The China challenge

Few regions have transformed as consequentially as Asia in the twenty-first century. In recent decades, China has risen faster than its neighbours and today outranks its major proximate competitors - India and Japan - on economic and defence indices by huge margins. The United States' interest in balancing against China is especially significant for India, because the contradictions between New Delhi and an increasingly assertive Beijing are the sharpest in the region. In this Adelphi book, C. Raja Mohan delineates the prospects for an Indian role in structuring a new Asian geopolitical order. Grounding his analysis in the (often neglected) evolution of modern Indian foreign and security policies from the colonial era to the twenty-first century, Mohan argues that China's rise has compelled India to discard its traditional ambivalence about Chinese power and counter Beijing by strengthening its own national power and developing partnerships with other states, primarily the US. In addition to considering potential challenges to the emerging US-India strategic relationship, the book evaluates India's likely contributions to a new Asian security, political and economic order in the light of both New Delhi's enduring regional interests and the policy changes envisioned by the second Trump administration.

Few regions have transformed as consequentially as Asia in the twenty-first century. In recent decades, China has risen faster than its neighbours and today outranks its major proximate competitors - India and Japan - on economic and defence indices by huge margins. The United States' interest in balancing against China is especially significant for India, because the contradictions between New Delhi and an increasingly assertive Beijing are the sharpest in the region. In this Adelphi book, C. Raja Mohan delineates the prospects for an Indian role in structuring a new Asian geopolitical order. Grounding his analysis in the (often neglected) evolution of modern Indian foreign and security policies from the colonial era to the twenty-first century, Mohan argues that China's rise has compelled India to discard its traditional ambivalence about Chinese power and counter Beijing by strengthening its own national power and developing partnerships with other states, primarily the US. In addition to considering potential challenges to the emerging US-India strategic relationship, the book evaluates India's likely contributions to a new Asian security, political and economic order in the light of both New Delhi's enduring regional interests and the policy changes envisioned by the second Trump administration.

Few regions have transformed as consequentially as Asia in the twenty-first century. In recent decades, China has risen faster than its neighbours and today outranks its major proximate competitors - India and Japan - on economic and defence indices by huge margins. The United States' interest in balancing against China is especially significant for India, because the contradictions between New Delhi and an increasingly assertive Beijing are the sharpest in the region. In this Adelphi book, C. Raja Mohan delineates the prospects for an Indian role in structuring a new Asian geopolitical order. Grounding his analysis in the (often neglected) evolution of modern Indian foreign and security policies from the colonial era to the twenty-first century, Mohan argues that China's rise has compelled India to discard its traditional ambivalence about Chinese power and counter Beijing by strengthening its own national power and developing partnerships with other states, primarily the US. In addition to considering potential challenges to the emerging US-India strategic relationship, the book evaluates India's likely contributions to a new Asian security, political and economic order in the light of both New Delhi's enduring regional interests and the policy changes envisioned by the second Trump administration.

Few regions have transformed as consequentially as Asia in the twenty-first century. In recent decades, China has risen faster than its neighbours and today outranks its major proximate competitors - India and Japan - on economic and defence indices by huge margins. The United States' interest in balancing against China is especially significant for India, because the contradictions between New Delhi and an increasingly assertive Beijing are the sharpest in the region. In this Adelphi book, C. Raja Mohan delineates the prospects for an Indian role in structuring a new Asian geopolitical order. Grounding his analysis in the (often neglected) evolution of modern Indian foreign and security policies from the colonial era to the twenty-first century, Mohan argues that China's rise has compelled India to discard its traditional ambivalence about Chinese power and counter Beijing by strengthening its own national power and developing partnerships with other states, primarily the US. In addition to considering potential challenges to the emerging US-India strategic relationship, the book evaluates India's likely contributions to a new Asian security, political and economic order in the light of both New Delhi's enduring regional interests and the policy changes envisioned by the second Trump administration.

Few regions have transformed as consequentially as Asia in the twenty-first century. In recent decades, China has risen faster than its neighbours and today outranks its major proximate competitors - India and Japan - on economic and defence indices by huge margins. The United States' interest in balancing against China is especially significant for India, because the contradictions between New Delhi and an increasingly assertive Beijing are the sharpest in the region. In this Adelphi book, C. Raja Mohan delineates the prospects for an Indian role in structuring a new Asian geopolitical order. Grounding his analysis in the (often neglected) evolution of modern Indian foreign and security policies from the colonial era to the twenty-first century, Mohan argues that China's rise has compelled India to discard its traditional ambivalence about Chinese power and counter Beijing by strengthening its own national power and developing partnerships with other states, primarily the US. In addition to considering potential challenges to the emerging US-India strategic relationship, the book evaluates India's likely contributions to a new Asian security, political and economic order in the light of both New Delhi's enduring regional interests and the policy changes envisioned by the second Trump administration.

Few regions have transformed as consequentially as Asia in the twenty-first century. In recent decades, China has risen faster than its neighbours and today outranks its major proximate competitors - India and Japan - on economic and defence indices by huge margins. The United States' interest in balancing against China is especially significant for India, because the contradictions between New Delhi and an increasingly assertive Beijing are the sharpest in the region. In this Adelphi book, C. Raja Mohan delineates the prospects for an Indian role in structuring a new Asian geopolitical order. Grounding his analysis in the (often neglected) evolution of modern Indian foreign and security policies from the colonial era to the twenty-first century, Mohan argues that China's rise has compelled India to discard its traditional ambivalence about Chinese power and counter Beijing by strengthening its own national power and developing partnerships with other states, primarily the US. In addition to considering potential challenges to the emerging US-India strategic relationship, the book evaluates India's likely contributions to a new Asian security, political and economic order in the light of both New Delhi's enduring regional interests and the policy changes envisioned by the second Trump administration.

China and the Strategic Imperative for the United States Charles Boustany (bio) and Richard J. Ellings (bio) keywords United States, China, U.S. Trade Policy, Balance of Power Click for larger view View full resolution [End Page 47] executive summary This essay examines the implications of China’s rise and calls on the U.S. to address the domestic bases for national power and to reassume a leadership role in Asia by executing a grand strategy that is fully cognizant of political, historical, economic, and strategic realities. main argument The U.S. has deep and long-standing interests in the strategically complex Indo-Pacific region. Now, however, Beijing’s multi-decade strategy is bearing fruit as Chinese power and interests are beginning to predominate there. U.S. regional interests and leadership are challenged, and U.S. economic and security policies relevant to Asia are incoherent. Washington must craft effective policies that coordinate economic and diplomatic instruments of power with military instruments of power, and these policies must be executed in a manner consistent with historical yet achievable strategic imperatives. policy implications • Xi Jinping is committed to consolidating his and the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on Chinese society, basing much of his and the party’s legitimacy on nationalism. China appears determined to replace the U.S. as the dominant regional force and compete for global hegemony. • The U.S. must address the threats to its economy and at the same time remain engaged in crafting the rules of the international economic order. It should improve as needed and consider rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership to accelerate economic growth and coordination among coalition members. The U.S. should seek opportunities to strengthen liberal economic behavior in the region. • The U.S. must develop an appropriate, well-resourced military strategy for the Indo-Pacific and deploy the required weapons and related systems to execute it. • The U.S. must build coalitions to keep a stable balance of power, as well as reform and lead the institutions that play critical roles in the post–World War II economic and political order. • The relationship between China and the U.S., together with the actions and strategies of each power, will be the most important determinants of the 21st-century world order. The U.S. has the capacity to rise to the challenge, but it must make serious assessments of what is needed and act accordingly and expeditiously. [End Page 48] China’s accession on December 11, 2001, to membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) was hailed by many in the United States as a breakthrough that could lead to political liberalization in China, peace and security in Asia, and greater prosperity for the American people.1 This optimism has faded away, replaced by rising pessimism. The first two goals have not been achieved, nor are the prospects for achieving them bright, and the third is a major continuing political issue and increasingly questioned by economists.2 Fueling the pessimism are years of muddled, uncoordinated U.S. policies toward China. These policies have been a Procrustean mix of robust yet distorted economic engagement, ad hoc strategic and diplomatic responses to events, and constrained defense planning due to budgetary paralysis. Neglect of the influence that China is deriving from its enormous economic success and the growing challenges in the U.S.-China relationship, coupled with a failure to properly consider this relationship in the context of a U.S. grand strategy, have constituted a profound policy failure. The situation has been made worse by a succession of Chinese leaders who, in contrast, have carried out a consistent grand strategy in the face of U.S. policy incoherence. To address this failure, the Trump administration issued in December 2017 the new National Security Strategy, which seeks to clarify the challenges presented by China, especially to the U.S. economy. The Trump administration is also conducting major investigations of Chinese industrial and trade practices.3 In December, with China the clear target, the administration agreed with Japan and the European Union to work together “to enhance trilateral cooperation in the WTO and in other forums, as appropriate, to eliminate…unfair market distorting and protectionist practices by...

Background, Objectives and Goals: From their auspicious meeting at the “Southern” White House, Mar-a-Lago, West Palm Beach, Florida on 5-6 April 2017, U.S. President Donald J. Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping seem to have struck up a friendship accord intended to maintain, hopefully augment, Western trade with China and in the process diffuse burgeoning tensions along the Western Pacific rim caused by aggressive rhetoric and belligerent behavior of Kim Jong-Un, leader of the “Democratic” People’s Republic of Korea [North Korea]. In the process, the United States appears to be recasting its foreign economic policy as a return to “Dollar Diplomacy,” the hallmark of American foreign policy during the William Howard Taft presidency (1909 – 1913), mostly out of favour since then until the present moment. An objective of this paper is to clarify and articulate characteristics of “Principled Dollar Diplomacy” in the 21st century compared with its 20th century counterpart, to identify what will be its objectives and goals, then to assess the viability and sustainability of the same globally but especially along Asia’s Western Pacific rim, connecting to South and West Asia then Europe along the ancient “Silk Road” of Eurasia as an integral part of President Trump’s “Principled Realism” in foreign policy. Methods: Literature reviewed include historiographical documents reflecting both the current state of, and recent changes to, United States foreign economic policy globally, termed “Principled Realism” by President Trump as it interfaces foreign economic policy with foreign security policy, focusing particularly on what appears to be a tottering Western Pacific rim of mainland Asia, fragmented by hostile rhetoric, nuclear threats, China’s unilateral South China Sea domination. Government reports by individual countries and trading partners plus journalistic accounts, together with diplomatic interviews have been reviewed. Attention is directed to changes in trade volume involving trading partners generally, together with trade values of both imports and exports across the first six months of the Donald Trump administration compared to similar periods in administrations of former American presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Barrack Obama. Presidential rhetoric will be analysed as communicated to three categories of recipients: foreign heads of state or heads of government, United States business leaders, the global general public. Some historical records are included, comparing Chinese maritime belligerence along the Western Pacific rim with similar activities engaged in by Imperial Germany during World War I then by Nazi Germany during World War II, each with disastrous consequences. Expected Results: Ever since the Florida summit meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi, an economic dialogue appears to have emerged that has expanded into diplomatic discussions involving the DPRK, Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) partners trading with both China and the United States, India, Japan, South Korea. Predicated upon President Trump’s self-assessment of his first 100 days in office, together with legitimate expectations of other nations, it should be possible to gauge the direction of “Dollar Diplomacy” across the first and second 100 days to predict the Strengths and Weaknesses of early changes in United States foreign economic policies over the first six months of the Trump Administration. Positive or negative results should be apparent in trade regimes, trade value, trade volume, as well as changes in rhetoric along the Western Pacific rim, and intensity of involvement if the state parties themselves. Stated succinctly, this is China’s chance to stand out and become a leader, potentially the leader, in Asia, and to work hand in hand with the United States and the Western Alliance to maintain continuity of “Pax Americana” for another 70 years or longer, an enduring peace from which, arguably, China has benefitted more than most countries, and stands to benefit much more across eight more decades of the 21st century. Amongst other factors, an expectation is to witness the United States and other Western Allies join with China in funding its “One Belt, One Road” or “OBOR” across Eurasia, because by partnering a rapprochement with DPRK, China and the United States should grow closer, greater and fairer trade should emerge between these two nations, that burgeoning friendship should draw in Japan and other huge trading partners of both. Possible as a successor to the ill-fated Trans-Pacific Partnership will be a sustainable “Pax Pacifica” reflecting core values of the West alongside China’s stated commitment to decreasing poverty in developing countries, providing an enormous opportunity for the Trump and Xi Administrations to cooperate harmoniously. In addition to the Pacific rim as a region, the DPRK could benefit from Sino-American investment inside of its borders, particularly if China and the West could construct international joint ventures (IJVs) in the region with each functioning as a check and a balance on the other.

Background, Objective and Goals: From their auspicious meeting at the “Southern” White House, Mar-a-Lago, West Palm Beach, Florida on 5-6 April 2017, U.S. President Donald J. Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping seem to have struck up a friendship accord intended to maintain, hopefully augment, Western trade with China and in the process diffuse burgeoning tensions along the Western Pacific rim caused by aggressive rhetoric and belligerent behavior of Kim Jong-Un, leader of the “Democratic” People’s Republic of Korea [North Korea]. In the process, the United States appears to be recasting its foreign economic policy as a return to “Dollar Diplomacy,” the hallmark of American foreign policy during the William Howard Taft presidency (1909 – 1913), mostly out of favour since then until the present moment. An objective of this paper is to clarify and articulate characteristics of “Principled Dollar Diplomacy” in the 21st century compared with its 20th century counterpart, to identify what will be its objectives and goals, then to assess the viability and sustainability of the same globally but especially along Asia’s Western Pacific rim, connecting to South and West Asia then Europe along the ancient “Silk Road” of Eurasia as an integral part of President Trump’s “Principled Realism” in foreign policy. Methods: Literature reviewed include historiographical documents reflecting both the current state of, and recent changes to, United States foreign economic policy globally, termed “Principled Realism” by President Trump as it interfaces foreign economic policy with foreign security policy, focusing particularly on what appears to be a tottering Western Pacific rim of mainland Asia, fragmented by hostile rhetoric, nuclear threats, China’s unilateral South China Sea domination. Government reports by individual countries and trading partners plus journalistic accounts, together with diplomatic interviews have been reviewed. Attention is directed to changes in trade volume involving trading partners generally, together with trade values of both imports and exports across the first six months of the Donald Trump administration compared to similar periods in administrations of former American presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Barrack Obama. Presidential rhetoric will be analysed as communicated to three categories of recipients: foreign heads of state or heads of government, United States business leaders, the global general public. Some historical records are included, comparing Chinese maritime belligerence along the Western Pacific rim with similar activities engaged in by Imperial Germany during World War I then by Nazi Germany during World War II, each with disastrous consequences. Expected Results: Ever since the Florida summit meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi, an economic dialogue appears to have emerged that has expanded into diplomatic discussions involving the DPRK, Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) partners trading with both China and the United States, India, Japan, South Korea. Predicated upon President Trump’s self-assessment of his first 100 days in office, together with legitimate expectations of other nations, it should be possible to gauge the direction of “Dollar Diplomacy” across the first and second 100 days to predict the Strengths and Weaknesses of early changes in United States foreign economic policies over the first six months of the Trump Administration. Positive or negative results should be apparent in trade regimes, trade value, trade volume, as well as changes in rhetoric along the Western Pacific rim, and intensity of involvement if the state parties themselves. Stated succinctly, this is China’s chance to stand out and become a leader, potentially the leader, in Asia, and to work hand in hand with the United States and the Western Alliance to maintain continuity of “Pax Americana” for another 70 years or longer, an enduring peace from which, arguably, China has benefitted more than most countries, and stands to benefit much more across eight more decades of the 21st century. Amongst other factors, an expectation is to witness the United States and other Western Allies join with China in funding its “One Belt, One Road” or “OBOR” across Eurasia, because by partnering a rapprochement with DPRK, China and the United States should grow closer, greater and fairer trade should emerge between these two nations, that burgeoning friendship should draw in Japan and other huge trading partners of both. Possible as a successor to the ill-fated Trans-Pacific Partnership will be a sustainable “Pax Pacifica” reflecting core values of the West alongside China’s stated commitment to decreasing poverty in developing countries, providing an enormous opportunity for the Trump and Xi Administrations to cooperate harmoniously. In addition to the Pacific rim as a region, the DPRK could benefit from Sino-American investment inside of its borders, particularly if China and the West could construct international joint ventures (IJVs) in the region with each functioning as a check and a balance on the other.

Introduction Jessica Keough (bio) Considerable uncertainty has surrounded the Trump administration's priorities in Asia. While U.S. cabinet officials have at times sought to reassure the region that the United States intends to preserve its commitment to the post–World War II international system, other comments and actions by the administration have indicated an inward turn that suggests less active U.S. engagement. These mixed signals have left regional allies, partners, and other states wondering what the future holds for their relationships with the United States. A roundtable discussion in the January 2017 issue of Asia Policy, "Assessing U.S.-Asia Relations in a Time of Transition," presented mainly American perspectives on the major issues facing the United States in its bilateral relations with leading powers in the Asia-Pacific at the outset of the Trump administration. This Asia Policy roundtable offers perspectives on U.S.-Asia relations from leading scholars and policy practitioners in select Asia-Pacific states. In their essays, these experts identify the most salient current and over-the-horizon issues in their countries' evolving relationships with the United States and evaluate how bilateral relations have progressed so far under the Trump administration. For China, Xie Tao examines four major issues confronting the U.S.-China relationship that both raise the possibility of conflict and offer prospects for cooperation: North Korea, the South China Sea, democratization in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and the sharing of global major-power responsibilities. The United States and China will likely find themselves working with each other in these areas, whether they want to or not, and will need to treat each other respectfully to avoid escalating risks. In Japan and South Korea, the U.S. alliance continues to form the bedrock of bilateral relations. Noboru Yamaguchi finds that, to Japan's relief, the U.S. commitment to the alliance and to Northeast Asian security seems unchanged, despite indications during Trump's presidential campaign that he might shift the burden for Northeast Asia's defense to the region. Kang Choi also addresses the importance of the United States' role as Northeast Asia's security guarantor in his essay on South Korea. Although Japan and [End Page 2] South Korea are concerned about China's rise and regional dominance, both identify North Korea as their most urgent security threat. According to Choi, the new administrations in Washington and Seoul will need to closely coordinate their policies toward the North and establish trust in each other. In light of North Korea's alarming acceleration of its nuclear weapons and missile programs, the allies face critical challenges ahead. While U.S. allies in Northeast Asia worry about abandonment, similar fears are very high in Taiwan. Ming Lee argues that, given its unofficial relations with most countries (including the United States) but also its unique security commitments from Washington, Taiwan struggles to make its voice heard internationally and fears becoming a bargaining chip in U.S. relations with China. The Kremlin is watching with interest the domestic upheaval in U.S. politics over allegations about the Trump campaign's possible links to Russia. Dmitri Trenin characterizes Russia's relationship with the United States under Trump as "confrontational with islands of cooperation." Issues such as NATO, European security, Afghanistan, and sanctions over Ukraine continue to generate friction, while reaching an agreement on sensitive issues such as Syria and the renegotiation of strategic arms control treaties will require a cautious, patient approach to overcome obstacles along the path of cooperation. China's rise is the defining structural characteristic shaping U.S.-India relations. Balancing China will likely bring Washington and New Delhi closer together over the long term, Rajesh Rajagopalan argues, however, that a number of roadblocks—the Trump administration's transactional approach to bilateral relationships, U.S. relations with Pakistan, economic nationalism, and domestic chaos in U.S. politics—could hinder this progress in the short term. Pakistan and the United States, by contrast, remain bound together over Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, but the long-term prospects for this strained relationship are uncertain. Moeed Yusuf details how Islamabad's and Washington's views of each other and their strategic priorities in South Asia increasingly...

THE STORY OF AMERICAN STATE BUILDING is one in which crisis, once episodic, has become a routine feature of American politics. At the heart of this development is the modern executive: emergency powers are presidential powers. The principal objective of this article is to highlight institutional developments since the late 1960s that framed the Donald Trump administration's actions during the COVID-19 pandemic and currently roil the American state: the expansion of administrative power in the White House, which is largely unconstrained by the institutional imperatives of the bureaucracy, Congress, or state governments, and the emergence of the modern executive as the repository of party responsibility, with both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents for messaging, fundraising, mobilization, and programmatic action. Together, these developments form a dynamic of executive-centered partisanship—a merging of partisanship and executive prerogative characterized by presidential unilateralism, social activism, and polarizing struggles about national identity that divide the nation by race, ethnicity, and religion. Our account of executive-centered partisanship and how it affected the Trump administration's response to COVID-19 sheds new light on contemporary crisis management and the political nature of administrative power. Other presidents would have responded differently, perhaps with greater success in stemming the spread of the virus; other presidents might have attempted to centralize administrative power more aggressively in fighting the pandemic, rather than deflecting responsibility to states and private entities. Nevertheless, Trump's actions were not irresolute. They were defined by a purposeful pursuit of partisan objectives: a denigration of bureaucratic expertise and an attack on the “deep state”; the politicization and racialization of federal administrative procedures to crack down on legal and undocumented immigration; a campaign of “law and order” to quell civil rights demonstrations; and a punitive form of federalism, defined by partisan retaliation against “blue states.” Contrary to dominant analyses that paint an administration in disarray, we argue that the Trump administration responded to the crisis through a tactical redeployment of national administrative power to fulfill partisan goals, within a party system beholden to executive power.11 Nicholas F. Jacobs, Desmond King, and Sidney M. Milkis, “Building a Conservative State: Partisan Polarization and the Redeployment of Administrative Power,” Perspectives on Politics, 17 (June 2019): 453–469. As such, we conclude that given the current political and institutional context, American presidents are less likely to offer unifying leadership during national crises, or to suffer the political consequences for failing to do so. Instead of subjecting his party to the “blue wave” many Democrats hoped for, Trump's polarizing leadership agitated a highly mobilized and fiercely contested election that sharpened, rather than ameliorated, partisan conflict. Republicans did better than pre-election prognostications implied down ballot, where they gained 11 seats in the House and maintained control of most state legislatures. Moreover, Trump's term in office enabled Republicans to solidify a conservative majority in the courts. As a result, his successor, Joe Biden, came into office having to navigate public health and economic crisis with a bare majority in the Senate, statehouses and governors more deeply divided than Congress, and a judiciary in which 28 percent of all sitting judges were appointed by Trump, including three new justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. Most tellingly, despite his personal defeat, Trump reigned over his party and reveled in the adulation of its base supporters. In short, the American state offers modern presidents not only the opportunity to strengthen their commitment to partisan tactics under the cover of national emergencies, but also the power to do so without the traditional constraints of party, Congress, and the states. That this strategy mobilized the Republican base and did not arouse a national repudiation of the president's leadership is evidence of the power bestowed on the modern presidency to advance partisan objectives in a deeply divided nation. The article proceeds as follows: First, we argue that while the government's response to COVID-19 is an exceptional case, scholars often learn much about the operating dynamics of the American state by exploring how crises shape and transform certain governing commitments. Students of American politics have long argued that national crises have been central to major political developments. Therefore, the absence of transformative change in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis—the stubborn persistence of the polarizing struggles over American identity that have intensified since the late 1960s—poses hard challenges to this prevailing perspective. Second, we argue that executive-centered partisanship explains the discrepancy between received wisdom and the contemporary battle for the services of the administrative state. We identify three ways in which the Trump administration's actions revealed and reinforced the dysfunctionalism of executive-centered partisanship during COVID-19: the delegitimization of bureaucratic expertise in partisan politics; the decay of constitutional forms that sustain the division and separation of powers; and the politicization of administrative procedures and policy implementation, now central to the partisan struggle to contend with a diversifying and politically fragmented America. Each of these factors, we argue, is symptomatic of the political pathologies that fester under executive-centered partisanship. We conclude with an analysis of Trump's legacy and its effect on the first few months of Biden's presidency. We do not mean to suggest that Biden's leadership is equivalent to Trump's, or that the Democratic and Republican Parties share equal blame for routinizing presidential partisanship. Not only does the base of the Republican Party not apologize for violent insurrection and embrace conspiratorial tales about election fraud, Republican Party leaders in Congress and the states openly question foundational rules and precedent for short-term advantage. Nevertheless, from the early days of his presidency, Biden has struggled to escape from the cultural and institutional forces embedding executive-centered partisanship in American democracy. Despite claims to the contrary, Biden's early performance in office, especially with respect to the COVID-19 crisis, has reinforced the essential features of presidential partisanship.22 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, “Get Out of the Way: Joe Biden, the U.S. Congress, and Executive-Centered Partisanship during the President's First Year in Office,” The Forum 19, no. 4 (2021): 709–744. Trump's presidency, therefore, has further fused partisanship and executive administration, fanning, rather than dousing, the flames of social discord, all while testing the “resilience” of American democracy.33 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Broadway Books, 2019). Emergencies have routinely engaged the potential power of the American state and served as a rallying cry to unify the nation. Yet the public health and economic crises wrought by COVID-19 revealed how the worst emergency since the Great Depression failed to free American politics and government from the conditions that deeply divided the nation. Therefore, there is a need to distinguish COVID-19 from previous crises in American political development, and to reconsider the ways in which earlier emergency responses have affected the development of the American state. To do so, we place the emergence of COVID-19 as a national crisis within a richer historical context, one that accounts for the secular development of a politicized administrative state and the deterioration of partisan organizations. Likewise, although the COVID-19 pandemic has been unique in many ways, it is a telling case for understanding the underlying factors that influence the partisan imperatives to use public crises and the authority they confer for partisan advantage. Indeed, unlike other crises fabricated for partisan objectives—for example, the “war on drugs” that Richard Nixon declared in 1971—COVID-19 posed and proved a dire threat to public health. Paradoxically, the Trump administration sought to exploit the public health emergency, even as it denied its severity. As a result, COVID-19 deepened a political crisis that for decades had politicized the administrative state, subjecting it to a contest between liberals and conservatives for its services. Our analysis takes a broader understanding of the American state. The idea of a “state” cannot be encompassed by Max Weber's definition of “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”44 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77–128 (originally published 1919). Especially in the United States, with its fragmentation of power, the state should be understood as “negotiated arrangements between the central government and powerful subnational units, patterns of competition and contestation among political parties, and relations among ‘public’ and ‘private’ providers of social welfare.”55 Desmond King and Robert C. Lieberman, “Review: Ironies of State Building: A Comparative Perspective on the American State,” World Politics 61 (July 2009): 547–588, at 549. The American state is not easily characterized as weak or strong—its power derives from a centralizing ambition amid a complex system of institutions that seeks to cultivate or impose a specific type of American community. This American state is a legacy of unintended consequences, historical contingency, and the unique position of the presidency in the constitutional order. In particular, the rise of the modern state, especially in a political culture that presumes to proscribe centralized power, is inextricably connected to American wars and domestic emergencies, which are frequently characterized as the moral equivalent of wars. Unlike some other republican charters, the U.S. Constitution does not have formal provisions that establish prerogative executive power in times of emergency.66 For example, Article 16 of the French Constitution explicitly allows the president to take exceptional measures “where the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat” (see https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008). This provision was an important template of the Fifth Republic, formed in 1958, which transformed a parliamentary into a presidential system. However, crises have created opportunities for presidents to cut through the normal working arrangements of American politics. The central role of the presidency as a vanguard of institutional change has long been understood by scholars; furthermore, territorial expansion, globalization, and the nationalization of American political culture have encouraged the consolidation of an executive-centered state. The imperative to act—especially when confronted with the existential possibility of the state's destruction—leads to creative extensions of existing administrative power and social policy.77 Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizen: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); William J. Barber, Designs within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, “Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s,” Political Science Quarterly 113 (Winter, 1998): 689–702; and Sheldon D. Pollack, War, Revenue, and State Building; Financing the Development of the American State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). Emergencies are not only instrumental in episodic bouts of executive aggrandizement; crises and presidential emergency powers have also entrenched the American state's more permanent features.88 Robert P. Saldin, War, the American State, and Politics since 1898 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Especially during major episodes of bellicosity, the terms of political conflict are redefined, and wartime presidents are central actors in defining these terms. Indeed, David Mayhew has written that wars “seem to be capable of generating whole new political universes.”99 David R. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (September 2005): 473–493, at 473. All-consuming emergencies open up space for presidents to act unilaterally, permitting political outcomes in both foreign and domestic policy that are largely inconceivable absent the nationalizing and centralizing tendencies of national crises.1010 William G. Howell, Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski, The Wartime President: Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of Threat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). As John Lapinski demonstrates, “crises often delegitimize existing government policies that are directly and, in some cases, indirectly linked to the event.”1111 John S. Lapinski, “Policy Substance and Performance in American Lawmaking, 1877–1994,” American Journal of Political Science 52 (April 2008): 235–251, at 238. Although Congress and the courts do not vanish during protracted states of crisis or war, “modern presidents are undoubtedly the preeminent actors.”1212 Douglas L. Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). “Reconstructive presidents,” Stephen Skowronek argues, can bring about new political orders, but they typically do so only when the prevailing regime is in disarray—after the extant regime's internal weaknesses are exposed, often because it cannot contend with governing exigencies.1313 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). Therefore, for liberals and conservatives alike, the grandeur of an energetic executive has been forged during the country's most perilous, unpredictable moments in history. More often than not, war and crisis are understood to be central to the development of foreign policy institutions within the presidency, such as the National Security Council.1414 Bryan Mabee, “Historical Institutionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Origins of the National Security Council Revisited,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (January 2011): 27–44. However, the fact that foreign crises are so central to redefining domestic priorities for presidential administrations suggests that emergency powers cut more deeply into the fabric of the modern political system. Presidential state building is nurtured by large-scale, national crises, but the modern executive, dependent on loyal partisans, is not an institution that works on behalf of the “whole people” or rallies the country to tackle national crises through enduring reforms. Even in the work of administering less politically charged programs, such as disaster funding or decisions to close military bases, the modern presidency is electorally motivated and often acts to serve its core constituency.1515 Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves, The Particularistic President: Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). During emergencies, well-organized and highly motivated factions within a single party can leverage the institution to enact unpopular and divisive schemes.1616 Daniel DiSalvo, Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868–2010 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Moreover, the reliance on unilateral administrative measures to advance party objectives—disingenuously justified in the name of the “national interest”—further enfeebles legislative institutions during moments of crisis.1717 Neomi Rao, “Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress,” New York University Law Review 90 (November 2015): 1463–1526. With the country sharply divided by deep cultural rifts, such presidential unilateralism arouses fundamental struggles over inclusion. For a time, the executive-centered administrative state was sustained by a fragile consensus that obscured partisan conflict over national administrative power. The extraordinary crises of the Great Depression and World War II led to institutional changes and policies that subordinated partisanship to administration, consolidating a New Deal state committed to a “coalition” between partisans of executive power and the proponents of expertise, or “neutral competence.”1818 Herbert Kaufman identifies the “quest for neutral competence” and the “quest for executive leadership” as core commitments in the development of the administrative state. See Kaufman, “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration,” American Political Science Review 50 (December 1956): 1057–1073. Politics was then a search for pragmatic solutions to the challenging responsibilities that America had to assume, at home and abroad, to secure economic and national security. However, public support for the New Deal state fractured in the wake of the cultural and political upheavals of the 1960s.1919 Hugh Heclo, “Sixties Civics,” in Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome Mileur, eds., The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 53–82. The attempt to realize the Great Society exposed the liberal state's central fault lines (notably racial inequalities), and with violent upheaval in Vietnam and in the nation's urban core, the pragmatic center that buttressed the New Deal disintegrated. Once contested by conservative Democrats and Republicans as a threat to constitutional government, national administrative power gained acceptance on the right as liberalism expanded throughout the 1960s. In the wake of the cultural revolution of that decade, Republicans built a conservative base whose foot soldiers, most notably the Christian Right, rallied around the belief that liberalism had so corrupted the country that the national government had a responsibility to aggressively protect “traditional values” and uphold “law and order.”2020 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, What Happened to the Vital Center? Presidentialism, Populist Revolt and the Fracturing of America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), chaps. 4 and 5. As presidents have the of partisan leadership and as partisans their political to the president's personal it has become more to national from the president's In the institutional of the presidency with the of the American emergencies offer even greater opportunity for presidents to they act on behalf of their partisan As a partisanship in the United is a struggle over the of the state. has become an executive-centered struggle for the services of national administrative power. The of executive has been deepened by partisan in which Democrats and Republicans not only on of and policy but also their as existential to the American of J. H. C. David G. J. J. S. and in Science no. of this party conflict it First, since the struggles over and have partisan fundamental about it to be an have been further by the expansion of presidential power, executive to partisan conflict. As party wars have Congress, the legislative have become more dependent on presidents to cut through the and advance through executive action. During the and both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents to their and advance partisan through unilateral Sidney M. Milkis, H. and J. Happened to and the New American Party Perspectives on Politics Indeed, Republican presidents have the development of executive-centered partisanship. to the of social in the Richard Nixon was the first conservative president to the of national emergency with a partisan of American With a rallying cry of and Nixon new in the urban core, and abroad, in the of an presidential administration and a conservative modern Richard P. The Administrative (New York: As of the National at the time, conservatives only the work of the New Deal and Great Society the of a powerful president is to to war within his executive in to his Conservative National in in The New Republic, that the politicization of emergency powers did not at the the unilateralism in foreign had been a since the of the threat of an was to its partisan Andrew The New Presidential University of Press, the one foreign the funding of the in is an of that is in the of the American The President: (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, the other the administration's and use of presidential power a deeply partisan commitment to the and to the Republican Party with a of American power A the War on in an by modern embrace of a state. Not only did legal a of legal support for the constitutional independence under the of the in by Donald Trump's Supreme M. of during the and Law Review the White House also to centralize the Republican to transform the and into on the president's leadership in the War against Sidney M. Milkis and H. the Republican and the American Party Perspectives on Politics (September Democratic presidents have also the that crises in to their partisan dynamics are not dependent on the of the White they are to executive-centered partisanship. was on the of the economic that the country had in a presidency, it would be by the of the country of an economic despite and from partisans, the administration its partisan to health the most divisive and partisan policy with perhaps the of The consequences are Democrats in Congress from an with the legislative of his the and of crisis the president's governing strategy long the worst of the Great had As the president in the to the and Sidney Milkis, Partisan Polarization and the Administrative The Forum no. built the centralizing of his conservative and liberal to advance through executive the of a powerful but of the the and especially The 17 at 16 The of and of the to control the federal bureaucracy, and the of Richard its into the administrative presidential powers over and to management strategy directly to his for example, J. and L. and the Administration,” The Journal of 2011): and R. The of in Press, In political crises often leadership and we the for to around the political upheavals also in the community and should in the current of American presidents are to power for partisan are that presidents the were Donald Trump's of the worst national crisis since the Great Depression should have to the of “a late regime Herbert or in a political repudiation of a conservative political and the rise of a new Richard about Trump's and Biden's The Nation, at 16 The Trump presidency at of the At the Trump's about the spread of the his that the president has to battle the pandemic, Trump responsibility to state and governments, and, when for racial and in the of of for the and sought to the of public and for as the president's public amid the of the and did his months a of these only how the Trump administration failed to the threat that COVID-19 posed to public health and the D. and David Trump's The to Leadership on the New York at 16 and C. and Trump from the Trump the of partisan than attempt to the modern executive as the of the public as many and public had been to during a national crisis of the Trump further fused executive prerogative and partisanship. This was not a of Trump's many was to executive

«М’ЯКА СИЛА» ЯК ХАРАКТЕРНА ОЗНАКА ПОЛІТИЧНОГО ВПЛИВУ ВЕЛИКОЇ ДЕРЖАВИ ЗАУМОВ БАГАТОПОЛЯРНОГО СВІТУ В ЛАТИНОАМЕРИКАНСЬКОМУ РЕГІОНІ

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2022

From today's viewpoint, 2016 may well represent the end of the post‐Cold War era and the general assumptions that are associated with it. These include the beliefs that the United States remains a European power, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of its European NATO allies, that liberal democracy represents the political system widely seen as the only legitimate normative reference point, and that the future of the European Union will be defined by continued integration into an ‘ever closer Union’. These assumptions have been shaken to the core.

In the last decade, the European Union (EU), a bulwark of the liberal international order, has been subject to a high degree of turmoil resulting from various processes and crises and has witnessed the rise of national populism, of which Brexit was the main exponent. The leadership of the order was also impacted by the changes in the foreign policy of the United States of America (USA) effected by the Trump Administration. The USA, the United Kingdom (UK), and the EU are the leaders of the liberal zone of peace and if national populism structurally affects them the liberal international order could be seriously challenged. Among the various instances of national populism, Brexit remains a significant challenge to the EU and might greatly impact the liberal international order. By adopting an interpretivist methodology anchored in hermeneutics and in the methodological approach of emergent causation, this article seeks to understand how Brexit, as an internal challenge to the order, and the rise of China and other revisionist powers, as an external one, might influence the future of the liberal international order and great power competition. I argue that the news of the order’s death is greatly exaggerated, and that depending on British, German, and US variables, Brexit and the rise of China can either challenge or reinforce the liberal international order. Nevertheless, liberalism has a resilience no other political perspective has due to its innate ability for criticism and adaptation to change. Considering that the current liberal international order is a USA-led order, I argue that these are the two main variables concerning how Brexit might influence the liberal international order and how the order’s leading powers will adapt their strategies and foreign policies towards China and other revisionist powers.