The danger of deepfakes, Indian laws and platform responsibility

The complexity of the situation in an Indian village as regards law and the process of settling disputes can be only briefly catalogued in this paper. To start, let me briefly summarize the social system of a particular region in India. Senapur is a large, multicaste village in Jaunpur District of Eastern Uttar Pradesh, 1 and my remarks, unless otherwise specified, relate to Senapur and the immediately surrounding locality, which is called Dobhi Taluka or Tuppah. Dobhi Taluka is an area of forty square miles with roughly one hundred

The essential thesis of this paper is that while Indian corporate law began as a legal transplant from England, it has been progressively decoupled from its source with subsequent amendments and reforms being focused either on finding solutions to local problems or borrowing from other jurisdictions. To that extent, decolonization has had a significant effect of radically altering the course of Indian corporate law. Current Indian corporate law not only represents a significant departure from its colonial origins, but the divergence between Indian law and English law as they have developed since independence has been increasing. While the Indian lawmaking process indulged in close cross-referencing of English legal provisions during the colonial period and immediately thereafter, the more contemporary legislative reforms pay scant regard to corporate law in the origin country that initially shaped Indian corporate law. This offers valuable lessons. First, even though India is considered to be part of the “common law” family, corporate law has evolved somewhat differently from the origin country, England. In that sense, it casts significant doubt on the assumption that all countries within a legal family bear similarities. On the contrary, each host country may follow a trajectory that is different from that followed by the origin country of corporate law. Second, it supports the proposition that legal transplants can be challenging unless the local conditions in the host country are similar to that in the origin country. Variations in economic, social, political and cultural factors may bring about dissonance in the operation of a transplanted legal system. Third, a comparison of the historical colonial experience in the functioning of the transplanted legal system and the more contemporary experience in the post-colonial period suggests fragility in the foundations of the transplant.

Federal Indian law forms part of the bedrock of American jurisprudence. Indeed, critical parts of the pre-civil war constitutional canon were defined in federal Indian law cases that simultaneously provided legal justification for American westward expansion onto unceded Indian lands. As a result, federal Indian law makes up an inextricable part of American rule of law. Despite its importance, federal Indian law follows a long and circuitous road that requires “wander[ing] the maze of Indian statutes and case law tracing back [over] 100 years.” That road has long oscillated between two poles, with the Supreme Court sometimes applying foundational principles that view tribes as sovereigns “retaining all their original natural rights,” and at other times treating tribes as mere “wards subject to a [self-imposed] guardian.” Supreme Court respect for tribal sovereignty and self-determination reached its zenith in the so-called “modern era” of federal Indian law, spanning from 1959 through the late 1970s. During this era, the Court tended to adhere to federal Indian jurisprudence and solidified a relatively coherent doctrine based upon the foundational principles developed in the 1830s. The late Dean David Getches described the modern era as a time that “encouraged a reinvigoration of tribal governments throughout the country. During this period, tribes gained political influence and economic security as [the federal government] generally promoted a policy of tribal self-determination.” The Court turned away from its foundational Indian law principles with the onset of the 1980s and the departure intensified as Chief Justice William Rehnquist was appointed chief justice in 1986. Since then, the touchstone of the Supreme Court’s federal Indian jurisprudence has been to employ a “subjectivist” approach whereby it “gauges tribal sovereignty as a function of changing conditions”—demographic, social, political, and economic—and the expectations of non-Indians that may be potentially by the exercise of tribal power. As a result, the Supreme Court became a strikingly hostile place for American Indian tribes as the Court became increasingly willing to divest tribes of governmental powers, not by upholding the enactments of Congress, but through its own interpretation of what tribal inherent governmental rights ought to be. The appointment of Justice Sonia Sotomayor and, more recently, Justice Neil Gorsuch seems to have brought change to the Court’s direction in Indian law cases. Since then, cases have been consistently decided in favor of tribal litigants by reaffirming treaty rights through the application of foundational principles that focus on the plain language of treaties and the application of the Indian canons of construction. However, to be sure, even the Rehnquist Court did “recite[] and sometimes act[] upon foundation principles,” but those cases were limited to situations where “non-Indian interests [were] not seriously threatened.” All of Indian Country waited for, or perhaps dreaded, a true litmus test. That test came to the Supreme Court in the form of two Indian law cases—Sharp v. Murphy and McGirt v. Oklahoma—both of which were framed by non-Indian parties to affect the interests of an estimated 1.8 million people in eastern half Oklahoma. Ready or not, Indian Country found its test case, which squarely placed the Court’s competing jurisprudential philosophies— its foundation principles versus its “subjectivist” approach—on a collision course. In a powerful and uncharacteristically passionate decision, Justice Gorsuch wrote for a 5-4 majority, upholding treaty-based rights to re-recognize the historic reservation boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, the fourth largest Indigenous nation in the United States. The decision was the fourth consecutive treaty-rights victory and seemed to solidify a shift toward a consistent approach rooted in foundational principles. The victory was short-lived. Just weeks after the Court’s decision in McGirt, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away, once again shifting the make-up of the United States Supreme Court. As a result, Federal Indian law once again finds itself at a crossroads. The Murphy and McGirt decisions are landmark decisions that bring change to the legal landscape of much of Oklahoma. It remains to be seen whether the perceived new Supreme Court era in Indian law is here to stay.

India has played a major role in the development of International Environmental Law (IEL). Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was one of the two heads of states who participated in the United Nations Conference on Human Environment (Stockholm Conference 1972). Since the days of Stockholm Conference, India has been an active participant at the multilateral environmental negotiations. India’s engagement with IEL has been mutually beneficial. The leadership position that India assumed at the multilateral environmental negotiations has helped in including provisions in treaties that better reflected the realities of the developing countries. This in turn has helped IEL to gain wider participation and acceptability among the developing and under-developed countries. On the other hand, IEL has helped in the shaping and development of Indian environmental law. The influence of IEL on Indian law has been most visible in the following two ways: helping the enactment of legislations in the field of environment and in the development of a robust environmental jurisprudence. This chapter focuses on the influence of IEL on Indian law and concludes that without the influence of the developments at the international level Indian environmental law would have remained much poorer.

The requirement of consideration has been a subject of intense scrutiny by contract law scholars, judges, and practitioners alike. Some have argued that consideration does not form the essence of contract law and must be abolished. This debate has entered the Indian contract law jurisprudence and the dominant conception of consideration in the Indian contract law (that its position in the Indian law is the same as common law) has been called into question. It has been argued that that the definition of consideration in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is a step away from the traditional common law conception of consideration as something which can be measured in terms of money or money’s worth (objective conception) and is wide enough to cover subjectively manifested promises. In this paper, I argue that consideration under the Indian Contract Act was never meant to cover subjectively manifested promises. Furthermore, the consideration requirement helps to build a distinct kind of relationship between parties to an agreement that justifies its continued existence. With this background, I explain the substantive features of the consideration requirement under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Company Law and Human Rights Law in India have come a long way since their inception. More often than not it is seen that these two hardly overlap. But is this all? Does it actually have to be this way? Often it is argued that why does Company Law in India has no space/provisions for Human Rights, let alone a few sections for mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility? The counter argument can be because there are other statutes that specifically look after the welfare of the workers be it the payment of minimum wages, maintenance of a proper work environment or even granting of holidays. But is this all? Does a Company only need to look at its own welfare in the long run and thereby provide amenities to its employees? Do basic Human Rights have no place in a Company? Let us have a look at its necessity or redundancy in today’s world.

Jurisdiction — Exemptions from — Immunity of Sovereign Government — The Law of India.91State Succession — Continuity of the Law — Pending Actions — Partition of States — India and Pakistan — Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947 — The Law and Constitution of India — Jurisdiction of Indian Courts — Immunities of Foreign Sovereign.

Family life and personal law in India express together a complex blend of historical, philosophical and political aspects. Family law is setting out a framework for thinking about how personal life affects the most profound aspects of our lives and communities. But the political issues are facing problematic as politician are not in favor of this because fear of losing their vote bank. There is not only political issue but also legal issue. Again, in the matters of personal law segment pertaining to marriage, dowry, divorce, adoption, legitimacy, wills, and inheritance each individual of different backgrounds must appeal to their respective religious laws for guidance or rulings. In a modern secular India, balancing the claims of religious communities in secular nature has caused some difficult problems as a nation. The author will scrutinize how personal laws in secular India provides an inclusive look into the issues and challenges and what extent State can interfere in the matters of religion so as to remove the hindrance in the governance. This article will also analyze the basis of national integration by removing disparate reliability on law which has conflicting ideologies of gender equality.

This article discusses the implications of sexual autonomy of children under international child rights regime upon Indian law. Indian general criminal law defining the offence of rape and a special statute defining different types of child sexual assault led to the inference that the current age of consent is 18 years. Despite statutory prohibition of child marriages in India, the general criminal law contains an explanatory provision exempting the rape of a married woman above the age of 15. The Supreme Court of India struck this down as discriminatory and inconsistent with existing provisions of law, increasing the age of consent of a married woman to 18. It is necessary for Indian law to clearly define the age of consent of children, and grant rights of sexual autonomy to children who are capable of making their own decisions, without compromising on penalising sexual offenders of children.

Condominium laws in India have been in existence since 1963, with the earliest condominium legislation in the state of Maharashtra. Most states in India have their own separate legislations for condominiums; however, the principles upon which these state legislations rest are based on the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963. In recent times, there have been efforts to revamp the rights and obligations of apartment owners, real estate developers and other stakeholders through the Maharashtra Housing (Regulation and Development) Act, 2012 and the Real Estate (Regulating and Development) Bill, 2013, which was passed by the Indian Parliament in March 2016.This paper is divided into three parts. The first part argues that while different states have their own respective state laws relating to the transfer and administration of condominiums, such states follow the same principles developed in the State of Maharashtra and for all intents and purposes, there exists a standardised set of rules relating to the transfer and administration of condominiums. The second part of the paper ‘Overview of Apartment Laws in India’ describes the development of apartment laws in India including a detailed discussion of the apartment ownership, transfer and administration law in India. The third section of the paper discusses a landmark judgment which laid the basis for wide sweeping changes in the way the real estate industry is regulated. It further discusses the salient features of the Real Estate (Regulating and Development) Bill, 2013, the proposed central legislation for the regulation and development of the real estate industry in India.

Srimati Basu, The Trouble with Marriage––Feminists Confront Law and Violence in India. New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2015, xiv+266 pp., ₹775, ISBN: 978-93-86050-56-4. Malavika Rajkotia, Intimacy Undone Marriage, Divorce and Family Law in India. New Delhi: Speaking Tiger, 2017, xiv+418 pp., ₹799, ISBN: 978-93-86050-56-4.

What is the fate of the rule of law in India that is transitioning to an ethnocracy? Drawing on a ‘thin’ conception of the rule of law, this article argues that the controversial Citizenship Amendment Act responds to the emergence of a political ideal that constructs the Hindu ethnos as central to the Indian nation. Drawing on a variety of sources that include pronouncements by leaders of the RSS, the ideological fount of India's ruling BJP, analysis of right-wing periodicals that function as a conveyor belt of social ideas, and the provisions of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), this article highlights the core themes that motivate the will of the Hindu ethnos in respect of the contentious legislation: (i) the persecution of the Hindu minorities in India's Muslim-majority neighbours; (ii) the discrimination faced by Dalits in particular and (iii) the establishment of India as a Hindu Zion. In the first section, I elaborate the concept of ‘ethnocracy’. The second section reflects on the fate of the rule of law in an ethnocratic India by analysing the social justifications for the introduction of the contentious CAA. In the third section, I situate these dynamics within India's broader transition to an ethnocracy, the political ideals that shape this transition, and the shared social norms that emerge from this transition, which feeds back to the rule of law in an ethnocracy.

Summary This Article addresses the rape epidemic in India and provides an analytical comparison to the rape laws in the United States. This Article provides an overview of the laws in both India and the United States and specifically discusses marital rape and the laws concerning it in both nations. This Article concludes with resolutions for the marital rape laws in India and the United States.

One of the causes for raised eyebrows to the Companies Act, 2013 is Section 135. The provision mandates companies meeting certain requirements to compulsorily contribute to corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, or explain the failure to do so. While this has been the subject of an ongoing debate ever since the provision was suggested in 2009, the provision in question has been met with considerable resistance from the industry. Arguments against Section 135 range from specific critiques of the semantics of the statute to critiques of the failure of India as a welfare state altogether.What this paper seeks is to attempt a definitive outline of the CSR law and practice in India, its roots in Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam, Gandhian philosophies and the pre 2013 position on CSR. It shall also attempt to provide a critical analysis of Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 and how the provision may be ignored, or worse - misused.Three arguments are presented in this regard. Firstly, that Section 135 constitutes a departure from the accepted position that CSR needs to be imbibed into the business and management principles of a company and is heading towards a potentially destructive conversion of the principles of CSR into corporate altruism. Secondly, the provisions of Section 135 make the Board of Directors liable to show to their shareholders - the compliance of the company’s social responsibilities. Instead, if the company is to have and comply with social responsibilities, the same should be ascertained by the society, or at least a representative of society. Finally, there is a slew of extant laws in India which also mandate certain companies to take into account their social responsibilities.

This article examines the debate on reforms in industrial relations law in India, needed to support its economic liberalisation programme. Analysing a distinctively Indian experience of state intervention in industrial relations, it concludes that the thrust of the reform should be towards entrusting union recognition and promotion of dispute settlement to an authority that is independent of the state executive.