The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta by Earl J. Hess

Abstract

Reviewed by: The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta by Earl J. Hess Paul Brueske The Battle of Peach Tree Creek: Hood’s First Effort to Save Atlanta. By Earl J. Hess. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017. 344 pp. $37.50. ISBN 978-1-4696-3419-7. The Battle of Peach Tree Creek was the pivotal action of the Atlanta Campaign during the latter stages of the Civil War. Earl J. Hess, a talented storyteller and the author of numerous books on the Civil War, including the fascinating biography Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man of the Confederacy (Chapel Hill, 2016), will delight military history buffs with his latest effort. It provides insight on the drama created by the controversial decision of Confederate President Jefferson Davis to replace General Joseph E. Johnston with General John B. Hood and the dire consequences that decision had on the Battle of Peach Tree Creek. He does a fantastic job of narrating the battle, masterfully detailing the tactical movements of both armies, identifying the costly errors made, and incorporating the experiences of the individual soldiers. The dust jacket includes a blurb touting the book as a “new and definitive interpretation of the battle’s place within the Atlanta Campaign,” and Hess does not disappoint. In the summer of 1864 Union General William T. Sherman’s campaign for Atlanta was slowly but surely gaining ground against General Johnston’s conservative defense. Johnston’s strategy was based on his belief of preserving “the main field armies and holding out until the North exhausted itself in money and spirit” (28). Frustrated with what he perceived as Johnston’s timid leadership, Davis sent his military advisor, the former commander of the Army of Tennessee, Braxton Bragg, to assess the situation and gauge Johnston’s willingness to fight. Bragg was not forthright with Johnston on his mission, opting to “observe Johnston to see if there were any signs of fight in the general” (14). The visit motivated Johnston’s subordinate Hood to write Bragg a letter openly criticizing the commanding general’s strategy. Hess suggests this letter may have convinced Bragg that Hood should replace Johnston as the army’s leader, but also criticizes the letter as “duplicitous and irresponsible” and notes that Johnston was not “as supine” as Hood claimed. Hess observes that both Davis [End Page 174] and Bragg were awed by Hood’s accomplishments as a soldier and viewed him as “a breath of fresh air” that was sorely needed at the top of the Confederacy’s largest army in the Western Theater (14). Hess contends that President Davis’s decision to place Hood in command was poorly timed and ill-advised. He notes that Davis himself realized the importance of the move and the Confederate president even admitted he had hesitated too long. Davis, however, also believed Johnston’s strategy was too timid and believed it would be disastrous to continue a conservative defense of Atlanta. Through numerous primary source accounts, the author shows that the stunned Army of Tennessee was demoralized by Davis’s decision and that it had dire consequences for the impending Battle of Peach Tree Creek. “The men are bitterly opposed to the change and Swear that they will not fight under Hood,” wrote one southern soldier (17). Despite the letter Hood wrote to Bragg, Hess points out that Hood did not desire to take command of the Army of Tennessee and “was genuinely surprised at the appointment and tried to persuade Davis to change his mind”(15). The widespread disappointment of Johnston’s removal among the rank-and-file of the Army of Tennessee was not the only issue plaguing the newly-appointed commander. Hood was ill-equipped for such an important assignment. In addition to missing a leg and an arm, Hood––who had spent most of the war fighting in the Eastern Theater––had little time to open up proper lines of communication with his corps commanders and was deprived of vital intelligence as to the location of Sherman’s units. Hood lamented after the war “that it is difficult to imagine a commander placed at the head...