The construction of meaning in an ambiguous political event

When maternal parent and progeny genotypes are known, inferences can be drawn about the paternal contribution to the mating event. A mating event is defined here as the fertilisation of an egg. With a diallelic locus and homozygous seed parent, mating events may be classified as detected outcrosses or as ambiguous mating events (those due to either self-fertilisation or outcrossing). When mating events are classified and when seed are sampled at two or more hierarchical levels within populations (e.g., seeds within fruits, fruits within plants) one may estimate the degree of correlation between classes of mating events at a given hierarchical level relative to that at others. Such an analysis applied to progeny from an experimental population of the common morning glory shows that there is correlation between classes of mating events within fruits, but not between fruits. In an experimental population of white spruce, the analysis reveals a low degree of correlation between classes of mating events both within and between cones. The results are discussed in relation to the pollination systems of the plants and to the problem of estimating genetic parameters from family-structured data.

Taking the issue of immigration in France as the entry point to a discussion of law and order, this essay examines what this focus on law and order masks: the manner in which law, in certain critical realms, operates according to the logic of exception, rather than as a regime of normative justice based on general rules and rights. Joining the renewed debate on Carl Schmitt's political theories while rejecting his larger political project, I suggest that the significance of this point is not primarily legal, but political. I locate my argument in the context of changing notions of both sovereignty and political power, suggesting that the situation in France constitutes just one instance of a larger struggle over sovereign power by national and transnational institutions. I focus on two specific and complementary spaces of what I have called ‘juridical indeterminacy’, each of which illustrates the enactment of this differently configured rule of law. These are policing and humanitarianism. In particular, I examine the policing of prostitutes, the phenomenon of detention centres, the Refugee Appeals Commission, and a humanitarian clause for undocumented immigrants who are gravely ill, to suggest that policing and humanitarianism represent two sides of the same coin – two essential elements of a moral economy in which law as a regime of systematic justice is not central, and where a democratic political realm has been displaced in favour of a regime of sovereign exceptions. Ultimately, this essay suggests that this logic of exceptionalism creates and privileges non-rights-bearing, apolitical, non-agentive victims. The underlying goal therefore is to point instead to the need for a more radical political project, one that sees a degree of legal regularity and predictability necessary to achieve the autonomous political action of a democratic society.

BOOK REVIEWS139 activities he was a negotiator with government ministers and a member of a Royal Commission. But the period of his efforts to defend Wesleyan education saw also the contraction of this type of schooling. On the question of maintainingWesleyan schools, Rigg clashed with Hugh Price Hughes and some other leading Wesleyans. At a few points in the book more explanation would have been a benefit, but this is a well-researched study which clearly charts the complex story of Wesleyan education in relation to rival developments. It forms a very useful addition to the growing literature on nineteenth-century Methodism. Ian Machin University ofDundee Carnets dufournaliste CatholiqueAlexandre Delmer (1860-1889),Tome IV: 1870-1872. Edited by Marie-Thérèse Delmer. [Bibliothèque de la Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique, Fascicule 81.] (Brussels: Editions Nauwelaerts; Louvain-la-Neuve: Collège Erasme. 1998. Pp. 944. Fr.b. 1800 paperback.) This final volume of the notebooks of the hard-working Belgian journalist, Alexandre Delmer (1835-1915), covers three years of momentous political and religious events which range from the Vatican Council's declaration of papal infallibility to the Franco-Prussian War and Paris Commune. The central event in Delmer's professional life during these years is his decision to transform a weekly, Courrier de Bruxelles, into a daily Catholic newspaper to counteract the liberalism of his former employer,/owrai?/ de Bruxelles. The volume concludes with an appendix covering the brief entries of November and December , 1889, in which Delmer resigns from the Courrier over a difference of opinion and becomes a librarian at the University of Liège. As in the earlier volumes, Delmer reveals not only his views on the political questions of the day but also his personal worries and everyday activities. He supported universal suffrage, distrusted liberal politicians, and was troubled by rumors of the activities of King Leopold II. The reader also learns of his religious practices (e.g., confessions and communions, charitable works), of his occasional leisure activities (e.g., riding horseback, reading classical and contemporary works), of the difficulties in his professional life (e.g., long hours, disagreements with others, starting and financing a daily) and in his personal life (e.g., the unsuccessful search for a wife, the insanity and death of his brother Louis, the fidelity to a friend who was in legal trouble). Delmer is sympathetic toward the French and comments on the political situation in France as well as on French leaders (both Catholic and political). Unfortunately , there is nothing in this volume about the siege of Paris, probably because he received no information during those months but possibly because there are missing entries dating from December, 1870, and January, 1871. In 140bookrevipjcs commenting on the events of May, 1871 (Paris Commune and aftermath), he labeled the Communards "monstres" (p. 379) who killed Archbishop Darboy He opposed the militarism of the government and wrote that France would be saved by the Church and Catholic education rather than by military action. Catholicism is the essential element in Delmer's life, and he is conscious of his vocation as a Catholic journalist. He opposed Belgian separation of Church and State as being detrimental to Catholic interests. The Italian question convinced him of the necessity of a second daily Catholic newspaper in Brussels which would more ardently support the Pope. The description and narration of Delmer's securing financing and collaborators show him to be a determined and persevering man of principle. His seeking the active approbation of the Belgian bishops and papal nuncio reveals the close connection between the press and the Belgian hierarchy. In this volume as in the previous three, there are extensive indices (about ninety pages). These research aids include brief identifications and references to all four volumes. Since there is no introduction to this volume, the introductory biography in Volume I is indispensable for providing a context for this volume . Delmer's granddaughter's editing is once again meticulous; she inserts relevant letters mentioned in the notebooks to provide a fuller picture of Delmer's ideas and activities. The four volumes published over the past decade provide a useful source for understanding the life and views of a...

Ambiguous events and maxmin expected utility

146 Reviews Church, S. D., ed., King John: New Interpretations, Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 1999; cloth; pp. xxvi, 361; 34 tables; 9 figures, 2 maps; R R P £45, US$75; ISBN 085115736X. This important collection of 15 essays on the hapless King John leaves the the abiding impression that John, for all his faults as politician, monarch, economist diplomat and husband, was a man embattled - under siege from all comers ofthe western European world including his own. This is no revelation, as S. D. Church's introduction makes clear. Nor is it the ultimate judgment of this collection, which attributes major personality and character defects to John, including the treachery long ago asserted by Bishop Stubbs. The collection claims to represent new interpretations, then, not on the basis ofthe question asked (was John a good or bad king?) but rather on the basis ofwhat a critical reading ofa variety ofsources might tell the m o d e m reader about this most complex of early thirteenth-century rulers. The collection begins and ends with essays on contemporary representations ofthe king. John Gillinghatn's exploration of'historians without hindsight', that is, those historians who wrote prior to the loss ofNormandy in 1204, demonstrates that even early on in John's reign, he was subject to criticism and distrust. Jim Bradbury's concluding piece compares John with his nemesis, Phillip Augustus,findingthat Phillip Augustus fared much better in contemporary opinion. The highlight of the collection is four essays on the English economy in the early thirteenth century. Here w e find just h o w important finance and economic policies were in contributing to political outcomes such as the loss of Normandy. In comparison to Richard I, V. D. Moss tells us that John's fiscal performance 'appears truly awful' (p. 116). John's incessant financial demands to fund his military campaigns and his policy of hoarding led to a reduction in money supply and higher prices throughout England. This period ofhigh inflation from 1199-1204, as J. L. Bolton points out, was followed by price stability, but at a higher level. This can be illustrated by Paul Latimer's study of wheat and oxen prices for the period. Overall, a recession lasting from 1204-14 was the result of poor economic management and increased military expenditure. An interesting comparison is teased out by Nick Barrat, who looks at the concomitant fiscal performance ofPhillip Augustus. Again, John does not acquit himselfwell. Three essays resist the notion of a 'Celtic fringe' to elucidate successfully the different political frameworks of Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and John's encounters with each. As a separate kingdom, Scotland was already a 'distant political culture', according to A. A. M . Duncan, w h o asserts the consolidation of Reviews 147 Scottish autonomy in the early thirteenth century as a result ofJohn's minimal role in Scottish affairs. In Ireland, however, things were different. Sean Duffy describes the 'dubious legacy' (p. 245) lefttoHenry III by King John, whose military lordship ofIreland saw this 'unruly frontier society' (p. 239) demand more and more ofthe monarch's attention. In Wales, which was neither kingdom or lordship, conspiracy and split allegiances were the order ofthe day. For Ifor Rowlands, John's failure can be discerned in the stark contrast between the fairly strong position of the monarch in Wales in 1211, and the collapse of royal power there by 1216. Wales had been implicated so deeply in the affairs of England, that when John's power began to collapse in England, it could not help but fall apart in Wales, too. 'There was a stench of failure everywhere', concludes Rowlands glumly (p. 286). The situation in France is explored in detail, and, not surprisingly, we find that John was in some ways peripheral to the events that unfolded so disastrously around him. Jane Martindale reveals the fundamental political role still played by Eleanor ofAquitaine after 1199, while Nicholas Vincent shows that Isabella ofAngouleme also played a central role in Capetian advances and John's losses. Daniel Power argues that the disunited Norman aristocracy were variously happy to accommodate Phillip Augustus, indifferent to John, actively hostile to John or simply unable to...

W E OFTEN are told that the knowledge of foreign languages diminishes the danger of war in creating a deeper understanding for other nations. The European example is a clear proof of the fact that the mere knowledge of or two or more foreign languages did not at all contribute to the achievement of our common purpose and common hope: the creation of a peaceful atmosphere between the different nations. I am speaking here about the language situation in those countries with which I am most familiar, namely about Germany and Italy, and it may be said parenthetically that the situation in France, Belgium, Spain, and Greece is not so much different.1 In high school at least modern language was offered, in most of the schools two, and even in the classical schools which laid greatest emphasis upon Latin and Greek, French was taught for seven years and the opportunity of studying English for four years was given. On the other hand it is a well known fact that high schools in the United States do not stress a thorough study of modern foreign languages, a fact frankly admitted by those who are critical of the present language situation in this country. Even if we allege for a moment that not a single American knows no single word of a foreign language, we could legitimately not contend that the mind of this one language nation is less peaceful than that of the Europeans. The political events of the last thirty years offer sufficient proof for this fact. However, it is evident that nobody who is interested in Europe and its future would venture to draw the opposite conclusion, that, on account of the unsatisfying results in Europe, the teaching of foreign languages should be abolished. On the contrary, if we believe in the possibility of creating a better world, if we believe in reconstruction, foreign languages shall contribute to this goal and shall serve as an efficient instrument to create a basis on which the different nations may live and work and compete peacefully together. The allied and the friendly nations in Europe will in a comparatively short time rebuild their educational systems. The disastrous influence of the German and the Italian oppressor on their educational systems will soon disappear, and these nations will enjoy a real renaissance and their common endeavor will bring their traditional culture and civilization to a new height. The question arises, what shall happen with the dictatorial

The MURTHER took place at four o'clock this morning, and was conducted in the most private manner. The Guillotine was erected in ya court of the Temple--a hole was dug in it, into which the King's head fell, and his body precipitated afterward .... (This must be understood as the prevailing report of the moment. It is impossible vouch for its absolute truth.) This scene of infernal assassination, which a base and cowardly faction have now degraded human nature by executing calls for a marked execration which it is not in the power of language convey .... Almighty vengeance must be the portion of who have thus step by step arrived at this damnable crisis. To that awful moment, when the great King of Kings shall sit in tremendous judgement of men and daemons, do we consign the diabolic spirits. It will come, and in thunders speak terrors their hearts, now hardened in human iniquity. THIS DESCRIPTION OF THE FRENCH REGICIDE FIRST APPEARED IN THE St. James' Chronicle on 24th January 1793, and was copied during the next few days in a number of other pro-ministerial newspapers. Its publication was a few days after the execution of Louis Capet, and clearly uses and elaborates upon a rumor suit the political purposes of that newspaper; the French King, murdered at night, in private, the perpetrators using all the cunning of a villain in a Gothic novel keep their crime secret. The Gothic tropes are built up so that, despite the partially-admitted dubiousness of the narrative being reported, a number of eschatological prophesies are made about the results. Today we would probably respond this passage by claiming that it is journalism, as it draws conclusions from facts not yet established, and accepts rumor as fact simply because it suits a particular political agenda. Against this, intend in the following pages argue that the imagination of political action, in this case imagining the King's death, cannot be read as simply bad journalism in the early 1790s; that in fact the equivocal nature of political factuality and truth steins from the whole system of the representation of political events at this time, and that this act of creative imagining is one of the ways in which political activity could legitimately be construed during the 1790s. I hope you do not think me weak enough, wrote Burke in a letter of January 1790, to form my of what is doing here [i.e., in France] upon the representations of newspapers, much less upon of a country in which the true spirit of the several transactions cannot be known. (1) The letter was probably intended for Thomas Paine, or at least reads very like a reply a letter that Burke had received from him a few days before, in which Paine assumes of his addressee an over-reliance on the London press for knowledge of the situation in France. Paine had stated, in the English papers is either untrue or misrepresented (75). So the writers of the most famed political appropriations of the events of the French Revolution, upon which so much debate turned, did not think much of the reporting be found in newspapers. Instead, they claimed more privileged access information, Paine through his friendship with Lafayette and his late presence in France, Burke by a more general appeal men of quality, or, those who have a considerable share in the formation of public measures (79). You really shouldn't believe everything you read in the papers-hardly a surprising sentiment find in the correspondence of two men of letters and active politicians such as Burke and Paine. It is perhaps statements such as these, and also the apparent disparities throughout the eighteenth century between government policy and opinion as expressed in the newspapers, that have led certain historians claim that the influence of the press on political affairs at this time was strictly limited; that the newspapers were much more concerned with the commercial interests of their readers; that people in reality did not believe what they read, or that they did not form effective critical based on what they read; and even if they did, the executive powers worked in a rarefied world that was not influenced by, or rather did not need be particularly bothered with, the formation of outside a relatively small circle attached the court and the cabinet. …

When the queen mother, Catherine de Medici, summoned protestant and catholic spokesmen to a conference at Poissy, in 1561, the religious situation in France was still remarkably fluid. Religious ideas of an innovative and reformist character had long had an appeal in French intellectual circles, but it was only recently that Protestantism in France had begun to take on the appearance of an organised religious movement. The persecution of Protestants had been severe at times, but neither systematic nor continuous, and the bulk of French Protestants was inclined to be conciliatory. Even the question of whether they could be considered heretics was still somewhat open, as the council of Trent had not yet concluded its sessions. Thus the time must have seemed propitious to the queen, then enjoying real political power in France for the first time, to attempt to reconcile the theological differences which were dividing her subjects, and to restore the religious unity of the realm.

Dignity is a highly controversial concept. Few other terms have been used in so many settings with so many contradictory meanings. Political events in the Middle East have given dignity new meanings. Some analysts have gone as far as calling the revolutions and civil wars that have dominated this region in the early 21st century the ‘dignity revolutions’. With this book we want to show that the concept of dignity can be meaningfully employed in politics, philosophy and everyday life, if one is clear about its different meanings, and about which of those meanings to use in what context.

The purpose of this study is to identify the features of the image of contemporary political power in China, formed by official “People’s Daily” publications. This study uses a culturological approach to studying the image of power. This approach involves the use of a set of cultural studies methods aimed at interpreting discourse, analyzing thematic blocks of printed publications devoted to the political power. An analysis of the linguistic, semiotic, “inter-discursive” features of the newspaper publications helps to estimate the trends in Chinese state policy and foreign affairs at present, the features of formation of attitude to political power of the Chinese, and the peculiarities of political power as a cultural phenomenon. The study has found that the topic of political power is one of the central topics covered by the official publication of “People’s Daily”. Almost all the newspapers in China are owned by the state government. The image of political power formed in newspaper publications is clearly structured and includes several components: the holder of power, the direction of political activity, and the estimating characteristics of the power. The culturological approach to the study of the image of political power formed by print media makes it possible to identify the national-cultural features of the phenomenon under study that cannot be established using philosophical, political science and sociological approaches. An analysis of the materials of the People’s Daily printed publications represents the “official” image of state power promoted by the ruling party of China.KeywordsChinaThe image of political power“People’s daily”Culturological approachPeriodicalsJEL CodeZ1Z18

Trust Me, I’m Trolling: Irony and the Alt-Right’s Political Aesthetic

This paper conceptualises the cultural dynamics of daily commuting against the backdrop of agrarian change in three villages in Uttar Pradesh. In doing so, it brings about a linkage between power structure, politics and labour mobility. Although neither circular migration nor its understanding is new in the context of villages in India and the state of UP, this paper shows how subordinate groups have been able to renegotiate their identities promoted by ‘development’ to their advantage. The analysis from the field indicates that poor agricultural labourers have not been able to bring about a broad structural transformation at the local level because power holders still control most of the opportunities. Despite this, a section of the poor commutes everyday to work in nearby factories and other work places. This intra-rural commuting, which is facilitated by improved transportation and improved levels of literacy among the depressed groups, has empowered the poor and enabled them to stay away from power holders. This entire process of transformation has not only made these groups more politically and socially aware of their rights, but has also led to shift in their consumption patterns, which indicates that the traditional social order is under siege.

Anxiety is driven by cognitive uncertainty, and large political events can change levels of uncertainty in a nation’s population, including among individuals in migrant groups. This article explores the association between the Brexit vote and the relative anxiety levels of various sectors of the UK population: the UK born, EU migrants, and non-EU migrants. Self-reported high anxiety levels among these population groups six months before and after the referendum suggest differences in social and economic uncertainty. After the Brexit vote, EU migrants reported high levels of anxiety at a rate that was 1.8 percentage points lower than the UK born; this suggests economic rather than social anxiety, given that the UK born were losing access to EU opportunities. The reduction in anxiety for EU migrants was marked in regions with greater support to remain in the EU, suggesting its importance in reducing their social uncertainty and therefore anxiety.

Although escape clauses and safeguard measures found in most international agreements are theoretically deemed as uncertainty management devices that help to facilitate cooperation among states, this thesis shows that whether or not a safeguard measure can do so depends on the degree of complexity of the negotiating environment. This thesis presents the case based on the prolonged negotiations on Emergency Safeguard Measures (ESM) in concluding the services trade agreement at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and compares that case with progress made on ESM negotiations in bilateral and regional trade agreements. As uncertainty management devices, ESMs can help to mitigate the adverse political consequences of liberalization that cannot be fully predicted due to the informational and cognitive uncertainties surrounding services liberalization. Empirical evidence is gathered from primary interviews with trade representatives to the WTO in Geneva, ASEAN Secretariat official, policymakers and national trade negotiators of the bilateral and regional trade agreements, as well as documentary sources. The findings show that the level of acceptance of ESM for services trade differs at different levels of negotiations because of the different degrees of complexity at multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations, which compound the informational and cognitive uncertainty associated with both services liberalisation and the use of ESM. The high degree of uncertainty surrounding the ESM has contributed to deadlock in ESM negotiations at the WTO. At the WTO, because of the high degree of complexity given by the large number of countries involved in the negotiations, the diversity of negotiating countries, and the multi-faceted and technical nature of services trade negotiations, an escape clause such as ESM itself acts as a source of uncertainty for developed countries in particular who are thus unwilling to agree to including ESM for services trade at the WTO. However, at regional and bilateral negotiations, ESM can act as an uncertainty management device because of the reduced complexity and thus lower degree of uncertainty at these negotiations. At the same time, developed countries seem willing to forgo the uncertainty generated by the ESM due to the anticipated non-economic longer-term gains from these bilateral and regional trade agreements, provided the ESM clauses in these agreements are ambiguously worded such that they create flexibility for both/all parties to the agreement. Whether or not the flexible ESM in these agreements is ultimately workable, remains to be seen.

TO give a critical analysis of the preceding articles is not my intention. Rather I shall try to establish a relationship between the three topics; then I shall point out the general problem toward which they contribute a solution; and, finally, basing my remarks on certain general statements in the three articles, I shall add some considerations about the relationship between politics and economics as well as between historical scholarship and ideology. The authors have outlined three epochs in the relationship between German politics and economics, that is, in the relationship between the holders of modern economic power, based on control over money and industrial capital, on the one hand, and the holders of political power, based on tradition or acclamation, on the other hand. No matter how strong the position or how great the wealth of Gerson Bleichrbder may have been, there can be no doubt that his relationship to Otto von Bismarck was one of subordination. Fritz Stern does not hesitate to compare Bleichroder's position in certain respects to that of a court Jew; he rightly calls this situation anachronistic, although even in the Weimar Republic, as Henry Turner points out, to Paul von Hindenburg the mightiest bankers and industrialists were hardly more than shopkeepers. Anachronisms in history are often persistent, and it seems clear that in Bismarck's Reich not only the Chancellor's banker but business in general, although influential and indispensable, was sub. ordinate to political power, that is, subordinate to the complex of military monarchy, rural nobility, and high bureaucracy. Gerald Feldman's observation that business lightheartedly saw the old regime collapse in I9I8 does not, therefore, come as a surprise. The relationship thereafter became one of coordination, and businessmen could even harbor the notion that they held the key to the nation's future, because in some quarters business was said to be the determining factor in the nation's fate. But obviously these men were not the masters of the Weimar Republic; otherwise the majority of them would not have opposed this bourgeois democracy with so much arrogance, mistrust, and even hostility. The relationship becomes less clear when one examines the National Socialist epoch. The thesis has been advanced with great determination that the big industrialists brought Hitler to power in order to become masters of the state and