Abstract
Abstract The adage ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ is significantly inaccurate. Ignorance and mistake of law do, under certain circumstances, exclude responsibility both in national and international criminal law. This book updates the existing reviews of law and practice on the topic and aims to go a step further, taking the analysis of mistake of law as a starting point for systematic observations about international criminal law in general. First, the book defines the contours of the defence of mistake of law in general theory of criminal law, distinguishing it from cognate defences and highlighting, most notably, its connection with superior orders. Secondly, it gives an overview of the possible approaches to the defence, offering examples from national law as terms of reference for the subsequent analysis of international criminal law. Thirdly, it surveys the relevant law and practice of international criminal tribunals, with a focus on the International Criminal Court, and it contemplates offences for which a defence of mistake of law may potentially succeed. Fourthly, the book tries to interpret the message that the rules on mistake of law applicable before international criminal tribunals send about the purpose of punishing individuals and the legitimacy of such punishment. Whilst the discourse on international criminal law is more and more concerned with global politics, this book brings the focus back to the appropriateness of imposing a guilty verdict on the individual defendant, a human being who remains a member of society.
Published Version
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