Abstract
This paper contrasts firm-level as opposed to state-level governance on directors self-rewarding behaviour in West Africa. Director self-reward or compensation is measured through fixed base salary as well as a new measure of total remuneration providing a conservative estimate of the full private benefits of control of directors. Using a unique hand-collected sample of 56 IPO firms from across West Africa from 2000 to 2012, I find that larger board sizes are less effective governance mechanisms while enhanced expropriation of private benefits of control is closely associated with lower government promotion of private sector policies, media and analyst freedom and corruption control.
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