The Betrayal of Pragmatism?: Rorty's Quarrel with James

Abstract

For the past several decades, Richard Rorty has sought to reinvigorate pragmatism as a viable alternative to analytic philosophy and various postmodernisms. His project insists on the contemporary relevance of his pragmatist predecessors. In Consequences of Pragmatism, for example, he boldly observes that "James and Dewey were not only waiting at the end of the dialectical road which analytic philosophy traveled, but are waiting at the end of the road which . . . Foucault and Deleuze are currently traveling." He argues that while "James and Nietzsche make parallel criticisms of nineteenth century thought," James's perspective is preferable, since it avoids the "metaphysical" entanglements that have hampered Heidegger and Derrida. 1 Aside from such eulogizing, however, for many years William James did not receive any detailed consideration from Rorty. Thus, it is remarkable to encounter an extended critique of James's pragmatism in Rorty's recent essay, "Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility and Romance." Here Rorty focuses on James's approach to metaphysics, the very aspect of James's thinking that he had previously praised. The essay culminates in a stinging accusation that James, in "The Will to Believe," had "betrayed his own pragmatism." 2