The Central Role of Thailand’s Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period

Abstract

INTRODUCTION Thailand's intransigent political crisis and polarization, marked by two military coups d’etat and debilitating mass demonstrations since 2006, has been recognized as the orchestrated work of the anti-democratic alliance of the old powers against the rise of electoral politics. The alliance is conceptualized as “the network monarchy” by Duncan McCargo (2005), the “parallel state” by Paul Chambers (2015), and “the deep state” by Eugenie Merieau (2016). Despite their differences in some aspects, these authors agree that the monarchy is the bedrock of the alliance while the military is its least popular component, especially after the violent crackdown of the popular uprising in May 1992 by the military government led by General Suchinda Khraprayun (7 April – 24 May 1992). The military's legitimacy comes from the claim that it is the major defender of the three pillars of Thailand — Nation, Religion and Monarchy. It lost much of its popularity following the May 1992 crackdown, however, and it had been perceived to have retreated to its barracks (Surachart 1998, p. 17). In other words, only putsches and military governments came to be considered political intervention on its part. Eugenie Merieau (2016) noted the significance of the ideological apparatus of the deep state, her works tended to focus though on the role of the Constitutional Court, the apparent tip of this deep state. A study of the Thai military's civil affairs programmes, however, holds better potential for improving our understanding of the phenomenon. Despite warnings from Suchit Bunbongkarn (1987, p. 53) and Surachart Bamrungsuk (1998, pp. 76–77) about the military's involvement in civil affairs projects at the end of the counter-insurgency period, there has been no serious study on the matter. The Thai military's civil affairs programmes, especially in the post-counter-insurgency period, have drawn little attention from scholars, and studies of the Thai armed forces tend to focus on internal factionalism; conflict between elected civilian governments and military leaders; networks of cliques and classes; and personal ties between military leaders and the palace (Chambers and Napisa 2016; Surachart 1998, 2016; Yoshifumi 2008). At the same time, it is well known that since the toppling of the absolute monarchy in 1932, the Thai military has never restricted itself to an exclusively military role.