The ‘Cogs’ of society: the origins and politics of ‘critical’ infrastructure protection in Weimar and the Third Reich

The study describes methods for protecting the critical infrastructure of a state. The article aims to determine the combination of protecting methods of the state’s critical infrastructure from terrorist activities, namely security, physical protection, protection of critical infrastructure, protection of critical information infrastructure, and prevention of emergencies of a terrorist nature at objects of critical infrastructure. It is necessary to fulfil the following objectives to achieve the aim: to consider the difference and interrelation of the concepts of critical infrastructure and information critical infrastructure; to characterise the general properties of various terms, in particular: security, physical protection, protection of critical infrastructure, protection of information critical infrastructure, prevention of terrorist emergencies at objects of critical infrastructure; to analyse from the scientific point of view the classical definitions of forms and methods of critical infrastructure protection; to propose a generalised structure of information and technical methods of critical infrastructure protection; to determine the possibility of using information and technical methods in various fields of knowledge to protect the state’s critical infrastructure from terrorist influence. In summary, the structure of information and technical methods for critical infrastructure protection consists of three components: a mathematical model that describes the process occurring at critical infrastructure, a control algorithm that implements the mathematical model, and procedures that indicate the order of actions for applying the method. The problem of protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist activities requires technical, legal, military, psychological, medical, chemical, biological, and other sciences to address it. Each type of science will use its specific methods to solve practical problems of preventing terrorist emergencies at critical infrastructure. For technical sciences, there will be information-technical, engineering-technical, operational-technical, organisational-technical, biotechnical, and other methods to prevent emergencies of a terroristic nature that need development shortly. Keywords: critical information infrastructure, protection, terror, security, terrorist emergency.

In 2008, the European Union regulated the basics of the protection of critical infrastructures in a directive. The Member States therefore had to ensure that – in addition to the freedom of the method and means of implementation – the provisions of the directive were transposed into their national legal order. Accordingly, some Member States may define different detailed rules. The detailed rules related to the protection of critical infrastructures (e.g. the designation thresholds) are not public in several Member States, but in Germany and Hungary they have been recorded at the legislative level. In my study, I compare the rules related to the protection of critical healthcare infrastructures, including inpatient care institutions, primarily based on legal sources and the experiences of my study tour in Germany, from the selection criteria system to crisis planning. The good practices resulting from the differences and similarities to be discovered can help to revise and standardise the rules and practices related to the protection of critical health infrastructures.

Aim: As part of this article, an attempt was made to present the legislative process in Poland regarding critical infrastructure, for which valid is the Act of 26 April 2007 on crisis management, specifying, inter alia, authorities competent in crisis management and their tasks and principles of operation in this area as well as implementing acts issued on its basis. The introduced legal regulations define both the concept of critical infrastructure, its protection and activities related to the prevention of crisis situations, reacting in the event of their occurrence and preparation to take control over them, as well as removing their effects and recreating key resources. Introduction: Regulations concerning the protection of critical infrastructure are included in legal acts covering various areas of the country’s functioning, including telecommunications activities, production and trade in fuels and electricity, performance of defence tasks by entrepreneurs, creation of strategic reserves, powers of the minister competent for the State Treasury in some companies, protection of persons and the property. The protection of critical infrastructure is related to the raison d’état, which indicates the need to make special efforts to protect the country’s key infrastructure. Therefore, it is reasonable to present selected legal elements needed to protect critical infrastructure, especially those issues that ensure the continuity of the operation of public administration bodies, which are to ensure the safety of the citizens. Methodology: The article was prepared based on the analysis of the literature on the subject and the analysis of legal acts in the area of strengthening the concept of critical infrastructure, taking into account the current situation related to the pandemic and, consequently, the loss of some officers and employees. During the analysis of the conducted research, compact publications, acts of Polish law as well as guidelines and recommendations published on the websites of governmental institutions were used. Conclusions: In the protection of critical infrastructure, there is a need to introduce legal regulations within the framework of cooperation between institutions. The preparation of effective activities in the area of critical infrastructure requires a comprehensive approach, including: physical, technical, personal, ICT, legal protection, as well as assistance from the government in the reconstruction of the damaged element. Each of the areas mentioned above is a complex set of activities requiring general and specialist knowledge, sometimes expert knowledge, extensive practical experience (using the so-called good practices), risk analysis skills, and risk prediction (profiling). Keywords: act on crisis management, legal acts, crisis management, protection of critical infrastructure, identification Type of article: review article

Governments have always been playing a central role for the provision and protection of critical infrastructures (infrastructures that are essential to national stability and security, such as energy, water or transport). Over the last decade, criticism on the increasing instability and vulnerability of these infrastructures emerged as they require special attention when it comes to modernization and protection, e.g. terrorism. Public-private partnerships open up public monopolies for competition and potential efficiency gains. In this paper, we show the risks and opportunities of including the private sector and consequently business interests on the example of transport infrastructure. We apply a novel institutional economic role model with which we can identify necessary roles (i.e. actions) for the provision and protection of critical transport infrastructure. We, then, provide a theory-driven discussion on the role of public and private actors. The results of our paper give an indication of the role of public policy for transport infrastructure. Taking a broader perspective, this paper will help to understand the effective ratio of public and private actions for the provision and protection of critical infrastructure.

The content outline: in accordance with law, the Polish critical infrastructure constitutes 11 sectors, vital for national security and public safety persistence. Two of the sectors (energy sector and transportation systems sector), are elements of the European Critical Infrastructure, and due to Poland’s EU and NATO membership, are subject to particular protection. The paper describes general principles of Polish critical infrastructure safety law acts and critical infrastructure sectors. Later in this paper, 4 alert states (THREATCON), and their impact on the critical infrastructure safety and protection were presented. The purpose and the program content of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan were described.

The article studies the legal basis for providing civil protection and protection of critical infrastructure in Ukraine under martial law. In particular, the authors draw attention to the fact that, as of today, the issue of providing civil protection and protection of critical infrastructure in Ukraine is crucial due to the Russian Federation’s encroachment on its territorial integrity and inviolability, starting in 2014. This problem has gained particular urgency since the open military full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, which took place on February 24, 2022. Summarizing the conclusions of the conducted scientific research, based on the analysis of the levels of formation and implementation of the state policy of Ukraine in the field of civil protection and protection of critical infrastructure, in the system of its subject composition, the author considers it appropriate to single out: subjects of the policy of civil defense and protection of critical infrastructure at the national level; issues of the policy of civil security and safety of critical infrastructure at the industry (sectoral) level; civil protection and essential infrastructure protection policy subjects at the local level; issues of the policy of civil security and safety of critical infrastructure at the object level (at the enterprise, institution, organization).

The research was conducted to study the state of development of the issue of protection of critical infrastructure in Ukraine. It is established that the world is increasingly using an integrated approach to ensuring the security of systems, facilities and resources that are crucial to the life of a state or association from criminal encroachments and terrorist threats, as well as threats of another nature - natural, technogenic, social, military ones.It is determined that the term “critical infrastructure” has not yet received its legislative definition, it is, de facto, already used in such fundamental regulations. Today in Ukraine only the legislative base for the protection of critical infrastructure is being formed and the body that will formulate the state policy for the protection of critical infrastructure, as well as the body (military formation) that will be responsible for implementing the tasks of protection of critical infrastructure remains undefined critical infrastructure from various threats.The purpose of the article is to conduct a research to study the state of development of the issue of protection of critical infrastructure in Ukraine and justify the tasks and powers of the National Guard of Ukraine in this area.A legal analysis of the implementation by the National Guard of Ukraine of the tasks to stop terrorist activities and counter-sabotage. It has been proved that the National Guard of Ukraine is involved in anti-terrorist activities and participates in the activities of the Unified State System of Prevention, Response and Cessation of Terrorist Acts and minimization of their consequences, without being part of the system of subjects of fight against terrorism. Counter-sabotage activities are a direct form of execution by the National Guard of Ukraine of tasks related to the cessation of terrorist activities.It is substantiated that at the stage of creation and organization of the State Critical Infrastructure Protection System, including by determining the Authorized Body for Critical Infrastructure Protection of Ukraine and determining the competence and authorities in the field of critical infrastructure protection of other subjects of the state critical infrastructure protection system. The National Guard of Ukraine in this system is not normatively defined.It is proved that the legal status, level of logistics and training of personnel, the presence of special units in the National Guard of Ukraine that perform the functions of units for counter-sabotage, their experience in performing counter-sabotage tasks in the field of the anti-terrorist operation and joint operations forces allow considering the National Guard of Ukraine the main subject of counter-sabotage activities ‒ the Authorized Body for Critical Infrastructure Protection of Ukraine both within the territorial defense and in peacetime for the protection of critical infrastructure.Areas of further research will focus on the protection of critical infrastructure in Ukraine.

The paper provides a technopolitical analysis of public infrastructure by attending to the ways large technical systems became a political problem and how the development of infrastructure has inflected biopower, territoriality and security. It seeks to deepen the historical understanding of technopolitics by exploring the concept of Daseinsvorsorge (existential provision), which served as a crucial framework guiding public infrastructure provisions in Germany. Daseinsvorsorge provides a particularly revealing lens through which to examine questions of technopolitics, since it makes it possible to illuminate the dis/continuities in the government of infrastructure between three distinct political regimes: Nazi Germany, the post-war Federal Republic and contemporary Germany. The concept first became operative in post-war Germany, but it had emerged during the Third Reich in the work of Carl Schmitt’s disciple Ernst Forsthoff. Forsthoff identified steps towards Daseinsvorsorge in Nazi infrastructure planning, which was part and parcel of war mobilization, and borrowed tropes from the geopolitical imaginary of Nazi Germany like Lebensraum. After the war, Daseinsvorsorge aimed at establishing equal living conditions within Germany. With European integration and the privatization of infrastructure, the norms and forms of Daseinsvorsorge eroded without vanishing, since they surface in modified ways in EU guidelines and in critical infrastructure protection.

Reviewed by: Versorgung der Haupstadt der Bewegung: Infrastrukturen und Statgesellschaft im Nationalsozialistischen München [Supplying the capital of the movement: Infrastructures and urban society in national socialist Munich] by Mathias Irlinger Jens Ivo Engels (bio) Versorgung der Haupstadt der Bewegung: Infrastrukturen und Statgesellschaft im Nationalsozialistischen München [Supplying the capital of the movement: Infrastructures and urban society in national socialist Munich] By Mathias Irlinger. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2018. Pp. 432. This book is the published version of a doctoral thesis defended at the University of Munich. It is a contribution to both the history of the Nazi regime and the history of technical infrastructures. Mathias Irlinger highlights the main argument from the very beginning: "Infrastructures . . . contributed to the population's assent to the Nazi regime" (p. 9). In other words, the author interprets urban infrastructures as instruments of power, stabilizing the regime until the very last weeks of the Third Reich. Infrastructure is not completely new to Third Reich studies—historians have [End Page 1243] already shown the symbolic role of highways and the importance of rail for the logistics that enabled the genocide of the Holocaust, for example. Yet, there is still much work to do in this area. The book is a case study of the city of Munich. As the Nazi Party started here and Adolf Hitler kept a private apartment in the city, the local government considered this "capital of the [Nazi] movement" as one of the leading European metropolises of the time. Urban and infrastructure development plans were therefore particularly ambitious. Irlinger focuses on communal infrastructures such as traffic (including road building and tramway systems), energy, and leisure (municipal swimming pool). Irlinger's book is divided into four sections. Irlinger uses the terminology known from scholarship on "large technological systems." In the first chapter he explains the "system management" of infrastructures in Munich under the Nazis, underlining that "system building" had been completed before. It stresses the ties between Nazi ideology and the ambitions of local politicians to improve public infrastructure. In the second chapter he outlines the development of some major projects, including debates of the time on the technical risks of gas provision and a subway scheme for Munich. In perhaps the most interesting part of the book, the author then analyzes multiple interactions between the users and the management of the infrastructure systems, including advertising campaigns, users' complaints or de-mands, and infrastructure as a space for "racial" exclusion of Jews and other minorities (chapter 3). The last chapter is devoted to the links between warfare and local infrastructure, including efforts to improve the logistics of the defense industry; to mobilize women and forced workers for operation purposes during the war; and above all else to mitigate damages or functional limitations due to the war in order to minimize impacts on the individual users. Although the author cites some of the relevant research on infrastructure and power and elucidates the phenomenon of "Eigensinn" (obstinacy, Alf Lüdtke), his conception of power relations is slightly simplistic. In his presentation, the regime was stabilized by the sheer existence of infrastructures in the city. The problem with that idea is another argument put forward in the same book: Irlinger emphasizes that Munich's newly established Nazi city government did a poor job in infrastructure management compared to their predecessors in the Weimar Republic. He asserts that they failed to implement highflying ambitions in infrastructure development. Why then should it have stabilized the regime? The author stresses important propaganda efforts aimed at concealing these failures. He explains that the majority of the population benefited from the increasing exclusion of specific groups, like Jewish inhabitants, from access to the infrastructure. In the war, the exploitation of forced labor contributed to the maintenance of services at a moderate price. During the last years and months of the regime, when important parts of Munich lay in [End Page 1244] ruins, the city government kept on privileging private consumer interests in energy provision and managed to repair public transport to a certain extent. All these efforts would have strengthened the ties between "governors" and governed. This interpretation is in line with seminal interpretations of the Nazis' welfare and consumer...

: Over the past decade, the cyber threat to critical infrastructure has grown to potentially catastrophic dimensions. Critical Infrastructure protection has become a matter of national security, public safety, and economic stability. It is imperative the U.S. Government (USG) examine current responsibilities, develop a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy, cybersecurity regulations, impose standards, and enforce the strongest security measures possible to protect the Nation from cyber attacks to critical infrastructure. This paper provides a background of what constitutes national critical infrastructure and Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), discusses the immense vulnerabilities, threats, and risks associated in the protection of critical infrastructure, and outlines governance and responsibilities of protecting vulnerable infrastructure. Finally, the paper will make recommendations for federal responsibilities and legislation to direct nation critical infrastructure efforts to ensure national security, public safety and economic stability.

Critical infrastructure represents a medium of national and international importance whose destruction, temporary or permanent disruption in process activities, would seriously endanger or weaken national and public safety, economic and social prosperity. Beside the internal threats, critical infrastructure is exposed to natural, technical-technological and anthropogenic threats, where terrorism is recognized to be one of the most unpredictable and dangerous sources of threats to the critical infrastructures. For that reason countries are responsible for the implementation and improvement of the critical infrastructures' protection and resilience to ensure survival, the development and advancement of individuals' and the social community, domestic and foreign economic subjects on their soil and, in partnership, achieving stability and safety of other countries. The goal of this work is to analyze how the Republic of Croatia has, so far, legally, regulatory and operationally developed protection and resilience of the national critical infrastructure, and give recommendations with regards to necessary steps in the continuation of the said process.

The article analyzes the existing legal mechanisms for managing critical information infrastructure in Ukraine. The instruments for their improvement are proposing in this article. An important component of critical infrastructure is its information component – a critical information infrastructure. The sphere of protection of critical information infrastructure in Ukraine is at the initial stage of formation. The current legislation defines only certain objects of socio-economic sphere, in which extraordinary events can lead to socially dangerous consequences. In view of the fact, that the term “critical information infrastructure” does not having a consistent interpretation in different countries, we propose our opinion. “Critical information infrastructure is a system of information management of critical facilities and information and communication networks that provide defense capabilities and security of public and private institutions, whose operation may flow to the national security of Ukraine” (KII). In the KII we can identified information and network components. Information environment of KII is a system for information management of critical objects, including computing and information resources that form automated control systems (ACS). The network component of KII consists of a set of telecommunication devices, communication lines and network equipment, systems of open protocols for the exchange of information between elecommunication devices, global system of digital addresses and digital identifiers, software. The Internet network can be considered as a technological add-on over a telecommunication network that provides the provision of data transmission and processing services (e-mail, teleconferencing, file transfer, access to computing and information systems in local area networks). The main threat to the safety of ACS of critical information infrastructure objects is targeted actions on information systems, information and telecommunication networks by software and hardware. KII legal security include two main components – national and international. The national component may be forming by a set of principles, legal institutions and norms, which are enshrined in the national legislation regulating public relations in Ukraine in the area of counteracting the security threats of the ACS of critical objects. In order to protect the most important objects of KII, it is necessary to identify these objects. The current legislation defines such categories of objects, for which special conditions for ensuring their protection and functioning are established. Some of them, in whole or in part, may be classifying as objects of critical infrastructure. The specificity of providing information security was reflecting in such Ukraine laws like “On the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine”, “On the Concept of the National Program of Informatization”, “On the National Program of Informatization”. As well as the Concept of Development of the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Strategy of Cybersecurity Of Ukraine. The National Security Strategy identifies actual threats to national security and sets priorities for information security, cyber security and security of information resources and critical infrastructure. At the same time, the implementation of the state policy in the field of security of KII requires the further development of legal principles and norms governing the relevant social relations, that is, the national component of the legal security of KII. Ukraine should ensure the establishment of a nationwide system for assessing risks and threats to critical infrastructure, and after the legislative definition of the main terms, the implementation of the Identification of Critical Information Infrastructure objects. Identification of objects of critical information infrastructure can be accomplishing by introducing the certification of objects of critical information infrastructure. Such passports must contain general data about the facility, data on the main sources of danger, data on hazardous natural conditions, technological processes and response to threats. The international component of the legal security of KII provides for the regulation of a set of principles and norms defined by international treaties and recognized by the state, regulating issues of international cooperation in this area. Ukraine has signed the Convention on Cybercrime together with the member states of the Council of Europe and other States. It is aiming at stopping actions against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems, networks and computer data, as well as abusing such systems, networks and data by installing the criminal responsibility for such behavior, the provision of powers sufficient to combat criminal offenses, and the conclusion of agreements on rapid and reliable international cooperation. In addition, the plan of measures for 2017 on implementation of the Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine provides for the implementation of Directive 2008/114/EC on the protection of critical infrastructure, in particular on cybersecurity and cyber defense of critical infrastructure objects. Development of the system of international information security, the following main groups of international relations that requirenormative legal regulation within the framework of the legal security of KII: definition of the boundaries of the national KII in the global information and communication infrastructure and fixing signs of computer incidents in the control system of critical objects information infrastructure. The absence of generally recognized borders of state sovereignty of States in this space is a significant obstacle to the application of international law to the actions of other states. In particular, this impedes the establishment of limits of responsibility of states for violating the security of the KII and organizing international cooperation in the field of countering computer crime. The urgency of the legislative consolidation of signs of computer incidents in the automated control system of critical information infrastructure objects suggests the widespread use of the concept of “incident” in international law. An incident in cyberspace usually associated with a violation of the functioning of the components of cyberspace – an electronic collection environment and automated processing of information that determines the processes of the implementation of these operations, as well as information systems and automated control systems. The essence of the general definition of the “international incident” in the field of KII will be determining, firstly, by the nature of international relations between states that are violating by the “incident”. This event may be the result of unforeseen actions of the state, including actions that harm the interests of public bodies of one or more states, or, conversely, be one of many intentional but minor provocations carried out by agents of one state against another state. Given that international relations in the field of incidents in the field of KII are not regulating by international treaties, the main and, in fact, the only source of international law in this case serves as an international custom, however, its application to the sphere of KII is accompanying by considerable difficulties. For Ukraine, it is possible to introduce the positive experience of other states in the security of the KII. In particular, the problem of security of information technologies has been enshrined in the international standard ISO / IEC 15408 “General criteria for assessing the safety of information technology”.

The paper deals with topical issues related to the protection of critical infrastructure, which depend on the survival of the human community. It is shown that rapid progress in the field of information technology, on the one hand, allows the modern economies of many countries to become inextricably interconnected; interfering with the work of critical infrastructure. The analysis of what are the true causes of such close attention to such objects by cyber terrorists. Top 10 major threats to industrial control systems are presented. The following steps determine the criticality of the infrastructure objects. The following is a list of 11 critical sectors and 37 relevant sub-sectors identified by the European Union. The answer is given to the question with which target countries should develop national strategies for the protection of critical infrastructure objects. A strategy for quantifying the level of security of critical infrastructure against the risk of third-party cybernetic exposure is proposed. The necessity to unite different elements of protection of critical infrastructure objects by states is substantiated. It is important that cybersecurity policies should be central to the protection of critical infrastructure. It is noted that not all national cybersecurity strategies provide the same place and relevance for critical infrastructure. It is noted that when developing a national strategy for the protection of critical infrastructure, it is important to compile a comprehensive list of all relevant national policies. It is concluded that today it is an important tool for the protection of critical infrastructure.

In the current geopolitical scenario, ensuring national security and the protection of critical infrastructure seem to be key elements for upholding the proper functioning of a state and, consequently, the safety of its citizens. This paper addresses issues related to the protection of critical infrastructure in territory of the European Union (EU). Particular attention is paid to issues regarding legal solutions to ensure the security of EU member states. EU directives concerning the immunity of critical entities (CER) and issues related to ensuring a high level of cybersecurity in the territory of the EU (NIS 2) are discussed. The paper is divided into several main parts, which, in addition to the above-mentioned issues regarding the legal aspects of critical infrastructure protection, also address security (e.g. types and divisions) and terrorism (e.g. the most important legal acts aimed at counteracting this very dangerous phenomenon is indicated). This study also discusses the European Security Strategy (2020–2025) and its most important objectives regarding the security of critical infrastructure, anti-terrorism, cybersecurity, and the protection of public spaces. Regarding national security, the paper discusses the various national security strategies from 1990 to the present in Poland, showing that the strategies pay particular attention to the changing approaches to security, the assessment of the current situation at the time and threats involved, and the increasing need to ensure the protection of critical infrastructure. The publication ends with conclusions and postulates regarding the need to ensure national security and increase the protection of critical infrastructure.

Effective operation of autonomous maritime systems requires sensor architectures tailored to mission-specific requirements, as key performance criteria like accuracy and energy consumption vary significantly by operational context. Against this background, this study develops a dual-stage, multi-criteria procedure to evaluate and assess individual sensors accounting for scenario-based requirements, using the TOPSIS algorithm as its core method. The first stage individually assesses sensors against scenario-specific requirements to generate context-aware weighting factors (αis). In the second stage, these factors are used to evaluate the overall performance of seven predefined sensor suites across five distinct operational scenarios (e.g., ‘Coastal Surveillance’ or ‘Protection of Critical Infrastructure’). The procedure is complemented by an architectural robustness assessment that systematically captures the impact of component failures. This flexible approach serves as a generic decision framework for designing unmanned maritime systems across different mission profiles. By integrating key performance metrics and failure scenarios within a context of prioritized operational requirements, the dual-stage multi-criteria procedure enables more than just selecting an optimal configuration. It reveals the fundamental architectural design principles. Our results demonstrate that for precision-focused tasks such as ‘Coastal Surveillance’, specialized sensor suites combining electro-optical and laser rangefinder achieves the highest performance score (0.84). Conversely, for scenarios with balanced requirements like ‘Protection of Critical Infrastructure’, architectures based on functional complementarity (e.g., electro-optical and Radar, score (0.64)) prove most effective. A key finding is that maximizing sensor quantity does not guarantee optimal performance, as targeted, mission-specific configurations often outperform fully integrated systems. The significance of this study lies in providing a systematic framework that shifts the design paradigm from a ‘more is better’ approach to an intelligent, context-aware composition, enabling the development of truly robust and efficient sensor architectures for autonomous maritime systems.