The Development of Sharing Experiences: From Dyadic Engagement to Taking Others’ Perspectives

Abstract

We argue that the main difference between humans and other animals lies in humans’ unique form of sociality: their shared intentionality. Instead of conceiving of shared intentionality as a special skill humans have in addition to the skills they share with nonhuman animals (the additive account), we propose to think of shared intentionality as transforming human cognition in its entirety (the transformative account, as in the thesis of Kern and Moll). We discuss the relevance of the evolution of the human face for shared intentionality, and we argue that the development of shared intentionality proceeds in the following three steps: 1) newborns’ tendency to engage in preverbal, face-to-face dialogue, 2) 1-year-olds’ drive to jointly attend to the world with others as plural subjects, and 3) preschoolers’ appreciation of individuals’ different perspectives. The shared intentionality thesis defended here can be viewed as an extension of Lev Vygotsky’s sociocultural account of human development.