Abstract
The "COMPUTATIONAL METAPHOR OF MIND" has gained currency in cognitive science, computer science, philosophy, and, not least, in the popular imagination. In "Mind and Metaphor" (1995) and "Language, Thought, and Computation" (1997), Mario Radovan canvassed the strengths and weaknesses of the metaphor as a tool of inquiry. This article uses recent developments in the application of theory to metaphor, including the topics of vagueness (vs. explanation), emergent features, the indefiniteness of a grouping, and shifts in the order of terms in the metaphor to test the general and implicit weaknesses of this particular use of metaphor. The metaphor is pervasively vague and can even lead to contradictory claims, but, interestingly, it can be rescued from false uses of the homunculus problem.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
