively here as the private property doctrine). While not tidal, standing water levels of the Great Lakes fluctuate over time substantially. As a result, the lakes have beaches much like ocean coasts, and the public trust doctrine is aptly applied to them, albeit awkwardly. All of the eight Great Lakes states have long acknowledged the applicability of the public trust doctrine to their Great Lakes bottomlands and shorelands. In doing so, they have accepted the now-conventional understanding that the doctrine originated in ancient Roman law. Even so, recent critiques of the public trust doctrine assert that it has been misinterpreted and that its historical pedigree is not so strong or aptly applied to American coasts, especially along Great Lakes coasts. These critiques do not address the historical pedigree and robustness of the police power doctrine, or, more importantly, the pedigree and robustness of contemporary notions of private property rights. If the public trust doctrine is indeed lacking upon reconsideration, how does it fare in comparison to these other doctrines? This Article lays the foundation for an extended study of the public trust doctrine as it applies to Great Lakes shores. We provide an overview of the public trust doctrines of all eight Great Lakes states, noting for illustration and, where appropriate, particulars for the State of Michigan, which enjoys more than 60% of the combined U.S. Great Lakes coastline. To explain our motivations in undertaking this study, the Article first briefly reviews the importance of the lakes to the State of Michigan and the other Great Lakes states more broadly and then frames shoreland management as one of the resource management imperatives those states face. The Article then reviews the historical origins, the contemporary contours, and the ongoing debates surrounding the police power, public trust, and private property doctrines separately. Building on that foundation, we then analyze how courts and legislatures have reconciled those doctrines through application in coastal settings broadly. First, we find that the public trust doctrines of the Great Lakes states fall well within the boundaries of the origins and application of that doctrine throughout the nation’s history, even though the Lakes are not tidal. Second, we find that the concept of a ‘moveable freehold’ inherent in the public trust doctrine—that the boundary separating state-owned submerged public trust land from privately owned upland along the shore—reflects natural dynamic shoreline processes, not arbitrary governmental rulemaking, and is well established and accepted by all Great Lakes states. Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of this Article, we find that all three doctrines—public trust, police powers, and private property rights—trace their roots to English common law and even ancient Roman law, but all are in fact distinctly American doctrines. All three doctrines were first fully articulated in the context of unique American institutions, values, and conflicts. Each has evolved over time as American institutions, values, and conflicts have similarly evolved. Thus, despite detractors’ assertions to the contrary, the public trust doctrine is no less robust or aptly applied to Great Lakes coasts than is either the police power or private property rights doctrine. In fact, despite case law and commentary rhetoric that can be dogmatically extreme, efforts to understand and reconcile these doctrines in practice generally strike a pragmatic balance between the private rights inherent in shoreland property ownership and the public interest in common access to and use of submerged lands and the foreshore. Following our analysis of these doctrines from a broad perspective, we conclude by providing a brief overview of the several public trust doctrines as adapted by all of the Great Lakes states and finally identifying a number of questions for further study.

The public trust doctrine (PTD) has sometimes been mischaracterized as applicable only to state-owned resources. But this “proprietary PTD” is only half of the scope of the PTD, for the doctrine also contains a “sovereign” component. The latter has been recognized for over a century and is not dependent on state ownership of the public trust res. This article examines the evolution of both the proprietary and sovereign PTDs. We first trace the development of the former from Roman and English law through several prominent and recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. We then turn to the lesser-recognized sovereign PTD, which grew out of a largely overlooked, but highly influential, decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. The article explains the legacy of that case, Lamprey v. Metcalf, which established the now-dominant state-law view that the PTD applies to waterbodies whose beds are privately owned. Unlike the proprietary PTD, which employs the federal test for title navigability, the sovereign usufructuary PTD is not tethered to the federal title test, but is instead the product of state definitions of navigability, which often are much broader than the federal test. The article assesses the implications of widespread judicial recognition of the sovereign PTD as distinct from the proprietary PTD, spotlighting a case pending before the Oregon Supreme Court involving a 400-acre Oregon lake, Oswego Lake, in suburban Portland. But the implications are much broader than that controversy and point to the application of the PTD to all resources of public concern like wildlife, groundwater, and the atmosphere.

This companion Article to the fall 2007 A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines explores the state public trust doctrines— emphasis on the plural—in the nineteen western states. In so doing, this Article seeks to make the larger point that, while the broad contours of the public trust doctrine have a federal law basis, especially regarding state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, the details of how public trust principles actually apply vary considerably from state to state. Public trust law, in other words, is very much a species of state common law. Moreover, as with other forms of common law, states have evolved their public trust doctrines in light of the particular histories and the perceived needs and problems of each state. This Article observes that, in the West, four factors have been most important in the evolution of state public trust doctrines: (1) the severing of water rights from real property ownership and the riparian rights doctrine; (2) subsequent state declarations of public ownership of fresh water; (3) clear and explicit perceptions of the scarcity of water and the importance of submerged lands and environmental amenities; and (4) a willingness to consider water and other environmental issues to be of constitutional importance and/or to incorporate broad public trust mandates into statutes. From these factors, two important trends in western states’ public trust doctrines have emerged: (1) the extension of public rights based on states’ ownership of the water itself; and (2) an increasing, and still cutting-edge, expansion of public trust concepts into ecological public trust doctrines that are increasingly protecting species, ecosystems, and the public values that they provide.

We welcome Craig's support for the notion that establishing public trust doctrine principles in the United States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) could prove important to federal oceans law and policy. Notwithstanding her concerns, the doctrine has burst out of its original confines—courts in many states (such as Florida, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Virginia) have expanded the doctrine's scope to protect various natural resources and public uses, and in so doing have authorized the protection of aquatic ecosystems ([ 1 ][1]–[ 4 ][2]). Additionally, several courts have concluded that the corpus of public trusts must be preserved—not just for the benefit of the current generation, but also for future generations [e.g., ([ 5 ][3])]. Thus, far from enshrining a right of today's citizens to fish, applying the public trust doctrine would impose an obligation to manage fishing in federal ocean waters in a sustainable manner. Moreover, improved understanding of the interconnectedness of ocean ecosystems lends weight to the conclusion that ensuring the ability of future generations to fish will require an ecosystem-based management regime created by means of a coastal and marine spatial planning framework ([ 6 ][4], [ 7 ][5]). Guerra-Pujol asserts that we promote a public trust doctrine–based ocean policy at the expense of property rights–based management programs. However, a federal public trust doctrine would not preclude the establishment of, for example, oil, gas, and renewable energy leases and fisheries catch-share programs; instead, it would guide the development of these policies such that they protect the public interest ([ 8 ][6]). Finally, Portman questions the added value of a federal ocean public trust doctrine when ocean-related agencies already have various mandates to act for the benefit of the U.S. public. But firmly establishing the public trust doctrine in the EEZ would explicitly impart a suite of specific duties and responsibilities to federal ocean trustees of the kind that are assumed by trustees of public, private, and charitable trusts ([ 8 ][6], [ 9 ][7]). The duties include those mentioned above—to preserve the trust corpus and to deal impartially among all beneficiaries (both present and future)—as well as the duties to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries and to provide complete and accurate information to trust beneficiaries regarding the management of the trust ([ 10 ][8]). The Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act regulatory framework has not been successful because of noncompliance and lack of enforcement. Such a circumstance should not disqualify the public trust doctrine from informing national ocean policy. Indeed, it did not prevent the Massachusetts Ocean Management Plan from identifying its impetus as the state's public trust doctrine ([ 11 ][9]). Would applying the public trust doctrine to the EEZ help to establish the necessary incentives, responsibilities, and powers for federal agencies to work in an integrated fashion toward long-term sustainable ocean management? We think so; by providing a common, overarching public trust mandate, as well as a suite of enforceable trusteeship duties, the doctrine would work at multiple levels to help Congress and federal agencies reshape the regulatory framework used to manage U.S. ocean space and resources. It would provide the bedrock for the new national ocean policy envisioned by the president—a policy that emphasizes both intergenerational ecosystem protection and stewardship ([ 7 ][5]). 1. [↵][10] Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Chiles , 701 So. 2d 619, 624 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App 1997). 2. Avenal v. State , 886 So. 2d 1085, 1101–1102 (La. 2004). 3. State Department of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power and Light Co. , 308 A. 2d 671, 674 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973), reviewed on other grounds, 351 A. 2d 337 (N.J. 1976). 4. [↵][11] In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980). 5. [↵][12] W. J. F. Realty Corp. v. State , 672 N.Y.S. 2d 1007, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998). 6. [↵][13]1. K. L. McLeod, 2. H. Leslie , Eds., Ecosystem-Based Management for the Oceans (Island Press, Washington, DC, 2009). 7. [↵][14]Presidential Memorandum, “National Policy for the Oceans, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes,” 74 Fed. Reg. 28591 (2009). [OpenUrl][15] 8. [↵][16]1. G. Osherenko , J. Environ. L. Litig. 21, 317 (2006). [OpenUrl][17] 9. [↵][18]Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 76–84 (2007). 10. [↵][19] Slocum v. Borough of Belmar , 569 A. 2d 312, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989). (“A public trustee is endowed with the same duties and obligations as an ordinary trustee. That is, the trustee owes to the beneficiary a duty of loyalty, a duty of care, and a duty of full disclosure.”) 11. [↵][20]Massachusetts Executive Office for Energy and Environmental Affairs, Massachusetts Ocean Management Plan (draft) , (Massachusetts Executive Office for Energy and Environmental Affairs, Boston, MA, 2009). [1]: #ref-1 [2]: #ref-4 [3]: #ref-5 [4]: #ref-6 [5]: #ref-7 [6]: #ref-8 [7]: #ref-9 [8]: #ref-10 [9]: #ref-11 [10]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1 in text [11]: #xref-ref-4-1 View reference 4 in text [12]: #xref-ref-5-1 View reference 5 in text [13]: #xref-ref-6-1 View reference 6 in text [14]: #xref-ref-7-1 View reference 7 in text [15]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253D%253FNational%2BPolicy%2Bfor%2Bthe%2BOceans%252C%2BOur%2BCoasts%252C%2Band%2Bthe%2BGreat%2BLakes%252C%253F%26rft.volume%253D74%26rft.spage%253D28591%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [16]: #xref-ref-8-1 View reference 8 in text [17]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DJ.%2BEnviron.%2BL.%2BLitig.%26rft.volume%253D21%26rft.spage%253D317%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [18]: #xref-ref-9-1 View reference 9 in text [19]: #xref-ref-10-1 View reference 10 in text [20]: #xref-ref-11-1 View reference 11 in text

Sovereign rights and responsibilities: Applying public trust principles to the management of EEZ space and resources

Hawaii’s public trust doctrine is unique in its breadth, its origins, and its constitutional basis. Perhaps the most expansive in the United States, the Hawaii public trust doctrine extends to water, land, air, minerals, natural beauty, and Native Hawaiian cultural practices. Although the majority of Hawaii’s public trust cases concern water issues, the Hawaii Supreme Court has also applied the public trust doctrine in several important land cases. Significantly, the court has applied the doctrine to land extensions created during volcanic eruptions and, most recently, to Mauna Kea, a mountain peak controversially used for both modern astronomy and Native Hawaiian cultural practices. I survey several public trust cases, beginning with Waiāhole Ditch—a water case widely regarded as the cornerstone of Hawaii’s modern public trust doctrine—and ending with the Hawaii Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Mauna Kea II. A survey of the case law reveals that the expansive nature of Hawaii’s public trust doctrine has not always led to greater protections for all trust resources, as courts have ruled that the doctrine requires a balancing between protection and maximum beneficial use. Applying this balancing test, court opinions have, in some cases, resulted in greater protection for Native Hawaiian rights to trust resources. In other cases, however, court application of the balancing test has resulted in resource allocations that harm native interests. In light of the dichotomous results, this paper recommends that Hawaii agencies like the Department of Land and Natural Resources develop inclusive participatory processes ensuring that Native Hawaiian concerns are fully ventilated before taking action affecting trust resources.

Over a year of shutting down the global economy during the COVID pandemic achieved about .01 degrees of improvement in global warming. Not even a drop in the bucket. We continue to face a monumental climate crisis. And of the many ways that crisis threatens our environment, winnowing water resources is one of the scariest. One solution that many scholars have turned to is the public trust doctrine. At first blush, this doctrine sounds like a panacea for water management problems: When our water resources are threatened enough that current and future citizen’s access to it is in peril, the trust kicks in. The government must take steps to protect our waterbodies. So no surprise that scholars have flocked to the doctrine and analyzed just about every angle of the public trust. Save perhaps one: Does it even work? Much less attention has been paid to what concrete impact the public trust is having on real litigation. There is no shortage of language in case law or state statutes about the trust. But does that language do any good? This article tries to answer that question, collecting data about state court decisions mentioning the public trust doctrine in thirty states. Our team reviewed the cases and coded them based on how authorities used the public trust doctrine. Our goal was to answer a key question: When does the public trust doctrine matter in real cases? In other words, when do courts use the doctrine to protect natural water resources? Beyond shedding light on how effective the doctrine is on the ground, this article’s goal is to offer insights about both successful and unsuccessful cases. What can we learn from the cases in which it does work that might equip litigants to wield this weapon better in the future? In most cases reviewed, the public trust doctrine was ineffective at combatting climate change or other harms to natural water resources. But the data offers ideas for moving forward towards a version of the public trust that will have teeth in the climate fight.

The public trust doctrine imposes obligations and restrictions on governments in their exercise of sovereign power over property and resources of great public value. For environmental plaintiffs alleging that the federal government has breached its fiduciary obligation as a steward of natural resources, the vitality of the public trust doctrine hinges on whether courts conclude that it is exclusively a state law doctrine or also applies to the federal government. Courts have split on the issue, disagreeing over the proper scope and application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal 1892 public trust case, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois. Several courts, including the D.C. Circuit, have leaned on an isolated quotation from Appleby v. City of New York—an obscure 1926 U.S. Supreme Court breach-of-contract case that discussed Illinois Central—for their conclusions that the public trust doctrine does not apply to the federal government. That presumed pillar of support, however, crumbles under scrutiny of the facts and reasoning of Appleby. The Appleby Court in fact recognized and ratified the broad principle of Illinois Central, under which public trust obligations inhere in sovereignty and would thus bind the federal government along with states. This Comment offers a thorough analysis of Appleby that may enable environmental plaintiffs to counter assertions that the Supreme Court has foreclosed the possibility of a federal public trust obligation. Although later Supreme Court dicta suggest otherwise, Appleby supports a conclusion that the public trust doctrine binds all sovereigns, including the federal government.

The public trust doctrine and critical legal geographies of water in California

This Note considers the relationship between the public trust doctrine and private property rights under the Takings Clause. Traditionally, the public trust doctrine vests authority in state governments to protect navigable waterways and related lands. But in recent years, state governments and state courts have begun to use the doctrine to achieve broader environmental ends. While increased environmental protection at the state level serves vital public interests, it is not an unambiguous good. Under current takings analysis, the public trust doctrine constitutes one of several affirmative defenses to just compensation liability; where state governments invoke the public trust doctrine, they are not required to pay just compensation to property owners, even for complete takings. The expanded public trust doctrine can therefore frustrate constitutionally rooted private property rights. This Note proffers some recommendations to resolve the tension between states' interest in environmental protection and private property owners' constitutional guarantee of just compensation. Under a codification and declaration regime, states can continue to expand their public trust doctrines while at the same time providing property owners more meaningful protections. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:Table Normal; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0in; mso-para-margin-right:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0in; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:Calibri,sans-serif; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;}

The public trust doctrine creates a set of sovereign rights and responsibilities with regard to certain resource commons, obligating the state to manage them in trust for the public.In the last century, the doctrine has gradually transformed from an affirmation of sovereign authority over trust resources to a recognition of sovereign responsibility to protect them for present and future generations.Especially in the United States, it has evolved through common, constititional, and statutory law to protect a broader variety of resources and associated values, including ecological, recreational, and scenic values.Today, the doctrine is frequently invoked in natural resource conflicts, some defending environmental regulations against constitutional takings claims, and some of which push the boundaries of previously recognized trust values, such as recent appeals to public trust principles in support of meaningful climate governance.After reviewing the origins of the public trust in early Roman and English law, this chapter explores its development in US law to protect different values, applied to different resources, and vindicated by different legal mechanisms in different states.It reviews the two most famous American public trust cases over a hundred year span, the U.S. Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Illinois Central Railroad v Illinois and the California Supreme Court's 1983 Audubon Society decision at Mono Lake, and then explores the incorporation of the doctrine in different state constitutions.It considers the expanding role of the doctrine as a defence to constitutional takings claims and considers whether it should be understood as a constraint on all sovereign authority, including federal authority, and the significance for climate-related public trust advocacy.It concludes with reflections on the ongoing development of public trust principles and contrasting environmental rights internationally.

Under the banner of state sovereignty, state wildlife agencies commonly claim they are entitled to manage wildlife as a public trust resource under the public trust doctrine (PTD). This assertion is frequently made in judicial proceedings, with state requests that their managerial authority over wildlife be given due force throughout state, private, federal, and even tribal lands. Based on these broad state assertions, one might be forgiven for concluding that a rich body of PTD practices and policies exists for wildlife. In reality, the PTD in state wildlife management proves to be little more than a legal ephemera, leaving few concrete traces on the landscape. This article empirically investigates implementation of the PTD as applied to wildlife by thirteen state fish and wildlife agencies in the American West over nearly two decades. For these states, we reviewed state agency management and/or decision making documents referencing the public trust (and related principles) using an evaluative rubric. In only two out of eighty-six documents is there a discernible application of the PTD or public trust principles that goes beyond merely mentioning those legal concepts. This research exposes a significant gap between the legal assertions western states make about the PTD and the actual decisions of state agencies. Agencies in any decision-making context must making findings under applicable law and support their choices with evidence. This administrative expectation should be all the more exacting when a public trust resource is implicated. To truly fulfill the legal mandate of the PTD, and to avoid the specter of arbitrary and capricious decision-making, state wildlife agencies must do more. By drawing comparisons to the application of PTD in state water resources decisions—an area with more developed public trust application—the article suggests how states can begin to close this implementation gap for wildlife.

This Article puts forward a new social–political theory of the public trust doctrine by demonstrating that the doctrine is a legal tool that embodies both rights-conferring and responsibilities-imposing functions. The new theory, as the Article shows, is capable of yielding effective responses to the criticisms that have been leveled against the doctrine and the conventional theories upon which the doctrine was founded. Based on the role of public space in human development, the Article first discusses how and why the public trust doctrine has functioned to protect public spaces by conferring upon citizens four categories of public rights. The Article then argues that we should regard the public trust doctrine as a legal tool to enforce the public trust principle as a fundamental constitutional principle affording citizens fundamental rights over public space that is indispensable for human development. The protection of the public interest under this principle embodies the fundamental human value of protecting public space and underscores the need for the legal system to be shaped in a manner that effectuates this human value. Moreover, the Article contends that while it grants citizens fundamental rights over public spaces, the public trust principle underlying the public trust doctrine also impresses social responsibilities upon the stakeholders regarding the protection of public space. Through the enforcement of social responsibilities, the doctrine promotes a stewardship ethic of protecting the public spaces in society. In this respect, the Article alters the conventional trusteeship model under the public trust doctrine, which deems the government to be the sole trustee responsible for managing public resources. It demonstrates that the social responsibility model of stewardship requires not only the government but also the judiciary and individuals as members of the public to act as the stewards of public resources.

The public trust doctrine has enjoyed a significant renaissance over the last twenty-five years as a tool for judicial review of government decisions to alienate natural resources. The analysis most responsible for the doctrine's rebirth, Joseph Sax's 1970 Michigan Law Review article, characterizes the doctrine as a tool for perfecting inadequacies in the political and administrative process that may result in inappropriate discounting of environmental values. In this Article, Professor William Araiza considers this democracy- reinforcing conception of the doctrine by exploring the analogy between it and the political-process theory of the Equal Protection Clause. This latter theory justifies a searching judicial scrutiny of legislation burdening certain groups on the grounds that prejudice limits those groups' ability to participate fully in the political process. Essentially, Professor Araiza asks whether public trust resources can be meaningfully analogized to such "discrete and insular minorities," for which heightened judicial protection is appropriate. He concludes that while it may be theoretically possible to draw this analogy, a process-justified public trust doctrine nevertheless fails to provide principles limiting that which would otherwise be an extraordinarily broad scope for judicial review. Moreover, environmental protection is a politically powerful rallying cry in contemporary America; when combined with existing mechanisms for channeling that political power into administrative action, this fact undermines the appropriateness of special judicial solicitude for environmental conservation based on alleged defects in the government decision-making process. Professor Araiza consequently rejects a purely process-justified public trust doctrine and instead considers sources of a substantive political commitment to public trust preservation. He argues that many state constitutions provide this commitment through provisions addressing environmental protection. Professor Araiza concludes that many of these provisions, carefully read, can provide the foundation for a public trust doctrine that seeks not to second- guess government decisions, but that merely attempts to ensure that environmental values are appropriately considered in the decision-making process. This conclusion both gives effect to these provisions, most of which have laid dormant since their enactment, and limits the judicial role in areas in which the need for technical expertise and political accountability make judicial policy making especially inappropriate.

439 THE LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED when the longestablished public trust doctrine intersects with casino siting issues is unique to Mississippi. While gaming facilities are located along the U.S. coastline in such notable places as Atlantic City and Puerto Rico, the legal requirement that Mississippi’s casinos actually float on the waters along the coast invokes an entirely different body of law which other states have not chosen to confront. This article will begin with a historical overview of the public trust doctrine, beginning with its English common law roots and following its centuries old evolution to its modern day application in commercial, residential, and recreational contexts. As will be seen, the public trust is unique in American law in that, while it does not rise to the level of Constitutional protection, it is much more difficult to circumvent than mere statutory law. It is essentially permanent protection for the nation’s coastal areas—a covenant that runs with the land, barring alienation of many of the rights that usually accompany an ownership interest. Next, a history of Mississippi’s coastal casino development will provide the backdrop for the legal questions which inevitably arose. In less than five short years following the legalization of gaming in Mississippi, a number of casinos and environmental groups began to question what authority the State of Mississippi had in regulating the coastal waters and beaches which were experiencing new development for the first time in decades. Licenses, permits, and leases which for years had been under the jurisdiction of local authorities were becoming the purview of the state, and many people questioned whether the interpretation of coastal law was merely following the influx of astounding amounts of new investment money. Finally, the historic and controversial “Mississippi Land Swap” opened a new set of questions regarding the future of the public trust doctrine. Though lauded by many conservation groups and developers alike, closer scrutiny of the swap would seem to undermine the very purpose of public trust tidelands and set a precedent for further erosion of the doctrine which has preserved public access to beaches and water transportation routes since the Revolutionary War. While this article will provide few answers to what may be legal, permissible, or popular in regard to the public trust doctrine, it should be a useful guide to its evolution and an aid in the understanding of the perspectives of the parties involved. After all, as with any trust, the public trust involves beneficiaries, who are in this case all Americans.