Abstract
This paper evaluatesthe distributional and welfare effects of two recent changesof Value Added Tax (VAT) and excise taxes in Italy applying andcomparing two related and complementary methods of analysis:the first based on the distributional characteristics of Feldstein(1972) and recently applied by Newbery (1995); the second basedon the theory of marginal dominance developed by Mayshar andYitzhaki (1996). The paper finds no evidence that the reformshave redistributed purchasing power among households. But themost striking result is that a simpler two-rate VAT structure,set according to the European directives on VAT coordination,could have replaced the present system producing the same revenueand increasing welfare. This last result provides a clear instancein which reducing the number of VAT rates can be welcome evenin the presence of distributional concerns.
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