The Dogma of Japanese Insignificance: The Academic Discourse on North Korea Policy Coordination

Abstract

apan's postwar development has been quite astonishing. The journey from military defeat to economic success only took twenty or so years to accomplish. Yet some international relations (IR) scholars have been rather surprised by the fact that Japan failed to fulfil what they prophesized namely, to develop political and military power commensurate with its great economic capability. This is why realist Kenneth Waltz has given Japan the epithet of structural anomaly.2 The Japanese anomaly is epitomized in (and sometimes also explained as a result of) Japan's historical legacy, including the promulgation of a pacifist constitution with its warrenouncing Article 9, the enactment of three anti-nuclear principles in 1967, and the three principles prohibiting the export of weapons in 1967 and 1976, and the fact that, in principle, Japanese defense expenditure occupies only 1 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) . The image of Japanese insignificance in international affairs reactivity, passivity, dependence or even non-existence is reproduced in many different literatures.