The Deals-based International Order?

State of the Union Addresses (SOUA) by two recent US Presidents, President Obama (2016) and President Trump (2018), and a series of recent of tweets by President Trump, are analysed by means of the data mining technique, sentiment analysis. The intention is to explore the contents and sentiments of the messages contained, the degree to which they differ, and their potential implications for the national mood and state of the economy. President Trump's 2018 SOUA and his sample tweets are identified as being more positive in sentiment than President Obama's 2016 SOUA. This is confirmed by bootstrapped t tests and non-parametric sign tests on components of the respective sentiment scores. The issue of whether overly positive pronouncements amount to self-promotion, rather than intrinsic merit or sentiment, is a topic for future research.

State of the Union Addresses (SOUA) by two recent US Presidents, President Obama (2016) and President Trump (2018), and a series of recent of tweets by President Trump, are analysed by means of the data mining technique, sentiment analysis. The intention is to explore the contents and sentiments of the messages contained, the degree to which they differ, and their potential implications for the national mood and state of the economy. President Trump's 2018 SOUA and his sample tweets are identified as being more positive in sentiment than President Obama's 2016 SOUA. This is confirmed by bootstrapped t tests and non-parametric sign tests on components of the respective sentiment scores. The issue of whether overly positive pronouncements amount to self-promotion, rather than intrinsic merit or sentiment, is a topic for future research.

State of the Union Addresses (SOUA) by two recent US Presidents, President Obama (2016) and President Trump (2018), and a series of recent of tweets by President Trump, are analysed by means of the data mining technique, sentiment analysis. The intention is to explore the contents and sentiments of the messages contained, the degree to which they di_er, and their potential implications for the national mood and state of the economy. President Trump's 2018 SOUA and his sample tweets are identi_ed as being more positive in sentiment than President Obama's 2016 SOUA. This is con_rmed by bootstrapped t tests and non-parametric sign tests on components of the respective sentiment scores. The issue of whether overly positive pronouncements amount to self-promotion, rather than intrinsic merit or sentiment, is a topic for future research.

At the center of this work is the analysis of the consequences of implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (also known as - the Iran nuclear deal) on divergent foreign policy approaches as the main indicators of the mismatch in relations between the United States and the European Union during the administration of the 45th US President Donald Trump. While the US unilaterally withdrew from this agreement, EU member states remained in it. The United States and the European Union, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, had completely different definitions of their own national security, insisting on their unilateral security, while failing to redefine the problem in the direction of mutual security. However, in addition, the US and EU member states, although both concerned about their own security due to the possible emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran, instead of a complementary approach to the issue had a mutually competing one. Using the case study method, as well as the analytical-deductive method and the content analysis method, the author explains the difference in this approach through the concept of the strategic culture of the US and the EU and concludes that they are a consequence of the different understanding of international relations, but also due to the different identity characters of these two actors. The main thesis of the paper is that the US administration of Donald Trump, with its more realistic and Hobbesian view of international relations, and a different understanding of the US national interest in the Middle East, adopted a different approach to curbing Iran's nuclear armament ambitions compared to the approach of the European Union, which is conditioned by a more liberal and Kantian nature of its view on international relations. With unilateral foreign policy actions, Trump's administration risked causing damage and shaking its own credibility in relations with the European Union. On the other hand, the European Union remains committed to multilateralism and the preservation of the Iran nuclear deal. The subject of this research is the direction of the foreign policy actions of the United States and the European Union, in the period from the unilateral withdrawal of Trump's cabinet from the Iran nuclear agreement on May 8th, 2018, until the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, a general of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on January 3rd, 2020 in the Republic of Iraq. The current state and perspective of contemporary transatlantic political relations in the context of unilateral withdrawal will be taken into consideration. In accordance with its new foreign policy agenda and strategy, and more inclined to a realistic view of international relations, the Trump administration risked deeper conflicts and divergence with the European Union over regional security issues. Thus, there was a threat to limit the further deepening and strengthening of the transatlantic partnership with the leading member states of the European Union, especially with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the government of the Republic of France. Additionally, the subject of research will be the patterns of behavior, embodied in speeches and foreign policy actions, which are consistent with the different approaches of the US and the EU to the problem of preventing the theocratic regime in Iran from developing its nuclear program. Accordingly, the focus will be on the period of the Trump administration, which, with its political will to break off with the legacy of the Obama administration, began to perceive Iran as a factor causing instability in the Middle East region. The Trump administration did not ratify the Iran nuclear agreement and continued to act under its obligations, solely because of the unfavorable benefits and a large number of shortcomings for the US. Thus, the paper will analyze whether the US administration of Donald Trump had a concrete foreign policy strategy in relations with the European Union and Iran. Also, the paper will try to answer the question of whether a unilateral or multilateral approach to regional security problems is more fruitful, taking into consideration the question of whether the unilateral approach of the only superpower in the world is more effective or, on the other hand, an international coalition of states is needed to suppress the Tehran's nuclear ambitions.

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2022

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to empirically examine whether the massive spreads and fatalities of the COVID-19 pandemic in the USA, the country with the most advanced medical technology in the world, are symptomatic of leadership failure. The authors posit that when political leaders, such as the President of the USA, in conjunction with a group of state governors and city mayors, employed conspiracy theories and disinformation to achieve their political goals, they contributed to the massive spreads and fatalities of the virus, and they also undermined the credibility of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the health-care professionals in providing the pertinent control guidelines and true scientific-based medical information.Design/methodology/approachThe authors conducted a review of current studies that address the handling of global infectious diseases to build a better understanding of the issue of pandemics. They then employed a theoretical framework to link the massive spreads and fatalities of the COVID-19 pandemic to political leaders, such as President Trump and the group of obsequious state governors and city mayors, who propagated conspiracy theories and disinformation through social media platforms to downplay the severity of the virus. The authors compared the massive spreads and fatalities of the COVID-19 pandemic in the USA under President Trump to President Obama who handled H1N1, Ebola, Zika and Dengue. More importantly, the authors compared President Trump's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic to other political leaders in advanced countries where there were no concerted efforts to spread conspiracy theories and disinformation about the health risks of COVID-19 pandemic.FindingsThe authors' theoretical analysis alluded to the fact that political leaders, such as President Trump, who are engulfed in self-deceptions, self-projections and self-aggrandizements would engage in self-promotion and avoid accountability for their missteps in handling global pandemic shocks. In contrast, political leaders in other advanced countries did not downplay the severity thus their ability to curtail the spreads and fatalities of the COVID-19 pandemic.Research limitations/implicationsThe theoretical viewpoints presented in this paper along with the derivations of the spreads–fatalities curtailment coefficients and the spread–fatality upsurge coefficients under Presidents Obama and Trump, respectively, may not be replicable. Given this plausible limitation, future research may need to provide a deep analysis of the amplifications of conspiracy theories and disinformation because they are now deeply rooted in the political economy of the USA. Furthermore, since scientists and medical professionals may not be able to forecast future epidemics or pandemics with pin-point accuracy nor predict how political leaders would disseminate health risks information associated with different pathogens, it is imperative that future research addresses the positive or adverse effects of conspiracy theories and disinformation that are now easily propagated simultaneously through different social media platforms, which are currently protected under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The multiplier effects of conspiracy theories and disinformation will continue to amplify the division about the authenticity of COVID-19 pandemic and the emergence or reemergence of other pathogens in the foreseeable future.Originality/valueThe authors derived the unique spreads-fatalities curtailment coefficients to demonstrate how President Obama used effective collaboration and coordination at all levels of government in conjunction with medical experts to curtail the spreads and fatalities associated with H1N1, Ebola, Zika and Dengue. They further derived the spreads-fatalities upsurge coefficients to highlight how President Trump contributed to the spreads and fatalities of COVID-19 pandemic through his inability to collaborate and coordinate with state governors, city mayors and different health-care agencies at the national and international levels.

From today's viewpoint, 2016 may well represent the end of the post‐Cold War era and the general assumptions that are associated with it. These include the beliefs that the United States remains a European power, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of its European NATO allies, that liberal democracy represents the political system widely seen as the only legitimate normative reference point, and that the future of the European Union will be defined by continued integration into an ‘ever closer Union’. These assumptions have been shaken to the core.

This article critiques debates in International Relations (IR) on revisionism and contestation of ‘international order’. It argues that these are overfocused on a binary view of ‘revisionism’ and ‘status quo’ and shows how ‘contestation’ takes place within ‘status quo’ states discursively. To this end, it uses the case of Japanese party-political discourses on ‘Ukraine’ and ‘international order’. Conducting a discourse analysis of election manifestos from 2022, it shows how the Japanese parties seldom reproduce the internationally widespread story of the international order being under threat in Ukraine, instead connecting ‘Ukraine’ and ‘international order’ to issues of significance in domestic Japanese politics, such as remilitarisation and opposition to nuclear weapons. This constitutes an example of how the latter is discursively contested by the former even in what has been called a ‘status quo’ state. Moreover, these are ways that do not conform to those commonly associated with ‘revisionist’ states and actors.

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy

In 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump was impeached for his ongoing conduct toward the Government of Ukraine. While much has been written about the domestic implications, few have raised questions about the potential violation of standing international agreements, especially those between the U.S. and Ukraine. Based upon a close textual analysis of available government documents and the agreement itself, we conclude that President Trump’s 2019 actions toward the Government of Ukraine violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.Based upon the available government documents and a close textual analysis of relevant sections of the agreement, we conclude that President Trump’s 2019 conduct toward the Government of Ukraine violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.Through his conduct, President Trump and his associates used “an act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion” (CSCE Final Act, 1975, p. 4, Section VI), to “subordinate” or influence the internal affairs, “political, social, economic [or] cultural systems,” or “laws and regulations” of Ukraine (CSCE Final Act, 1975, p. 4, Section VI). (Budapest Memorandum, 1994, p. 4) in order to “[serve] their own interests” or to “secure advantages of any kind” (Budapest Memorandum, 1994, p. 4).This raises critical questions going forward: what are the implications of such a violation by a president of the United States? And how far will the Trump administration go?Although it would directly contradict Ukraine’s long-held strategic culture and security interests (Sinovets, Budjeryn, 2017, p. 1), had Ukraine deemed this violation “extraordinary circumstances that jeopardize its supreme interests” (Budjeryn, n.d., p. 4), the international ramifications, damage to the nonproliferation paradigm and disarmament efforts could have been immense. A more aggressive nation might be inclined to strike back at such a violation.Additionally: even though this instance of President Trump’s conduct was unique in that it directly violated an agreement, detrimental foreign policy and the degradation of the nonproliferation and arms control paradigm are nothing new for the Trump administration. From the JCPOA, to declining the INF treaty, to distancing and publicly degrading long-standing NATO allies (Fisher, 2016), to growing increasingly close with and complimenting authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin – who also violated the Budapest Memorandum – reckless foreign policy is a consistent, destructive practice by the Trump administration. And as demonstrated by President Trump’s decision to – wittingly or unwittingly – abuse the power of his office to violate an international agreement with a strategic partner for his own political gain, there is no telling what foreign policy damage his administration could do from here.

Key Takeaways • Beijing sees Moscow as its long-term strategic partner to reshape the international order, therefore has no serious intention to contradict Moscow’s interests in Ukraine. In spite of the contradictions with Beijing’s insistence on territorial sovereignty as a key principle of the international order, Beijing has provided vital economic and diplomatic support to Moscow to wage its war against Ukraine. • Ending the war in Ukraine is not a priority for Beijing and will not act against Moscow’s interests to achieve this. • The Ukraine war is mainly utilized by Beijing in multilateral forums to criticize the US-led “liberal international order” and present its own approaches to global governance, especially its “Global Security Initiative”, as a more viable alternative to preserve global peace. • Despite scepticism in the West and among its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, China’s narratives about the war have found a more receptive audience among Global South elites, as seen in joint declarations between Beijing and various Global South governments regarding the war. • China’s approach to the Ukraine war indicates that the willingness to improve relations with Europe is not prioritised at the expense of keeping Moscow onside. This remains true despite the major changes brought by US President Donald Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy.

ABSTRACTIn this article I analyze the recurring representations of Russia’s president Vladimir Putin in US liberal online news media and in political comedy 2013–2019. I take a closer look at these representations in terms of their types, political aims and effects, using critical image and discourse analysis. Arguably, the depictions of Putin focus on his masculinity, thereby rendering the Russian president Other, as backwards, undemocratic, and as a threat to the US. Such imagery is utilized to create a contrast to the US that, in turn, appears as a united, modern and progressive nation. Images of Putin are also frequently used to criticize US president Donald Trump and his populism, which suggest that he is a puppet of Russia. I argue that the media’s focus on Putin, and specifically on his masculinity in criticizing the US president and his politics, however, exaggerates the threat ‘of Russia’ and thus not only runs the risk of affirming a hierarchical binary gender model of power, but also of participating in a tacit populism. Lastly, and paradoxically, many of these images rely on anti-gay sentiments in the name of western values and liberal democracy to make assessments of the political relationship between the US and Russia.

PurposeThis introductory essay historicizes the evolution of China’s geopolitical strategy from the Maoist era (1949–1976) to the present. It examines the Chinese strategic thinking in four spatial settings: Eurasia, maritime Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the wider Indo-Pacific region. The Chinese strategic concerns are comparable across these regions, but the ability to pursue security interests is contingent on many circumstantial factors. This study refers to some snapshots of the ongoing regional disputes to discuss the continuities and breakpoints in China’s strategic outreach in a multipolar world.Design/methodology/approachThis study draws on the scholarly literature and policy papers to examine the interrelated forces that shape China’s rise to regional dominance: how Beijing has co-opted a series of global and regional crises for its rise to domination; how China, the USA and neighbouring countries have adjusted and adapted to a new changing international order; and how major powers in littoral and maritime Asia respond to an increasingly assertive Chinese state.FindingsThis study documents the combination of smart, soft and sharp power that China has deployed, since the global financial crisis of 2008, to enforce its dominance against the USA across the Pacific Rim and Eurasia. It argues that General Secretary of the Chinese Communist PartyXi Jinping initially launched the Belt and Road Initiative to respond to former US President Barak Obama’s policy of rebalancing Asia, and he has expanded these expansionary projects to counter US President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, thereby asserting Chinese influence abroad and tightening control against discontented populations at home.Research limitations/implicationsMany Western policy analysts are wondering whether a rising China will be a “status quo” state or a revisionist state that attempts to challenge the existing world order. The lack of clarification from Beijing has prompted Washington to shift from a longstanding strategy of diplomatic engagement to that of geostrategic containment to balance against China.Originality/valueThe strategic goals of China in the early 21st century pertain to security reassurance, access to energy resources and national image building. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, China has become immensely confident of its own socio-economic accomplishments and scornful of what it perceives as an American conspiracy to undermine its rise to power. Following in the footsteps of the USA in the post-Second World War era, Japan in the 1980s and Taiwan in the 1990s, Beijing has used international commercial activities and business contracts to achieve specific political, strategic and diplomatic objectives.

Refusal is not simple to be taught to language learners. It is challenging act due to its intrinsically face threatening nature. This study is aimed at finding out the realization of refusal strategies in five different channels of political interviews used by Donald Trump--The President of United States of America. The method of collecting data is documentation. The researcher uses descriptive qualitative in analyzing the data. The results show that there are direct and indirect refusal strategies used by President Trump in five different channels of political interviews. In direct strategy, there are ‘no’ and negative willingness. Moreover, in indirect strategy, there are excuse reason and explanation, promise for future acceptance, statement of principle, threat or negative consequences, criticizing or statement of negative feeling or opinion, and verbal avoidance. Further, there are the similarities and differences of refusal strategies used by President Trump among the five different channels of political interviews. The similarities are shown in the interview with CNN; he is more indirect to refuse the interviewers’ want. It is similar to the interview with FOX and CBS News that he is more indirect too. In addition, the differences are shown that in the interview with CNN, FOX, and CBS News, he uses more indirect refusal strategies. In contrast, in ABC and CNBC News, he uses more direct refusal strategies. In term of social status, he uses more of indirect refusal strategies to the interviewers who have lower social status. It means that he wants to soften the offending of interlocutor’s face in refusals. This study also gives pedagogical implication for the language learners to improve their pragmatic competence especially in refusal speech act. Thus, they can use refusals appropriately for communication.

Current discourse on International Relations conflates international order and the interstate distribution of power. Many studies fail to clarify the concept of international order or to provide systematic empirical analysis that compares states' conduct in relation to this order. The prevailing tendency relies instead on rhetorical assertion or definitional fiat to attribute revisionist and status-quo motivations to different countries. For example, power-transition theory claims that rising states are typically revisionist, whereas established states are committed to the status quo. This article presents a contrarian view, arguing that the dominant or established state can be a revisionist. This state is not forever committed to those rules and institutions of international order that it has played a decisive role in fostering. Conversely, a rising state is not inevitably bent on challenging the order that has enabled its ascendance. Revisionism is thus not unique to a rising power; moreover, this state is not destined to be a challenger to international order and an instigator of systemic war as typically depicted in the current literature. I advance these propositions in the context of recent conduct by China and the US, suggesting that whereas China has become less revisionist over time (even while its power has increased), the US has become more so especially during the Trump administration. The major impetus challenging the liberal international order has come more from domestic sources in the West than from China.