Abstract
On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole was attacked by a small band of Islamic (global) insurgents. Why would sea insurgents attack a professional warship that did not appear to be related to counterinsurgency? When are such attacks successful, and when are they not successful? Three dimensions—value, vulnerability, and learning—give convincing answers to this puzzle. I trace two cases: the USS Cole bombing and the USS Ashland and Kearsarge missile attack. I find that when the navy is equipped with a fast learning process and this reduces its vulnerability, sea insurgents' attacks are less successful. This strategic interaction dynamic is strongly applicable to South Korea under three subdynamics: alliance, commitment dilemma, and enhanced naval capabilities. Thus, the Republic of Korea Navy needs to establish a flexible strategy in its effort to effectively deal with nontraditional threats as well as traditional threats, such as North Korea.
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