The Crux(es) of the Argument(s)

1. The story behind the story (p. 1) 2. What are they saying about Jesus? (p. 22) 3. The birth of Jesus Christ was on this wise (p. 75) 4. The beginning of the good news about Jesus Christ (p. 106) 5. The kingdom of God has come near (p. 133) 6. Thy kingdom come! (p. 164) 7. And he cured many who were sick (p. 191) 8. Hosanna to the Son of Davidl (p. 208) 9. Crucified under Pontius Pilate (p. 235) 10. He has been raised he is not here (p. 254) 11. The significance of Jesus (p. 295)

This study analyses the role of the house motif in Mark's Gospel since in the tradition, Jesus healed, forgave sin, taught and shared meals as well as the Last Supper in the house. It is argued that Mark was composed for a Gentile, Hellenist Christian house group in Rome and written soon after Nero's persecution (64-65 CE) of the Christian house-church communities and prior to the destruction of the temple in 70 CE. Though other studies support alternate sites in Galilee, Southern Syria and the Transjordan as the source of the Gospel, the traditional arguments favouring Rome indicate that Mark is a Hellenist Gospel written for the majority Law-free Christian household groups in Rome as Paul's letter attests in 58 CE. The Gospel offers hope in following the way of the secret of the kingdom. In Mark's terms, the secret is Jesus' servant dedication to his messianic ministry, climaxing in his crucifixion and resurrection. There is no description of Jesus' resurrection in the Gospel; in part unnecessary since, from its opening, the Gospel presumes the power and authority of the crucified, risen Son of Man, the Lord. As Lord, he calls disciples to follow him along the way of eschatological servant dedication in the spatial context of the typical, urban house-church. Consequently, within the house motif, Mark sets out the minor characters' response in faith and hope to the Lord's authoritative call, healing, forgiveness and Eucharistic unity in the house. In contrast, the narrative synagogue groups first react only with astonishment to Mark's messianic Jesus. But, under the authorities' leadership, the Jewish response hardens into total rejection of Jesus as Mark's gradually enlarges Israel's negative response to Mark's symbolic visitation, judgment and rejection theme of the temple due to the opposition of the Jewish authorities and their abuse of the Law and the temple liturgy. Mark has no pastoral interest in a remote Jerusalem or its temple.;From the Gospel's 's viewpoint, his real aim is the visitation of Rome's house-church groups through the living Word of the risen Jesus of Nazareth. Israel's negative narrative response acts as a literary backdrop to the faith responses in the house. As a result, through its misused Law and temple traditions, Israel ensures its symbolic visitation and rejection. Concurrently, in house-churches sustained by faith, and the authoritative Word of the risen Son of Man, challenges Christians in Rome to a renewed fidelity in way, covenant service. Therefore, under the mantle of the house motif, the Gospel offers 'the secret of kingdom of God' - Jesus' life as the selfless servant - as the basis for individual and communal hope. Christians live in the aftermath of severe persecution. These house groups are challenged to live the paradox of faith in life through death, gain through loss, in following a crucified/risen Lord in servant dedication. This appears to be particularly Mark's aim in his close linking of the two motifs, the house and the way, during the journey of Jesus and the disciples on the way to Jerusalem from Galilee. Throughout, he accents eschatological house-churches; their members live the secret of the kingdom in faith, hope and mutual selflessness. Thus, as Lord of the House, Jesus goes before Rome's Christian groups in his ever-present living and dying in his glorified humanity. By following Jesus of Nazareth in servant discipleship in a house community, Christians blend their existential human becoming with that of the glorified Lord. Hence Mark clearly expects Christians to see the 'things of God' as their Spirit-inspired servant charity. In this way, they daily deepen their Christian unification with Jesus' own dedication as the Beloved Servant/Son in his obedience to his Father's will. This is the gift that Mark points to 'now in this time'.;Mark stresses this sense of the victorious, fruitful presence of the glorified Son of Man, the Lord, from the opening of the Gospel. The superscription and the fact that he addresses Christians, who already know Jesus as the triumphant Lord, allow him to write from a post resurrection viewpoint. So, within the scope of the house motif, Mark encourages a deeper faith and hope in the efficacy of Christian self-identification with Jesus in his victorious way of the cross

Scholars have long discussed the characterization of the Roman governor, Pontius Pilate, in the Fourth Gospel. Historically, a majority of scholars have labeled him a “weak” governor, who ultimately bends to the wishes of the Jewish authorities. In recent years, some scholars have made compelling arguments that Pilate is actually a strong figure who gets what he wants while antagonizing the Jewish authorities in the process. The Roman governor is indeed a complex character in the Johannine narrative. Pilate is presented with significant strength, but is not without significant vulnerabilities. Yet the Johannine evangelist also employs the literary device of irony against the Roman governor, undercutting the presentation of a strong Pilate and subverting Roman imperial claims to authority and dominion.

This analysis is based on a thorough investigation into the jurisdictional criminal profile proceedings against Jesus Christ, plagued by iniquities, malignancies, elucidated in two antagonistic judgments: one, the Religious Judgment or Jew before the Sanhedrin and the Political Judgment before Pontius Pilate, of Roman power, and subjected to asummary and laconic judgment. If we make a retrospective procedural legal vision of the trial of Jesus Christ by the Jewish authorities, ab initio, and later by the Roman iurisdictio, in the light of the new Ecuadorian Integral Criminal Organic Code (2014), of a guarantee, accusatory court, of transversal orality and adversarial, it must be asserted, withall conviction, that It did not refer to the minimum international standards of the constitutional due process guarantee , effective jurisdictional protection and the unrestricted respect for the right to defense by a lawyer of his free choice or of the Attorney General's Office of the State. By virtue of the analytical-synthetic and dialectical method, comparedto the descriptive exploratory scope inclined to accurately show the angles or dimensions of the most famous criminal trial of humanity, the investigation contains the condemnation of an innocent person to death for a political crime the Sedition, which Jesus did not perpetrate. Such a condemnation repealed the one decreed by the Sanhedrin, that is to say, that of “Blasphemy” which made it consist of the fact that Jesus repealed the endowment of being a son of God, injurious at the beginning –non bis in idem–, among other flagrant procedural violations, in which the inconsistency of the form can only be matched by the iniquity of the fund.

‘(Jesus’ audience) thought that the Kingdom would be a place like the old kingdom of David, with armies and a king’s throne. Jesus knew that it was not a place, but the action of God ruling over our hearts.’ So John Hargreaves, though it is perhaps unfair to pick on him, for similar pronouncements can be found in hundreds of popular, and indeed scholarly, theological writings. It is the way most of us were brought up to think. Perhaps it is the right way of thinking, but there are, I think, increasingly good reasons for feeling unsure about that. When the Jews talked about ‘the kingdom’ (without further qualification) they certainly were not thinking of some invisible operation: they meant the Roman Empire. The ‘Kingdom of God’ on the lips of Jesus may well have referred to something equally tangible—to a world order, not a concept. He may well have been speaking not of the invisible activity of ‘grace’ in the ‘soul’, but of a kingdom, however spiritual, with visible, material attributes. A recent writer on the Fourth Gospel, for instance, has interpreted the scene before Pilate in these terms:Jesus’ kingship is not ‘unworldly’. Instead one of the characteristics of the Johannine treatment of the trial and of the events that lead up to it is that the political implications are emphasized. In 11, 48 a specifically political motivation is injected into the plotting of the Jewish authorities. John alone mentions the presence of the Roman soldiers (he spaira kai ho chiliarchos) at the arrest of Jesus. In the trial itself, the political-realistic element is introduced by the Jews at 19, 12: ‘If you release this man you are not Caesar’s friend; anyone who makes himself a king opposes Caesar’.

‘(Jesus’ audience) thought that the Kingdom would be a place like the old kingdom of David, with armies and a king’s throne. Jesus knew that it was not a place, but the action of God ruling over our hearts.’ So John Hargreaves, though it is perhaps unfair to pick on him, for similar pronouncements can be found in hundreds of popular, and indeed scholarly, theological writings. It is the way most of us were brought up to think. Perhaps it is the right way of thinking, but there are, I think, increasingly good reasons for feeling unsure about that. When the Jews talked about ‘the kingdom’ (without further qualification) they certainly were not thinking of some invisible operation: they meant the Roman Empire. The ‘Kingdom of God’ on the lips of Jesus may well have referred to something equally tangible—to a world order, not a concept. He may well have been speaking not of the invisible activity of ‘grace’ in the ‘soul’, but of a kingdom, however spiritual, with visible, material attributes. A recent writer on the Fourth Gospel, for instance, has interpreted the scene before Pilate in these terms:Jesus’ kingship is not ‘unworldly’. Instead one of the characteristics of the Johannine treatment of the trial and of the events that lead up to it is that the political implications are emphasized. In 11, 48 a specifically political motivation is injected into the plotting of the Jewish authorities. John alone mentions the presence of the Roman soldiers the spaira kai ho chiliarchos) at the arrest of Jesus. In the trial itself, the political-realistic element is introduced by the Jews at 19, 12: ‘If you release this man you are not Caesar’s friend; anyone who makes himself a king opposes Caesar’.

Biblical prototypes of suffering for others – the eschatological prophet and messianic high priest – are correlated in the present article with Edward Schillebeeckx's examination of two vital concepts to provide the basis for a critical praxis: anamnesis, or the critical remembrance of history, and eschatological hope. The dialectical opposites of anamnesis and hope, which Schillebeeckx deems crucial for solidarity with suffering and its alleviation, are embodied by the prototypical scriptural figures. Indeed, critical remembrance and hope are intrinsic to the images of Jesus as the ‘suffering righteous one’ and the eschatological messianic high priest in Schillebeeckx's theology of suffering for others. Both the images and the critical concepts prove essential in his historical reconstruction of the eschatological communities, religious figures, and symbols in Hebrews and 1 Peter, among other New Testament documents. Schillebeeckx's discernment of hope as an eschatological concept is predicated on the transformation of the history of suffering into a constructive and critical force. He understands Jesus’ preaching about the coming kingdom of God as a message of hope that emerges from Jesus’ consciousness of the contrast between the history of suffering and his experience of God as Abba. Schillebeeckx's exegesis of biblical passages – taken from the Beatitudes, narratives of Jesus’ forgiveness of sins, and stories of his table fellowship – lays the foundation for the development of hope as the antidote to suffering and as a presentiment of eschatological salvation. He proposes that the transformation of failure and suffering into a critical and constructive force is Jesus’ eschatological legacy to the world and a model for the suffering servants of any age. Moreover, Schillebeeckx's dialectical understanding of remembered history and hope attests to his deep engagement with the Frankfurt School of social critical theory. In his later work (published during the 1970s and 1980s), such critical ideas serve to cultivate an eschatological sensibility and an ethical praxis, made possible by grace mediated through voluntary suffering.

TOWARDS AN ADEQUATE CONCEPT OF CHURCH IT is sometimes asserted that modern ecclesiology needs to elaborate a more spiritual concept of Church to replace one which has been too juridic and sterile. Such a perspective, however, seems superficial. It does not touch the fundamental reality of the Church. The need of the present moment is not for substitution but synthesis. It is possible now to recapture the Pauline synthesis which was lost when apologists and polemicists concerned themselves exclusively with the visibility of the Church. The need is to take up this synthesis once again and restate it in terms for our times. An adequate concept of Church must explain the Church's theandric character. Recognizing the Church as a reality which is at once visible and invisible, it must accept the Church as both a society and a life; a society which manifests in a public way Christ's triumph over Satan; a life which establishes a totally new relationship between redeemed humanity and God. The members of the Church possess a unique relationship to Christ and the Holy Spirit. The communion among those possessing these relations constitutes the precise reality which imparts to the Church its specific esse, viz. a mystico-visible sharing in the life of Christ. The present article will not attempt to present an adequate concept of Church. Rather its aim is to establish what seems to be an antecedent necessity: that only through a synthesis of the juridic and spiritual viewpoints can we arrive at a truly adequate concept of Church.1 It will do this by reviewing the synthesis which is present in St. Paul. It will then explain how this synthesis was lost and offer some suggestions relative to the restatement of this synthesis today. 1 Although this was recognized in the last century by Scheeben, it has not received the consideration it merits. Cf. B. Fraigneau-Julien, L'Eglise et le charactere sacramentel selon M.-J. Scheeben, (Paris, 1957). 11 12 JOHN J. KING So rich and complex is the concept of Church that St. Paul uses a multiplicity of biblical images to describe it: Body of Christ, People of God, Bride of Christ, Kingdom of God, Temple of God.2 Each image expresses some element or some consequence of the union of men with Christ. We do not have to seek the origin of St. Paul's thought in the Stoic metaphor which saw the whole cosmos as a body animated by a divine Pneuma; or in the gnostic myth of Urmensch.3 These certainly influenced the evolution of Paul's expression, but his thought concerning the Church was already fully contained in his awareness of our oneness "in Christ." The words which he heard on the road to Damascus had given him this awareness which he never lost. The heavenly voice's identification of the Christian community with Jesus was without doubt the source of Paul's thought and it was this he sought to express by a variety of images. Among these there are two which stand out: People of God and Body of Christ. From the time when God first made a special intervention in human affairs and called to Himself a special group of men, there was always a People of God on earth. The divine election effected on Mt. Sinai made the Jews God's own people. The desert community was thus set aside from the rest of humanity. They became, as a race with an existence and a unity of their own, the heirs of Abraham and of the promises made to his seed. They were also raised up as a sign to all nations that God had determined upon a definite plan for the world and its salvation. At the very beginning of this covenant between God and his people, there was foreshadowed Israel's sin and unfaithfulness.4 God's plan for Israel would never be fulfilled. In time the prophets would announce a 2 Space limitations make it impossible to treat this very important image of temple. It is well treated by J. C. Fenton, "The New Testament Designation of the True Church as God's Temple," in American Ecclesiastical Review...

In the present article the author with the use of rhetorical method analyzes the coherence of Paul’s argumentation on new life in Rom 5 – 8. First, the topic of new life is examined in the global context of the dispositio rhetorica in Rom 5 - 8. The three dangers to the gift of new life distinguished by the author are: 1) the slavery of sin (Rom 6), 2) the defective human self-righteousness (Rom 7,7-25), and 3) the suffering and corruption of the present world (Rom 8,19-23). At the end, the role of the Spirit in Rom 5 – 8 is explained. He is the one that liberates mankind from the triple slavery and leads to the fullness of new life, which is to be revealed in the Kingdom of God. The rhetorical reading shows the coherent strategy of Paul who describes the gift of new life in a germinal state, which calls for man’s reliance on the Spirit and the Spirit empowered deeds.

N.T. Wright’s understanding of the nature of the kingdom of God in Jesus’ proclamation has been persuasive and significant. The present article engages Wright’s presentation with respect to the particular question of the relationship to between the kingdom of God and Israel’s Land promise. For all the focus on the Jewish context of Jesus, the so-called Third Quest for the Historical Jesus, of which Wright is an exemplar, has been reluctant to consider the possibility of an ongoing interest in territorial restoration in Jesus’ conceptions of the eschatological hope. Where Wright does address the Land of Israel he argues that Jesus reinterprets it away from a localized territorial conception to a more universal symbol of God’s sovereign reign. The argument of the article, while appreciating much in Wright’s interpretation of Jesus, seeks to destabilize his ‘reinterpretation view’ of the Land, on the one hand. And, on the other, the present work presents substantial evidence in support of the hypothesis that the historical Jesus both affirmed Israel’s Land promise and promulgated Israel’s territorial restoration in his teaching, preaching, and even in his physical movements in Greater Galilee.

Resumen: El presente artículo pretende realizar una aproximación entre los pensamientos éticos de Kant y Kierkegaard concentrándonos en los conceptos de educación y libertad. Para ello pondremos foco en el pensamiento práctico desarrollado por el filósofo alemán en el año 1790, al cual denominamos la segunda ética kantiana, y en la primera autoría kierkegaardiana, es decir, O lo uno o lo otro (1843) y El concepto de angustia (1844). Consideramos que estos dos periodos, en ambos autores, nos brindan la posibilidad de encontrar puntos de contactos que nos permiten sostener que la ética que Kierkegaard tiene en mente para estas obras es el pensamiento moral desarrollado por Kant en este periodo.Palabras claves: Kant. Kierkegaard. Libertad. Educación. ÉticaAbstract: The present article intends to make an approximation between the ethical thoughts of Kant and Kierkegaard concentrating on the concepts of education and freedom. For this we will focus on the practical thought developed by the German philosopher in the year 1790, which we call the second Kantian ethic, and in the first Kierkegaardian authorship, that is, Either/Or (1843) and The Concept of Anxiety (1844). We consider that these two periods, in both authors, give us the possibility of finding points of contact that allow us to maintain that the ethics that Kierkegaard has in mind for these works is the moral thought developed by Kant in this period.Keywords: Kant. Kierkegaard. Freedom. Education. Ethics Resumo: O presente artigo pretende fazer uma aproximação entre os pensamentos éticos de Kant e Kierkegaard concentrando-se nos conceitos de educação e liberdade. Para isso, vamos nos concentrar no pensamento prático desenvolvido pelo filósofo alemão no ano de 1790, que chamamos a segunda ética kantiana, e na primeira autoria de kierkegaardiana, ou seja, Ou/Ou (1843) e O conceito de Angústia (1844). Consideramos que esses dois períodos, em ambos os autores, nos darão a possibilidade de encontrar pontos de contato que nos permitam sustentar que a ética que Kierkegaard tem em mente para essas obras é o pensamento moral desenvolvido por Kant nesse período.Palavras-chave: Kant. Kierkegaard. Liberdade. Educação. Ética REFERENCIASALLISON, Henry. Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.ASSISTER, Alison. Kant and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Evil. In: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 72 (April 1996), pp 275-296.DI GIOVANNI, George. Freedom and religion in Kant and his immediate successors: The vocation of mankind, 1774–1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.DIP, Patricia. Judge William: the Limits of the ethical. In: Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, Volume 17, Katalin Nun,Jon Stewart (Eds.), London-New York, Routledge, 2016.FOUCAULT, Michel. 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In light of the interpretatlve nature of discourse analysis and within the context of two advertisements of soap - Gessy , dated 1942, and Lux Luxo , dated March 2003 - the main purpose of the present article is to analyse how the discursive practices of advertising discourse allow for the reproduction and maintenance of certain ideological assumptions, such as the ones related to consumerism and gender-based issues. DOI: 10.28998/0103-6858.2007v2n40p15-26

Trichinellosis is an important parasitic zoonosis that is caused by the intracellular nematode Trichinella spp.. Infection of humans occurs through consumption of raw (or undercooked) meat containing infectious larvae. In Europe, meat from pork, horse, and wild boar have been identified as most important sources of Trichinella infections in humans. In Switzerland, both the domestic pig and wild boar population are considered free of Trichinella. Conversely, Swiss foxes, lynxs and recently a wolf were found to be infected, the species identified in these animals was always referred to as Trichinella britovi. Although this species rarely infects pork and, compared to Trichinella spiralis, only causes reduced pathogenic effects in humans, the basic presence of Trichinella in Switzerland cannot be neglegted. This fact has gained increasing importance since the responsible authorities in the European Union (EU) are preparing regulations for the official Trichinella-control in meat in order to improve food safety for consumers. These regulations will be implemented as a consequence of the recent association of east European countries with the EU. This new legislation particularly takes into account, that in the past by far most cases of human trichinellosis in the EU were due to consumption of imported east European meat.Within the framework of the bilateral agreements of Switzerland with the EU, the Swiss veterinary public health authorities will have to comply with the foreseen EU regulations. Although diagnostic methods for the direct demonstation of Trichinella in pork meat are already routine practice in several Swiss abattoirs, the implementation of a meat control program for Trichinella for the entire slaughter pig population of the country would lead to an enormous increase in costs for the administration and will require an increased infrastructure in veterinary services. In order to find a reduced testing format for monitoring Trichinella infections in Swiss pork, an infection risk-oriented survey strategy is currently evaluated. In the present article, this minimized survey strategy is discussed regarding its compatibility with the EU regulations laying down rules for the official control of meat for Trichinella.

The diversity of economic-financial instruments for environmental protection requires that they be systematized according to certain common criteria, whether they belong to the fiscal, commercial or customs field, or whether they are applied by various categories of subjects or are provided for in the content of one and the same legislative act . The present article comes with a distinct systematization, gives a consecutiveness that also ensures an efficiency in interpretation, understanding and application by the responsible environmental authorities, but also by those that carry out the control of economic activity.

The statement of the Jewish authorities to Pontius Pilate in John 18. 31b, ‘It is not lawful for us to kill anyone’, is commonly regarded as a key to the historical reconstruction of the trial and execution of Jesus. If it means — as it is usually understood to mean — that Roman law did not permit the Jewish Sanhedrin to carry out the death penalty in capital cases, then it explains what is otherwise unexplained in the synoptic Gospels: i.e. why, if Jesus was convicted by the Sanhedrin, was he delivered to the Romans for another trial, and for death by crucifixion? Why was he not simply stoned to death at the command of the Sanhedrin, as the Jewish law required (cf. Lev 24. 16)? The narrator's parenthetical comment in John 18. 32 seems to bear out this interpretation: the fact that the Jews were not allowed by the Roman government to execute Jesus meant that he would die by being ‘lifted up’ on a cross - a distinctively Roman method of execution (cf. John 3. 14; 12. 32–33).