The Commitment Costs of Extended Deterrence and US Public Support for South Korea’s Nuclear Development: Survey Experiments from South Carolina

In this paper, I evaluate two competing perspectives regarding what underlies the public’s support for democracy promotion—a democratic values-based perspective positing that the public’s support for democracy promotion is based on a principled desire to spread American values, beliefs, and ideologies to other countries, and a national interests-based perspective claiming that it is based on a rational desire of Americans to advance the US’ political and economic interests abroad. Using a survey experiment, I find that, in general, Americans are not driven by either democratic values or national interests to support democracy promotion even though they believe that democracy promotion is in the interests of both the recipient country and the United States. Only a subset of the population is motivated to support democracy promotion for the sake of democratic values. This subset of the population is driven by cosmopolitanism—that is, a sense of concern for the welfare of those living in other countries and a sense of moral responsibility to promote democracy abroad derived from the US’ position as a world leader, not national pride.

Critics argue that it is unethical to expose children to research risks for the benefit of others, whereas many regulations permit "net-risk" pediatric research but only when the risks are minimal. In the present survey, we assessed whether the US public agrees with these views and whether the US public's views regarding the acceptability of net-risk pediatric research are influenced by its social value. A 15-minute survey of a nationally representative sample of US adults. Participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 hypothetical scenarios involving procedures that pose increasing levels of risk. To assess whether respondents' views on the acceptability of the risks is influenced by the social value of the research, in each of the 4 scenarios we described the respective procedure being used in 3 studies with increasing levels of social value. A total 1658 of the 2508 individuals who were sent the survey link participated (response rate = 66.1%). Approximately 91% approved of a research blood draw in minors, and ∼69% approved of a research bone marrow biopsy. The proportion who indicated that the respective procedure was acceptable increased as the study's social value increased. This effect was significantly stronger for studies which pose greater risks compared with studies with lower risks (P < .001). The vast majority of the US public supports net-risk pediatric research that poses minimal risk, and a majority supports net-risk pediatric research that poses somewhat greater risks, provided it has high social value. These findings offer important information for assessing when it is acceptable to conduct net-risk pediatric research.

Resource Limitation and "Forced Irremediability" in Physician-Assisted Deaths for Nonterminal Mental and Physical Conditions: A Survey of the US Public.

The United States—an architect of international criminal tribunals in the twentieth century—has since moderated its involvement in international justice. Striking to many observers is the United States’ failure to join the International Criminal Court—the institutional successor to the tribunals the nation helped install in Germany, Japan, the Balkans, and Rwanda. Interestingly, the US public’s support of the ICC increases yearly despite the government’s ambivalence about, and even hostility toward, the Court. Drawing on the US foreign policy public opinion literature, I theorize that human rights frames increase support for joining the ICC among Americans, whereas national interest frames decrease support. I administer an online survey experiment to evaluate these expectations and find consistent support. I additionally test hypotheses from the framing literature in American politics regarding the effect of exposure to two competing frames. I find that participants exposed to competing frames hold more moderate positions than participants exposed to a single frame but differ appreciably from the control group. Crucially, I find that participants’ beliefs about international organizations’ effectiveness and impartiality are equally, if not more, salient than the treatments. Thus, the ICC may be able to mobilize support and pressure policy change by demonstrating effectiveness and impartiality.

Does hostility affect public support for the provision of global public goods among competing neighboring countries? A survey experiment in Northeast Asia

Research regarding military interventions suggests that the objective of an intervention (such as whether it is carried out for humanitarian or power-political ends) substantially influences public support. It is unknown, however, whether that holds for political warfare strategies such as electoral interventions. In a series of survey experiments, we evaluate how different objectives affect US audiences’ support for foreign electoral interventions, both overall and in relation to other forms of political warfare, such as sanctions and covert regime change. Humanitarian objectives elicit greater support than those carried out to stave off threats to US leadership or to promote US economic interests. Furthermore, religious identity affects support for interventions undertaken for humanitarian ends, with the congruence between the identity of respondents and victims substantially influencing support. Finally, support for partisan electoral interventions and other forms of political warfare varies in relation to each other and in relation to interventions’ objectives.

Three Essays on the Political Economy of Corporate Bailouts

To what extent does the public support the use of cyber weapons? We propose that public exposure to the destructive potential of cyber-attacks will dispel the clear cross-national preference for cyber strikes. To test this, we conducted two survey experiments (n = 2,585) that examine support for cyber versus conventional military strikes in the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel. In study 1, we exposed respondents to television news reports depicting various forms of terror attacks, and then measured the subsequent support for retaliatory options. Findings indicate that the high public support for deploying cyber weapons dissipated entirely among respondents exposed to lethal cyber-attacks. In study 2, we probed this vanishing support, finding that exposure to destructive cyber-attacks undercuts the perception of cyber as a less lethal domain, therefore diminishing its appeal. We conclude by discussing how the fragile public preference for cyber weapons encourages military escalation in the short-term.

To better understand how desires to avenge the September 11 terror attacks affected US public support for the 2003 Iraq War, we integrate data from two uncoordinated surveys—one measuring revenge motivations and the other beliefs about Iraqi complicity—completed by overlapping samples drawn from the same online panel. Citizens who mistakenly blamed Iraq for 9/11 were more likely to say that going to war would satisfy their desires for revenge, which in turn predicted greater war support, controlling for political orientations and the perceived security incentives and costs of war. But a substantial proportion of those who said Iraq was not involved in 9/11 also expected war to satisfy desires for revenge, suggesting that a revenge “spillover” effect also contributed to war support. These findings help explain how President George W. Bush was able to bring the nation to war against Iraq, testify to the importance of emotion and moral motivation in public opinion, and demonstrate the utility of integrating data from independent online panel surveys.

ABSTRACTOne view in the study of attitudes towards immigration is that public reactions depend on who the immigrants are. Using a survey experiment, we confirm that group cues matter: South Koreans are more likely to support liberal immigration policies, when immigrants are framed as North Korean defectors (coethnic group). When other groups cues—Korean Chinese (semi-coethnic group) or guest-workers from Indonesia (non-coethnic group)—are given, the level of support becomes significantly lower. Apparently clear evidence on the existence of favouritism towards coethnic group notwithstanding, the relationship between in-group favouritism and immigration threat is not simple, as demonstrated by the finding that individuals exposed to Korean Chinese cues are more likely to feel culturally and socially threatened than those exposed to Indonesian cues. Also, South Koreans experience higher levels of economic threat from North Korean defectors than from Korean Chinese and Indonesians. Additional analysis reveals that ethnic group cues affect public attitudes towards immigration policies not necessarily by heightening perceived threat towards immigrants, but by facilitating individuals’ emotional reactions to them.

How are immigrants’ feelings of inclusion and trust in political institutions affected by interactions with the host society? In a field dominated by observational correlation studies, I use a survey experiment in two national contexts to test how perceptions of discrimination and expressions of pro-immigrant support influence non-Western immigrants’ political trust and national belonging. Following standard experimental procedures to test the hypotheses, I attempt to prime perceptions of group discrimination by asking questions about unfair treatment. Expressions of pro-immigrant support are, in turn, primed with facts about public and institutional support for immigrants’ rights. The results from the survey experiment are in line with expectations from prior work in some subgroups and underline the importance of equal treatment to achieve social cohesion. They also paint a rather complex picture of discrimination and its psychological impact. These findings have substantial implications for our understanding of host societies’ roles in immigrant inclusion.

Can constitutional court decisions shape public opinion on a governmental policy? Previous studies have focused on the US Supreme Court, which enjoys a high degree of public support as the major resource of power for courts. In this study, we examine the extent to which courts can influence public opinion regarding a government bill at European courts. First, we argue that the public support for courts also allows them to move public opinion on policies into the direction of their decisions. This works in both directions: they can confer legitimacy to a policy that they support, but they can also de‐legitimize a policy that they oppose. Second, we argue that this mechanism strongly depends on the amount of support that a court receives. It only has an effect for courts that possess a higher institutional legitimacy and among the group of citizens trusting a court.We test our arguments by combining a most different systems design for France and Germany with a survey priming experiment on a school security bill. France and Germany are selected for a most different systems design as they exhibit different institutional designs as well as different levels of support for the court at the aggregate level. The survey experiment is implemented within large national election surveys, the German Internet Panel and the French National Election Study. Both experiments contain more than 2,600 respondents each. Our survey experiment primes for decision outcomes and different institutions to understand whether there are differences between an institution supporting and opposing a policy and between a court and alternative institutions.Our findings confirm that with higher public support, courts can move the opinion of citizens to both legitimize and de‐legitimize a policy. This effect can be found at the aggregate level for a court enjoying higher public support, but also at the individual level for respondents with higher trust in the court. Interestingly, courts can even move the opinion of citizens with strong prior attitudes in the opposite direction, if these citizens highly trust the court.These findings have implications beyond the study itself. First, they confirm that the legitimacy‐conferring effect can also be observed for European courts, not only for the US Supreme Court. Second, they show that the relevance of a mechanism identified for a single case, like the US Supreme Court, might only hold for specific conditions. As public support for courts strongly varies across countries in Europe, we also expect the impact of any mechanism relying on public support to strongly vary, as we can observe in our own analysis.

Even as the protection of civilians becomes a widely held norm, there is substantial variation in public support for humanitarian policy efforts. We use a survey experiment in Sweden to gain insights into this puzzle. Our survey confirms that citizens generally support military, but particularly non-military, means of civilian protection. Yet, we also find that support is partly particularized. Specifying that civilians may have ties to extremist groups (as victims or supporters) reduces support for proposals to provide humanitarian aid, contribute to UN observer missions and accept refugees. We trace this reduced support to lower moral obligation and higher threat perceptions. In contrast to expectations, respondents do not prioritize the protection of co-nationals, or women and children. Manipulation checks suggest the explanation that perceptions of who constitutes a civilian are subjective. Our findings provide insights into the domestic political determinants of atrocity prevention abroad.

Research indicates that administrative burden influences the behaviors and views of clients and potential clients of government programs. However, administrative burden may also shape mass attitudes toward government programs. Taking a behavioral public administration approach, the authors consider whether and how exposure to information about administrative burden embedded within eligibility‐based programs influences citizen favorability toward those programs. It is hypothesized that if information about the existing screening mechanisms is highlighted and made salient, this will lead to greater approval of eligibility‐based programs. This expectation is evaluated using a survey experiment that explores administrative burden in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. The evidence shows that being exposed to information about administrative burden increases favorability toward TANF and its recipients, though these effects are conditional on party identification. The results provide insight into a potential consequence of administrative burden, showing the way in which information regarding burden can shape citizens’ support for eligibility‐based programs.

In several world regions, democracy is in retreat. This retreat is taking place amid growing polarization in many countries, and analysts are increasingly concerned with the role that deepening political divisions play in processes of democratic decline. This article investigates the relationship between partisan polarization and deteriorating public support for democratic institutions. It leverages the case of Indonesia, a major third-wave democracy now in the midst of a democratic regression. Indonesia’s political landscape has become more ideologically polarized in recent years, despite the strength of clientelist networks and low levels of party identification. Using four survey experiments, we find that Indonesians embrace illiberal interventions and abandon democratic institutions when exposed to party and leadership cues. These results suggest that political polarization may prompt citizens to abandon democratic norms even in democracies without strong partisan identities.