Abstract

The making of modern authority centred on efforts to formalise and de-personalise power, and transnational orders such as the European Union have often been viewed as an extension of that project. As this article argues, recent developments tell a different story. More than a decade of crisis politics has seen institutions subordinated to and reshaped by individuals and the networks they form. Locating these tendencies in a wider historical context, the article argues that greater attention to informality in transnational governance needs to be paired with greater recognition of the normative questions it raises. Just as a separation between rulers and the offices of rule was central to the making of modern legal and political structures, the weakening of that separation creates legitimacy problems for contemporary authorities both national and supranational. Rather than acclaimed as flexible problem-solving, the step back from institutions should be viewed as a challenge to accountable rule.

Highlights

  • The making of modern authority centred on efforts to formalise and de-personalise power, and transnational orders such as the European Union have often been viewed as an extension of that project

  • Such dynamics can be observed in the recent experiences of the European Union (EU), the most consolidated of transnational orders, as its leaders have grappled with a succession of challenges centred on finance, migration and health

  • Looking at the Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), the section highlights the concentration of power in individuals, such that key decisions are taken by the few; the collaboration of leaders across institutional boundaries, such that ties of trust override the formal definition of roles; and a reliance on personalised authority, such that emphasis falls on personal judgement, expertise and discretion

Read more

Summary

Introduction

The making of modern authority centred on efforts to formalise and de-personalise power, and transnational orders such as the European Union have often been viewed as an extension of that project. Looking at the Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), the section highlights the concentration of power in individuals, such that key decisions are taken by the few; the collaboration of leaders across institutional boundaries, such that ties of trust override the formal definition of roles; and a reliance on personalised authority, such that emphasis falls on personal judgement, expertise and discretion.

Results
Conclusion
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.