The Bourbons in Sicily and the British Protectorate. An Account of Events During an Awkward Coexistence

Military interventions in the political arena and internal affairs of African states without a clearly defined legal framework, roles, and extent of their operations pose a significant threat to democratic governance and constitutionalism in the continent. This study therefore sought to determine the military interests and related factors that make the military intervene in political transitions in Africa. The study adopted Feaver’s Agency Theory as its theoretical framework. The theory emphasises the distinct preferences and the roles of the military and civilian leaders in shaping military interventions. This study utilised a mixed-method research design, entailing both quantitative and qualitative techniques. The study was conducted in eight African countries that have had coups: Sudan, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Mali, Sierra Leone, Gabon and Niger. A sample size of 48 respondents was drawn from the study’s target population (military officers and commanders, members of parliament, representatives from the Attorney General’s office, the general public and scholars in the fields of political science, international relations, and security studies). Purposive sampling was used to identify the countries and the respondents to be included in the study. Primary data for this study was obtained using interviews. The study also relied on secondary data which was obtained from pertinent literature in the field of study, including journals, books, essays, policy papers, government reports, conference proceedings, and other publications. Content analysis was used to analyse qualitative data and identify emerging themes pertaining to military interests in their political involvement, while descriptive statistics was computed for quantitative data. Excel sheet, NVivo, QDAS, and SPSS will be used to aid data analysis in this research. The study utilized graphs and tables to exhibit and evaluate quantitative data. From the study’s findings, military intervention in the political affairs of African nations is primarily necessitated by military corporate interests and a confluence of interlinked factors such as historical precedents, economic downturn, legitimacy crises, poor governance or weak political institutions, and terrorism. Consequently, the study recommends coup-proofing mechanisms that bolster regional security organisations and promote cooperative efforts in addressing security threats, reinforce the principle of civilian control over the military through legal and institutional mechanisms, and strengthen political institutions and governance.

Lord William Bentinck said in 1835 that flogging had diminished 'a hundred, perhaps a thousand fold' since his early years in the army around the turn of the century. The reformers made much of the comparisons they were able to draw, and in 1835 their case seemed to be strengthened further when Lord William Bentinck, as governor general of India, issued an order prohibiting the flogging of troops in the native army. The ‘New Liberal’ interpretation of early nineteenth-century history offered by J. L. and Barbara Hammond around the time of the First World War laid considerable stress on the role of liberal humanitarians and reformers in parliament — men who could ‘break through the prejudices of their class’ and campaigned for such causes as penal reform, popular education and the regulation of child labour.

John Rosselli. Lord William Bentinck: The Making of a Liberal Imperialist, 1774–1839. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1974. Pp. 384. 115.00 and M. E. Chamberlain. Britain and India: The Interaction of Two Peoples. (Library of Politics and Society.) Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books. 1974. Pp. 272. $13.00 Get access Rosselli John. Lord William Bentinck: The Making of a Liberal Imperialist, 1774–1839. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1974. Pp. 384. 115.00. Chamberlain M. E.. Britain and India: The Interaction of Two Peoples. (Library of Politics and Society.) Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books. 1974. Pp. 272. $13.00. Ainslie T. Embree Ainslie T. Embree Columbia University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 80, Issue 5, December 1975, Pages 1334–1335, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/80.5.1334 Published: 01 December 1975

A fu-!1damental shift for preparing the entry into a new, militarily relevant big technology is currently taking place in West Germany. This technology its proponents maintain can be compared in terms of its dimensions, costs, and social consequences with nuclear energy. I am referring to West Germany's plans for manned space flight, which have been outlined by a number of decisions during 1985 and 1986; they will eventually lead to anational space program and thus to a fundamental reorganization of research priorities. While it is still impossible to predict the outcome of these ongoing processes, we have the chance of observing the emergence of a new big technology out of a specific area of social, political, economic, and military interests; we can also observe the actions of those interest-groups, which begin to form a stable pattern of argumentation and legitimation, thus producing, step by step, a self-consolidating social structure with its own interests and its own dynamics. The space lobby, however, doesn't start from zero; a system (in terms of social force and the power to determine research policy) to some extent comparable to the U.S. military-industrial complex has been established during the last thirty years. It possesses an inner coherence and institutional resistance. The development of this complex is one important point this paper will examine. German plans for

Previous articleNext article No AccessLord William Bentinck: The Application of Liberalism to IndiaGeorge D. Bearce, Jr.George D. Bearce, Jr. Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Modern History Volume 28, Number 3Sep., 1956 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/237906 Views: 7Total views on this site Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1956 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:JOSHUA EHRLICH The Crisis of Liberal Reform in India: Public opinion, pyrotechnics, and the Charter Act of 1833, Modern Asian Studies 52, no.0606 (Aug 2018): 2013–2055.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X16000780Douglas M. Peers Between Mars and Mammon; the East India Company and Efforts to Reform its Army, 1796–1832, The Historical Journal 33, no.22 (Feb 2009): 385–401.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X00013388

The French Revolution was one which happened between 1789 and 1799, and which influenced France’s history as well as world history. This revolution first started against the Bourbon dynasty that ruled France. In France, society was chiefly divided into three categories: The First Estate that included the clergy, the Second Estate which comprised the landowners, and the Third Estate which consisted of common people. Of these, while the burden of tax fell completely on the ordinary people of the third estate, the other two categories enjoyed many privileges just like the royal family. The common man had to pay tax to the lords and the clergy. The wars during the reign of Louis XVI had adversely affected the economy of France. Excessive tax burden, poverty, joblessness etc. created discontent in the people. The dawn of an educated middle- class section marked the beginning of the spread of new ideas. The ideas of Voltaire, Rosseau, and Montesquieu led to decentralisation of power, democracy, and the spread of ideas like liberty, equality, and fraternity.

Introduction The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the Middle East. Lying within the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, it borders the Red Sea to the west; Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait to the north; the Persian Gulf, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to the east; and Oman and Yemen to the south. The foundation of Saudi Arabia may be largely credited to two main historical figures who lived in the first half of the eighteenth century. The first figure, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, was a devout Islamic scholar and religious activist who fervently condemned the increasing tendencies of local peoples toward idolatrous practices. He preached the need for a return to stricter adherence to the original principles of Islam, based on devotion to the doctrine of the ‘absolute unity of God’ as passed through, and enunciated by, the witness of God’s word, Prophet Muhammad (Rentz). In present-day Saudi Arabia, reverence to Prophet Muhammad’s divine revelations and divinely appointed role, as accentuated by al-Wahhab, remains inscribed on the national flag (fig. 1), which states: “there is no god but Allah; Muhammad is the messenger of God”. Figure 1: The flag of Saudi Arabia Although initially met with opposition, al-Wahhab’s eventual encounter in 1744 with the ruler of the Najd town of Diriyah, Muhammad ibn Saud, led to “the drastic change in the course of Arabian history” (Rentz 16), after both men pledged an oath and alliance in pursuit of a successful religious, political, and military expansion campaign that saw Diriyah become the first Saudi state and original home to the Al-Saud dynasty (MoFA). It was not until 1932, however, that the nation-state of Saudi Arabia was officially formed, establishing Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud (often known as Ibn Saud) as the first officially recognised ruling monarch and patriarch of the modern House of Saud. In only a few short decades since the date of unification, the once poor desert landscape comprised of rivalling nomadic tribes has undergone astonishing transformations, making the present-day unified Kingdom a key strategic regional and international actor within world politics, and a major economical, technological, and military power and rival. In addition to being a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for example, Saudi Arabia is also an active and founding member of international organisations such as the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (OAS). Notably, Saudi Arabia’s influence and eminence in the international arena specifically pertains to its leading role within OPEC, given that Saudi Arabia’s command economy is largely petroleum-based. Here, Saudi Arabia is the “largest generator of net oil export revenue” for OPEC, and the “largest OPEC crude oil exporter” (Statista); in 2022, Saudi Arabia’s oil export revenues totalled US$311 billion (Statista). Unsurprisingly, the House of Saud is the wealthiest royal family in the world, worth an estimated US$1.4 trillion (Hieu), a figure four times the combined wealth of billionaires Elon Musk (worth an estimated US$236.1 billion) and Bill Gates (worth an estimated US$119.7 billion). The combined wealth of the House of Saud also significantly surpasses the worth of the renowned British royal family, whose combined wealth pales in comparison at an estimated US$28 billion (Hieu; Srinivasan). Arguably, the net worth of the House of Saud not only financially ranks them among the top tier of elites, but also makes them one of the most powerful royal families in the world (Hieu). Presently, the nation remains an absolute monarchy under a Sharia legal system, in accordance with Islamic law as principally derived from the Quran (holy book) and Sunnah (the saying, traditions, and practices of Prophet Muhammad). Absolute monarchism denotes that no political parties or national elections are permitted, and that the reigning monarch executes predominant control over legislative and internal civil affairs. Comparatively, a constitutional monarchy such as that of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland denotes that the powers held by the reigning monarch in their position as head of state are more symbolic and ceremonial. As such, the House of Windsor often rely significantly on consumerist culture as a means for maintaining their monarchical legitimacy, and relevance and ‘celebrity’, particularly within its Commonwealth settler nations (Randell-Moon). The rule of the House of Saud has often been controversially labelled by critics as totalitarian (Bandow), particularly for the limited freedoms of expression and association afforded to its citizens, where “controversy is discouraged, and conformity is encouraged” (Faksh & Hendrickson 1171); as Faksh and Hendrickson (1171) surmise, “the system offers little scope for the expression of competing views, much less for acting on them”. Nonetheless, the prevailing system of government in Saudi Arabia, currently under the patronage of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, led to the creation of one of the most uniquely curated sovereign powers, whose rise and affluence is, in part, largely testament to the loyalty of its citizenry to its monarchy. The Saudi government provides its citizens with a range of benefits, including exemption from personal income tax, free education (including tertiary) and healthcare, as well as government-subsidised handouts. In 2018, for example, King Salman ordered the government to pay around 1.18 million Saudis working in the public sector 1,000 Saudi Riyals (SAR) (approximately US$266) per month to “offset increasing costs of living” (Perper); for Alawwad (cited in Perper), “the allocation of 50 billion Riyals (approximately US$13 billion) for this decree indicates the leadership’s concern for the people’s comfort and quality of living. The modern-day rule of Saudi royalty may be seen as reminiscent of the foundational traditions and customs on which the nation was formed, “much like a sheikh of a tribe who is in close touch with the concerns of his tribesmen and keeps those concerns in balance” (Faksh & Hendrickson 1171). The Saudi monarchy that has thus emerged may be seen to radically differ from Western concepts of the institution: “no Sun King, no pomp elevating the monarch far above the common breed, not even a crown or a throne” (Rentz 15). This article discusses the growth of the House of Saud – from nomadic warriors principally guided by the foundations of Islam to entrepreneurs determined to bridge the gap in the Kingdom between tradition and modernity, conservatism and social liberalism, nationalism and internationalism. The Founding Monarchs, Black Gold, and Foreign Relations Prior to the official unification of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the House of Saud considered the UK a close ally, particularly with regard to British support received in relation to the defeat of the Ottoman conquest in the Arabia Peninsula (Nonneman). During World War I, for example, Ibn Saud (then ruler of Najd and al-Ahsa, and later founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) signed the 1915 Treaty of Darin (or ‘Anglo-Saudi’ Treaty) with the British government, granting the regions under Ibn Saud’s rule the status of a British protectorate (Wilkinson; Dahlan). In the years that followed the signing of the treaty, Britain also granted Ibn Saud “a loan of [₤]20,000 and a shipment of arms”, as well as a monthly stipend of ₤5,000 from 1917 to 1924 (Nonneman 640). This stipend was granted as a token for the “consolidation of the new Saudi polity, through military means and acts of patronage and generosity towards both [Ibn Saud’s] supporters and many of his vanquished foes” (Nonneman 640). In 1927, the Treaty of Darin was supplanted by the Treaty of Jeddah, which affirmed the British government’s recognition of absolute independence of Ibn Saud’s rulership as King of Najd and Hejaz and its dependencies – the ‘dual Kingdom’ later unified and renamed to Saudi Arabia (Nonneman). Undoubtedly, the discovery of ‘black gold’ in Saudi Arabia had, and continues to have, significant influence on the nation’s identify formation, the extent of its socioeconomic growth, and the Saudi monarchy’s political prowess. Given the strength of the alliance between the state under Ibn Saud and the UK in the early twentieth century, Ibn Saud awarded a UK-based company its first petroleum concession in 1923; after four years, however, the company was unable to strike any oil and the contract was not renewed. A second sixty-year concession that was awarded to the US-based Standard Oil Company of California (now known as the Arabian American Oil Company, or ARAMCO) in 1933 would, however, not only mark a significant turning-point for the Saudi economy, but also for Saudi foreign relations thereafter (Al-Farsy). According to Al-Farsy (45), Ibn Saud’s “concession to the American firm at that time represented a major break with what was virtually a British monopoly of petroleum concession in that part of the world”. Notably, the House of Saud also received ‘advantageous’ offers from both Japan and Germany for oil ‘diplomacy’ in the late 1930s (Al-Farsy). Ibn Saud believed, however, that the Axis Powers were instead “motivated by political considerations” (Al-Farsy 47) and were “aware of the strategic value of the Middle East, situated as it was on the lines of communication with her new European partners” (Katakura 263). As such, Ibn Saud “preferred to continue his association with the Americans” as it had “the advantage of assuring the economic development of the country without incurring political liabilities” (Al-Farsy 47). World War II, thus, markedly represented a unique epoch for the House of Saud, characterised by an expansion of diplomatic missions beyond Europe to America (Beling). From Warrior to Diplomat Ibn Saud was considered a warrior of “towering a

On 5 February 1835, Thomas Babington Macaulay prepared a memorandum or ‘minute’ for the governor general of India, Lord William Bentinck, in which he interpreted aspects of 53 Geo. III c. 155 (1813), known as the East India Act or Charter Act. That Act was one of the series of statutes that at twenty-year intervals revised and renewed the charter of the East India Company, which administered British interests in India. Macaulay advised Bentinck that it would be within the meaning of the statute to stop subsidizing advanced instruction and scholarship in Arabic and Sanskrit and to subsidize advanced instruction in English literature instead. This chapter develops one ground for construing the statute so as to uphold the ‘Orientalist’ position (as it was called) favouring Arabic and Sanskrit, against the ‘Anglicist’ position that Macaulay advocated. That ground is the legislative history of the relevant sections of the East India Act, a history that has been slighted since the nineteenth century.

From about the year 1823 the education of the people had been a matter of increasing concern to those responsible for the administration of the East India Company's territories in India. The authorities both in London and in India began to recognize that it was closely connected with the carrying out of the plans and policies of the Government. In London it was beginning to be realized that efficient government was altogether beyond the capacity of the East India Company unless Indians were employed on a scale greater than hitherto had been considered expedient. In India the increased importance attached to education led, in 1823, to the creation of the Committee of Public Instruction, and during the next few years there developed within the Committee a group which sought primarily to increase facilities in India for education along Western lines through the medium of the English language.

For many years the official folk-lore of British India has included a story that Lord William Bentinck once contemplated the demolition of the Taj Mahal in order to sell its marble. The point of the story has varied with the mental climate of the time: at first it was an illustration of Bentinck's supposed meanness; the arch “clipper” would even lay hands on the Taj in order to make money. Later it became evidence of the supposed vandalism of the British in early nineteenth-century India; even Bentinck, the otherwise praiseworthy economical reformer, saw nothing in the Taj worthy of preservation. For many years, after the circumstances of its origin and its early expressions had been forgotten, the story lived on in the realm of verbal folk-lore, but more recently it has been revived in print and its truth largely taken for granted. The story, if true, would be a serious reflection on Bentinck according to the standards of any civilized age, and it is therefore worth asking with some particularity upon what basis of fact it rests.

Alexander Sergeevich Griboedov's letter of December 24, 1828 O.S. (January 5, 1829 N.S.) to his wife Nina has hitherto been considered his last extant piece of correspondence. The Manuscript Division of the University of Nottingham Library, however, has in its archives a copy of an unpublished Griboedov letter which now replaces the letter to Nina as his last surviving letter. It belongs to the final weeks of Griboedov's life, early February 1829. I found the letter among that portion of the Portland Papers which comprises the correspondence of Lord William Bentinck, governor general of India from 1828 to 1835. It was lying in a packet containing three other documents: a letter from Lieutenant Colonel John Macdonald, British envoy to Persia, to Sir John Malcolm, his brother-in-law and governor of Bombay; a letter from Sir John Malcolm to Lord William Bentinck; and an “Extract of Private Letter from Lt. Col. Macdonald to Sir John Malcolm.”

MR. O'MALLEY quotes a remark by Lord William Bentinck, when the prohibition of suttee was under consideration, that the question was not what the rite was, but what it was thought to be. His own account of Indian caste customs is quite in this spirit. His object is to show how the caste system works in the everyday life of India, without entering into any inquiry as to origins, or the origin of specific castes and groups except in so far as present conditions are thereby affected. He writes for those whose knowledge of caste is at best superficial, and shows how it works in the spheres of social position and intercourse, marriage and morals, internal regulation and external control, food and drink, and occupations.

Lord William Bentinck's minutes Get access D. C. Boulger D. C. Boulger Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Notes and Queries, Volume s7-XI, Issue 273, 21 March 1891, Page 232, https://doi.org/10.1093/nq/s7-XI.273.232c Published: 21 March 1891

In January 1835, the General Committee of Public Instruction, the semiofficial body responsible for administering the Government of India's education funds, reported deep internal division over matters of principle. One group within the Committee, the orientalists, wanted to continue the existing policy of supporting traditional Indian learning, with the prospect of gradually engrafting European subject-matter upon it. Their opponents, the Anglicists, urged the substitution of Western for Eastern studies (with some safeguards for the latter) and the use of English as the principal language of instruction. Because the dispute was hampering all but the most routine activity, the Committee requested the government to settle the question.

Lord William Bentinck in Sicily, 1811–12 H. M. LACKLAND H. M. LACKLAND Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The English Historical Review, Volume XLII, Issue CLXVII, July 1927, Pages 371–396, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/XLII.CLXVII.371 Published: 01 July 1927