The Constitutional Framing: Republican Democracy, Private Property, and Free Expression

Abstract

How did the framers conceive of the relationship between the government and the market? During the Revolutionary War and under the Articles of Confederation, most government power rested with the states, and most state constitutions assumed the people would virtuously pursue the common good. American leaders were political idealists, conceptualizing the citizen-self as predominantly virtuous. By 1787, however, the delegates to the constitutional convention had been disabused of their idealism. The delegates therefore faced a conundrum: How could they maintain republican government while simultaneously protecting property and stabilizing the nation’s economy? They tried to hammer out a practical solution that could achieve these goals. Most important, the framers believed national survival depended on a relative balance between public and private spheres of activity, a political-economic system structured by the Constitution. The framers sought a balance between the public and private spheres. The framers’ citizen-self was Janus-faced: one face animated by virtue and reason, but the other face animated by passion and interest, especially economic interest. To a great degree, passion and interest were to enjoy free rein in the private sphere. Yet, in the public sphere, the founders designed the Constitution to produce results in accord with virtue, reason, and the common good. The framers’ multiple discussions and ultimate acceptance of slavery underscored their desire to protect property, their incomplete adoption of capitalism, and their racist blindness of slavery’s immorality. The chapter concludes by briefly discussing free speech and a free press.