The Division of Household Tasks and Household Financial Management

Abstract

Both the standard economic model and bargaining theory make predictions about financial management and the division of household labor between household partners. Using a large Internet survey, we have tested several predictions about task divisions reported by Dutch household partners. The division of household labor was mainly explained by partners’ job status, wife’s levels of education, and number of children, pointing to the relevancy of social class effects and life cycle stage to the division of household labor. The spouses’ wage rates were not significant in explaining the division of household labor. Financial management was almost evenly divided between household partners. The participation of the husband in financial management was positively related with his wage rate, and negatively with wife’s level of education, pointing to the relevance of bargaining theory. Furthermore, wife’s education was positively associated with household’s quality of financial planning, whereas the wife having a paid job, income going into separate accounts, and the number of children negatively affected financial planning. In addition, without indication of causality, the husband’s share in paying bills was negatively associated with the household easily making ends meet, the husband spending freely, and frequent debate about money. Also, financial planning was positively associated with the household making ends meet and the spouses’ frequent debate about money, and negatively with the spouses spending freely, indicating the importance of associations with psychological variables.