The deal of the century in Chile Endesa España's takeover of Enersis

Abstract

We analyze the effect of the announcement of the tender offer made by Endesa España to control Enersis Chile through the Chispas holding structure. In this clinical study of the case, we summarize the salient points of the Chispa case—one of the most controversial in Chile—and obtain the abnormal returns to the shareholders of the target firm using three alternative models for robustness of results: the constant mean model, the market model, and the market model adjusted for non-synchronous trading problems. Contrary to expectations based on prior empirical research in the United States and United Kingdom, our results demonstrate the absence of positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Chispa stockholders during the takeover bidding event window. We present evidence in this case that the governance structure of the target firm led to this seeming anomaly and conclude that the generally accepted theories of corporate control and governance in the United States and United Kingdom do not automatically apply to developing countries with differing legal environments.