The Congressional Connection: The Structure of Politics and the Distribution of Public Expenditures in Brazil's Competitive Period

Abstract

The interest of social scientists in Latin American legislatures has never been very intense, but in the 1970s, when competitive governments gave way to authoritarian regimes, it virtually died. With pluralist regimes emerging once again, a resurgence of interest in legislatures can be expected, but it remains striking how little we know about Latin American legislative structure and behavior. The nature and effects of legislative politics are not merely academic questions in Latin America. The decline of Chile's congress in the 1960s, for example, has been indirectly linked to the overthrow of President Salvador Allende, and Ecuador's congress played a central role in the overthrow of one of that nation's democratically elected presidents.' Legislatures also seem to be a favorite target of technocratically oriented civilians. Their attacks center on the very stuff of legislative politics: bargaining, trading, logrolling-in sum, the politics of pork. But for legislatures, they argue, budgets could be planned in accordance with national priorities and resources rather than local needs and the reelection strategies of incumbent legislators. Roberto Campos, a civilian architect of Brazil's military regime, made the point succinctly.